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PREFACE
In the years between I89O and 1930 congressmen and 
senators representing various interests groups had fought 
bitter battles over the McKinley, Wilson-Gorman, Payne- 
Aldrich, Simmons-Underwood, Fordney-McCumber, and the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff bills. The years immediately after 
the passage of the Smoot-Hawley act witnessed a continuing 
concern by many people over the tariff; however, the Great 
Depression with its unemployment, business failures, low 
farm prices and bank closings forced the issue into the 
background. Yet, despite the overriding importance of 
such domestic problems, the tariff question did receive 
serious consideration. Those who related the depression 
to previous tariff policies called for a different approach 
to tariff policy which, they believed, would stimulate in­
ternational trade and help to restore prosperity both at 
home and abroad. Their idea was to inaugurate a broad pro­
gram of reciprocal trade agreements.
During the initial days of his administration. Pres­
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt turned his back on the inter­
national depression in order to concentrate on restoring 
America's prosperity. However, as time passed he became
iv
convinced tbat complete recovery by the United States was 
unlikely in the face of prolonged world-wide depression.
As the year 1934 unfolded, the President decided to seek 
a "middle way" between extreme economic nationalism on one 
hand and internationalism on the other.
The current conduct of international trade threat­
ened to obstruct any solution to the world economic crisis. 
Since the late 1920's world trade and, even more so, United 
States trade had experienced a serious drop. The adoption 
of nationalistic economic policies by a number of nations 
played a significant role in this collapse. Ever-increasing 
tariff walls, import quotas, monetary controls, sanitary 
restrictions, and myriad other practices impeded the flow 
of world trade. During the period 1929 to 1933 world 
exports decreased 64,6 percent while those of the United 
States fell 75-2 percent. The American export industries, 
including agriculture, quickly felt the effects of disap­
pearing world markets. Consequently, the Roosevelt admin­
istration sought to enhance the revival of international 
trade in order to stimulate recovery of the American export 
industries in particular and the entire economy in general.
With this thought in mind, in March 1934, President 
Roosevelt proposed a major change in United States tariff 
policy--a change designed to attack the economic national­
ism which he believed was currently stifling the flow of 
international commerce. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act sought to lower trade barriers by giving the President 
authority to conclude trade treaties with other nations 
without congressional approval. Roosevelt's proposal 
sparked a great deal of interest in the six upper mid- 
western agricultural states of North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa and Kansas. By 193^ many farm 
spokesmen in the Upper Midwest had become convinced that 
the previous tariff policies had done little to further 
the interests of agriculture. The trade agreements pro­
gram seemed to offer a method to reopen foreign markets 
which they considered essential to agricultural prosperity.
While many farmers and their spokesmen in the Upper 
Midwest initially saw great potential in the reciprocity 
program, not all midwesterners shared their enthusiasm.
By 1938 the New Deal tari ff program had become, as the 
American Farm Bureau Federation Official News Letter said, 
"one of the most controversial issues ever debated by 
farmers." The economic and political discussion prompted 
by the Roosevelt tariff policy assumed a nationalist versus 
internationalist character as people in the six states of 
the Upper Midwest, as well as elsewhere, debated the pro­
gram's objectives and accomplishments. Those of an inter­
nationalist persuasion maintained that the United States 
must seek to lower tariff barriers in order to reopen for­
eign markets to American farm surpluses. The nationalists, 
on the other hand, contended that the days of prosperous
vi
foreign markets were gone and they demanded that the 
Roosevelt administration pursue a nationalistic tariff 
policy which would guarantee the entire American market 
to United States producers.
An examination of midwestern editorial comment in 
newspapers and farm journals, correspondence and public 
statements of congressmen and the activities of the major 
farm organizations which had a large midwestern constitu­
ency reveals the hopes, fears and convictions of the mid- 
western farmer and his representatives as they evaluated 
the performance of the reciprocal trade agreements pro­
gram. While regional in the sense that it deals with only 
a six-state area, this study discloses the feelings, atti­
tudes and actions of midwestern agriculture in general, 
and its response to one important segment of the New Deal.
The author would like to express appreciation to
the many individuals and staffs who offered assistance 
during the research travel which covered l6 ,000 miles and 
many libraries and historical societies. A special word 
of thanks to Mr. Robert Richmond and his staff at the 
Kansas State Historical Society and the staffs of the 
Library of Congress, the National Archives and the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
The author wishes to acknowledge the guidance and
assistance of Dr. Gilbert C, Fite who in addition to di­
recting this study has been a continual source of
vii
encouragement and inspiration during the writer's grad­
uate studies at the University of Oklahoma. A special 
word of gratitude to my dear wife Jean who has endured 
four and one-half years of graduate school while at the 
same time working and encouraging the author's efforts.
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ECONOMIC NATIONALISM OR INTERNATIONALISM:
UPPER MIDWESTERN RESPONSE TO NEW DEAL 
TARIFF POLICY, 1934-1940
CHAPTER I
MIDWESTERN AGRICULTURE AND THE TARIFF
The announcement of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
program in March 1934 opened a new chapter in the growing 
dialogue on the state of international trade and the rela­
tionship of United States tariff policy to that trade. The 
Midwest with its heavy reliance on agriculture had been 
vitally interested in tariff policy ever since the Civil 
War, but the relation of the tariff to overall agricultural 
prosperity had come in for closer scrutiny after the post- 
World War I recession. During the 1920's and early 1930's, 
the emphasis of tariff discussions experienced several 
changes, but it never diminished as agriculture failed to 
achieve full prosperity. With the beginning of the New 
Deal and the subsequent reciprocity proposal, the discourse 
became more vocal and controversial.
During the 1920's there was very little criticism of 
the extreme protectionism afforded by the Fordney-McCumber
1
2Act of 1922 in the increasing discussion of the tariff. 
Rather, the main emphasis was on how to include agriculture 
effectively within the framework of protection. According 
to James Conner, the major farm organizations were united 
in the belief that farmers stood to benefit immensely if 
agriculture could attain the same benefits from high tar­
iffs as industry.^ In fact, some suggested that if agri­
cultural tariff rates were boosted to the level of the 
manufacturing interests, the farmer could get back on the 
road to recovery- Only in isolated instances did the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, the Farmers Union or the 
Grange raise the question that perhaps all tariffs were 
too high.
In addition to the battle to attain higher agri­
cultural tariff rates, farm representatives supported 
another attempt to further the interests of agriculture 
within the protectionist framework. The McNary-Haugen 
bills sought to make the tariff effective for agricultural 
products by establishing a government corporation to re­
move farm surpluses from the domestic market so that prices 
could rise behind a tariff wall. The movement failed to 
recognize the fact that nationalistic, protectionist poli­
cies of the United States and other nations were contrib­
uting substantially to the agricultural depression by
James R. Conner, "National Farm Organizations and 
United States Tariff Policy in the 1920's," Agricultural 
History, XXXII (January, 1958), 52-43.
3closing off their markets to foreign producers, and that 
dumping surpluses on world markets would bring economic 
retaliation and trade restrictions. The defeat of McNary- 
Haugenism in 1928, however, did not signal the end to the 
midwestern interest in tariff policy.
In contrast to the earlier period, a considerable 
number of midwesterners began to question the value of 
protectionism after 1930- The growing division in the 
Upper Midwest over the tariff issue was indicated by the 
changing midwestern vote on the major tariff bills between 
1922 and 1930. Over the eight-year period midwestern con­
gressional delegations steadily reduced their support for 
high tariffs. In 1922, 46 of 49 congressmen representing 
the upper plains states voted in favor of the Fordney-
McCumber Tariff and the protectionist philosophy it em- 
2
bodied. Eight years later xweiiLy-three congressmen, or
nearly half of the representatives from that area, opposed
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff bill. Significantly, seventeen of
3
those opposing the tariff act were Republicans.
2
The congressional delegation in the six Upper Mid­
west states in 1922 included fifty Republicans and one 
Democrat. Two men did not vote. U.S. Congressional Record, 
67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 21, 1921, pi 4l9 7, and 2d Sess. , 
August 19, 1922, p. 11627.
3
In 1930 the congressional delegation numbered 
fifty-three. Seventeen Republicans, four Democrats and two 
Farmer-Labor voted against the tariff bill, while thirty 
Republicans voted for it. Ibid., 71st Cong., 1st Sess.,
May 28, 1929, p. 2106, and 2d Sess., March 24, 1930, 
p. 6015.
4After 1930 midwestern congressmen on several occa­
sions debated the issue on the floor of Congress. Even 
though they represented similar constituencies in western 
Kansas, Republican Clifford Hope and Democrat Randolph 
Carpenter offered contrasting opinions on the tariff issue. 
Hope remarked that he was not "one of those who believe 
that our past tariff policy has been responsible for the 
world decline in foreign trade." Rather, he attributed 
the world trade decline to the lower level of prices, 
quota systems, permits, licenses, exchanges controls and 
"other export schemes for stopping up the channels of
Ij.
trade." Senator L. J. Dickinson of Iowa agreed with Hope 
and noted that he and others "had been fighting for a good 
number of years here to try to get agricultural products 
under the protective tarzff system. . . ." He believed
that liberalization of the tariff would wash out all the 
"gains" made by agriculture under the protective system.^
Representative Carpenter argued, on the other hand, 
that the high tariff policy was "the root of all evil in 
this country from an economic standpoint." After acknowl­
edging that the tariff was a key issue in his district, he 
outlined several evils of the present tariff system. The 
high protective tariff undoubtedly was responsible for the
^Ibid., 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., March 28, 193^,
p. 5633.
^Tbid., May 31, 1934, p. 10104.
5disappearing world market, he said. Even more important, 
Carpenter pointed out that the present tariff wall had 
caused American industries to relocate in foreign coun­
tries in order to get around retaliatory tariffs erected 
by those countries in response to American legislation.
Then these industries competed with industries in the 
United States.^ Nebraska Representative Ashton Schallen- 
berger declared that agriculture had made no gains at all 
under the protective shield of the Smoot-Hawley and pre­
vious high tariffs. In fact, such tariffs had resulted 
in "destruction of world trade, idled factories, abandoned 
farms, unemployment for millions of men, and tremendous
7
losses to the national income."
Anti-protectionists in the Midwest related the dis­
appearing world agricultural markets to the nationalistic, 
protectionist world atmosphere fostered by the Fordney- 
McCumber and Smoot-Hawley tariffs. They offered consider­
able documentation to support this contention. During the 
decade prior to the Great Depression, American farm exports 
had averaged over Si.8 billion dollars a year. By 1933
Q
this export trade had dropped off 62.5 percent. In the
^Ibid., March 28, 1934, p. 5658.
7Ibid., March 24, 1934, p. 5333.
^The dollar value and percentages were figured from 
statistics presented in U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Agriculture's Interest in America's World Trade (Washing- 
ton, 1935 ) , p"^ 7 •
6Midwest wheat growers in particular felt the effects of an
increasingly restrictive world market. From 1920 to 1924
the United States exported an average of 31-5 percent of
its total wheat crop, while in 1933 only 7 percent left 
9
the country- Exports of hog products, another important 
midwestern commodity, also experienced a serious drop. 
During the period 1920 to 1924, the United States exported 
an average of 17-5 percent of its total pork products. In 
1933 less than 1 percent was exported.
In light of the disappearing world market and the 
continuing agricultural depression, anti-protectionists 
gained increasing support. More and more midwesterners 
charged that the farmer had been "taken" on the tariff 
issue. The Des Moines Register informed its readers that 
the high-tariff crowd had worked long and hard to mold the 
"illusion" that high tariffs "were created and maintained 
primarily for the benefit of farmers." The Register hap­
pily reported that "Illusion No. 1" had been blasted down 
in recent days.^^ Clifford Gregory, editor of the Prairie 
F armer, told a gathering of farm leaders that "in the 
Middle West we were suckers for a long time. In fact, I 
was twenty-one years old before I learned that the pro­
tective tariff was not one of the Ten Commandments."
9
Ibid., pp. iv, V . 
l°Ibid.
^^Des Moines Register, March 13, 1934.
7Reflecting a new understanding of the tariff, he added
that the farmer must seek to "have the tariff so adjusted
that it will contribute to the enlargement of the foreign
markets for our products, rather than standing as a barrier
12in the way of those markets."
While more and more farm spokesmen in the Midwest 
agreed that they had not profited from the previous tariff 
policies, no consensus evolved as to the evils of the past 
or recommendations for the future. Writing in 1931>
Wallac e ' s F armer echoed the opinion of many when its edi­
tor suggested that the present tariff committed two major 
"injustices." First, rates on industrial products were 
about twice as high as those of agricultural commodities. 
Secondly, the entire rate structure was "so high that
foreign nations that owe us money can't pay us in goods
1 3and can't trade goods for our unwanted surplus."
Numerous other midwesterners echoed the criticism 
that high tariff rates discriminated in favor of the manu­
facturing interests. The editor of the South Dakota Union 
F armer complained that "the industrial tariff rates have
l4made the wall a skyscraper." H. G. Keeney of the Nebraska 
Farmers Union agreed that the high tariff wall was costing
12American Farm Bureau Federation, Minutes of the 
Annual Meeting, December 10-12, 1934 (Nashville, Tenues -
^ee), pp. 34-35•
1 1
Wallace's Farmer, LVI (September 5, 1931), 4.
l4Nebraska Union Farmer, XVII (August 27, 1930), 2.
8America its export trade and pointed to another evil in­
herent in the tariff rate structure. The high tariff 
wall enabled "manufacturers to boost the prices that 
farmers must pay for supplies far out of proportion to 
any increase in income derived by farmers from duties on 
farm products. . . .
Farm editors and leaders were not the only mid- 
westerners who had become vitally interested in the tar­
iff question by the early 1930's. From his farm in 
Danbury, Iowa, Ray Mathews attacked the high tariff sys­
tem in a most graphic way. He informed Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry Wallace that there "had been a farm 
problem ever since the first tariff law was enacted."
In Mathew's mind, the cause for the continuing agricul­
tural depression stuck out like "a carbuncle on the end 
of a man's nose" and the remedy was "as plain to be seen 
as the noonday sun in a cloudless sky." The cause was 
the obstruction of trade by high tariff w a l l s . A n o t h e r  
midwestern farmer also pointed an accusing finger at high 
tariffs and offered the Secretary of Agriculture a quota
17system plan to aid xn reduction of excessive tariff rates.
^^Ibid., XVII (June 25, 1930), 4.
^^Ray Mathews to Henry Wallace, February 2?, 1934, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group l6 , 
Records of the Secretary of Agriculture. Cited hereafter 
as N A , RG l6 .
X 7Carl Axelson to Henry Wallace, November 4, 1934,
N A , RG l6 .
9Convention platforms and resolutions reveal that 
the tariff was a prominent issue within many state and 
regional farm organizations in the Midwest. Most agreed 
that agriculture had not been adequately served by past 
policy. However, a number of these organizations believed 
that the protectionist philosophy would probably continue 
and thus agriculture must strive to protect and further 
its interests within that framework. The Iowa Farm Bureau 
in 1932 resolved that "as long as the American protective 
system is maintained, we favor such tariff rates as will 
insure the American market to the American farm, and fur­
ther insist that tariff schedules must be immediately
revised to a basis of equalization between agriculture
18and all other industries." The Nebraska Farmers Union 
"condemned the Smoot-Hawley tariff act as not giving 
equality to agriculture," and demanded "that all indus­
trial schedules be reduced to the schedules of the Fordney- 
McCumber act."^^
The National Farmers Union echoed the demand that 
agriculture "be placed on an equality with industry in the 
matter of tariffs." According to the National Farmers 
Union, the interest of agriculture should be furthered by
18Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Resolutions of the 
Annual Meeting, January 1932 (Des Moines).
19Nebraska Farmers Union, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, November 1931 (Omaha).
10
the government immediately placing "an embargo against 
foreign importation of agricultural products which this
20country produces more than enough for home consumption."
Even though more and more midwesterners were ques­
tioning the propriety of continued high tariffs, consider­
able sentiment still existed for protectionism. The editor 
of the Nebraska F armer, after citing the low average price 
of foreign agricultural products, suggested that "the tar­
iff on agricultural commodities is a real bulwark to the 
American farmer." Without it, he said, these lower priced 
foreign products would, in many instances, offer serious 
competition to American domestic growers. A higher tariff
or even an embargo might be necessary to prevent some farm
21products coming in over the tariff wall."
The dairy industry in particular voiced the belief
that agriculture had not been well served by past tariff
laws. The Dairy Record was suspicious of any proposal to
lower the tariff. If tariff reductions were necessary or
possible, the editor argued, it was time that these reduc-
22tions came from some industry other than agriculture.
The Land O'Lakes creamery chain supported The Dairy Record's 
position and resolved "to unanimously and emphatically go
20National Farmers Union, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, November 20-22, 1933 (Omaha, Nebraska).
^^Nebraska Farmer, LXXIII (March l4, 1931), 8 .
P P
The Dairy Record, XXXV (June 13, 1934), 10.
11
on record as demanding a revision upward rather than down-
2 3ward in agricultural tariffs."
The reference to an "American standard of living"
revealed the divergence of opinion in the Midwest over
the correct tariff policy. The Dakota F armer questioned
the propriety of lowering the tariff wall in view of the
"great difference in wages here and abroad." "How can we
maintain the 'American standard of living' in such condi-
24
tions?" asked the editor. On the other hand, the
Nebraska Union Farmer dismissed any apparent threat to 
the American standard of living. The editor of this jour­
nal labeled such arguments "utter fallacy." "The standard 
of living in a country is determined by internal condi­
tions, not by the standards of the peoples with whom it 
trades .
Thus, a general examination of midwestern sentiment 
during the 1920's and early 1930's reveals that the tariff 
was indeed a live issue among farmers and their represent­
atives. Both protectionists and low tariffs supporters had 
adherents in the Midwest. However, most midwesterners 
fully believed that their interests had not been properly 
served by the tariff laws then on the statute books. They
2 3Resolutions of the Annual Convention of Land 
O'Lakes Creameries, Land O'Lakes News, XIV (March, 1934), 
24 .
p u
The Dakota Farmer, LTV (August l8 , 1934), 360. 
^^Nebraska Union Farmer, XXI (July 11, 1934), 4.
12
were looking for a change of policy, but there was no 
agreement on just what the change should be. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in his proposal for a reciprocal trade agree­
ments program offered a new alternative which had received 
very little consideration in the Midwest between 1929 and 
1932. Would this program open foreign markets as promised 
and in general profit agriculture? Or, would the "eastern 
manufacturing interests" again be the main beneficiary of 
the tariff system while agriculture languished? These 
were the questions which faced midwestern farm interests 
in 1932.
CHAPTER II
RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM ENACTED
Although the Democrats had vacillated on tariff 
policy in the campaign of 1928, four years later they 
came out four-square for reducing trade barriers. The 
Democratic platform of 1932 criticized the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff for creating international economic hostility, 
destroying international trade, and robbing the American 
farmer of his foreign markets, and called for a new and 
better day in tariff policy- The Democrats called for 
restoration of international trade through "reciprocal 
tariff agreements with other nations."""
During the campaign Franklin D. Roosevelt hammered 
hard at high tariffs and demanded reduction of what he 
called the "outrageously excessive rates" of the Smoot- 
Hawley law. At the same time, in several speeches deliv­
ered in the Midwest, he sought to assure farmers that 
agricultural interests would be protected. In an apparent 
contradiction to his earlier statements, Roosevelt sug­
gested that it would be "absurd to talk of lowering tariff
^New York Times, June 30, 1932, p. 15
13
14
duties on farm products." He went on to promise "to 
endeavor to restore the purchasing power of the farm dol­
lar by making the tariff effective for agriculture, and 
raising the price of farmers' products. I know of no
effective excessively high tariff duties on farm products.
2
I do not intend that such duties shall be lowered."
Despite considerable discussion of the tariff in 
1932, Roosevelt made no concrete move to deal with the 
international trade situation until the second year of 
his administration. Finally, in March 1934 the President 
sent a message to Congress asking authorization "to enter
3
into executive commercial agreements with foreign nations." 
After referring to the startling decline in world trade, 
he pointed out that numerous other nations were adopting 
the reciprocal approach which provided for "rapid and 
decisive" negotiation of trade agreements. According to 
Roosevelt, unless the American government received author­
ization to bargain in a similar manner, the agricultural 
and industrial sectors stood to lose their "deserved place" 
in international trade. He emphasized the administration's
^Ibid., September 30, 1932, p. 12; October 26, 1932, 
p. 10; November 3, 1932, p. 5*
3
U.S., Congress, Message from the President of the 
United States Transmitting a Request to Authorize the Exec­
utive to Enter into Executive Commercial Agreements with 
Foreign Nations, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., March 2, 1934, House 
Doc. N o . 273, P . 1•
15
belief that complete domestic recovery depended "in part
4
upon a revived and strengthened international trade."
Several weeks later, Representative Robert Doughton 
of North Carolina introduced the reciprocal trade agree­
ments measure in Congress and elaborated on the proposed 
objectives of the bill. Once again, as in the 1932 cam­
paign, the administration sought to reassure agriculture 
that such a program was in its best interests. Doughton 
pointed out that the United States must seek "to reopen 
the markets of the world tc the products of American farm 
and factories, or otherwise face the prospect of adopting 
as permanent the policy of curtailing acreage. . . . "
Even more important to the farmer, the administration 
promised to use the program to "exchange the surpluses 
which we have built up fox' surpluses which other countries 
have accumulated of commodities which we do not produce."^
Prior to consideration of the reciprocity proposal 
by Congress, both the House Ways and Means Committee and 
the Senate Finance Committee held hearings. The testimony 
given in these first hearings was based on theory and sup­
position rather than on fact or experience. Several high 
administration officials explained and defended the pro­
gram. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of
4
Ibid., p . 2.
^U.S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess 
March 23, 1934, p. 5260.
16
Agriculture Henry Wallace provided the administration's 
main line of defense.
Secretary of State Hull was the first administra­
tion witness to testify. A long-time advocate of lower 
tariffs, Secretary Hull stressed the United States com­
mitment to international leadership in trade policy.^
He characterized the proposal as an "emergency measure" 
designed to attack an emergency situation. In answering 
the critics of the bill, Hull suggested that once the 
present crisis passed, there would be time to review and
re-examine programs such as the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
7
ments Act so necessary in this time of crisis.
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace's testimony 
included reassurances to agricultural representatives 
that their interests would not be sacrificed in the nego­
tiated agreements. At the same time, Wallace expressed 
criticism of "inefficient industries." He pointed out 
that "as producers, those who produce for the export 
market would be beneficially affected by this bill; those 
which are so inefficient that they cannot meet foreign 
competition would, in case the powers of this bill were 
exercised to lower the tariff, be perhaps unfavorably
US.,, Congress, House of Representatives, Com­
mittee on Ways and Means, Hearings on Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act on H.R, 8430, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
(March 8-l4, 1934)1 pT JZ ~Cited hereafter as House 
Hearings, 1934.
^Ibid., p . 6.
17
g
affected." Several midwesterrx representatives viewed 
Wallace's statement as a veiled threat to their sugarbeet 
and livestock interests. In response to questioning by 
Harold Knutson of Minnesota, Wallace admitted that he con­
sidered the sugarbeet industry to be inefficient. He 
added that he did not "think the beetsugar industry should 
be allowed to extend further, because if it is expanded 
further, it is doing it at the expense of our export agri­
culture; it is robbing the wheat farmers of a market for
flour in Cuba; it is robbing the hog farmer of a market
Q
for lard in Cuba."
In Wallace's estimation, midwestern agricultural 
interests stood to profit considerably from the program. 
Through reciprocal agreements, the United States would be 
able once again to move wheat abroad. The Secretary sug­
gested that there were "a number of European countries 
that have extraordinarily high tariffs on wheat and those 
same European countries have goods which they would like 
to send into this c o u n t r y . W a l l a c e  expressed confi­
dence that new foreign markets would be created. He indi­
cated that it would be quite possible to increase Germany's 
purchasing power for American pork products since that 
country at one time had been the leading consumer of 
American lard. If the United States could entice Germany
^Ibid., p. 46. ^Ibid., p. 60. ^^Ibid., p. $6.
18
to lower its sixteen cent tariff on lard, a new market for 
midwestern hog growers would be opened.
Anticipating the concern of many agricultural 
leaders, Secretary Wallace discussed the question of com­
petitive agricultural imports. He assured all present that 
no tariff reductions in any industry would be made without 
serious study. He added that efficient industries had 
nothing to worry about and that agriculture in general 
stood to benefit from increased imports of a select nature. 
The Secretary insisted that unless imports were increased 
and foreign purchasing power enhanced, it would be neces­
sary to continue and even expand the acreage restriction 
program of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Wallace esti­
mated that, in the long run, forty or fifty million acres
of crop land would have to be permanently retired if ex-
12treme protectionism continued. Secretary of Commerce,
Daniel Roper, who testified after Wallace also related the 
loss of foreign markets to the need for acreage restric­
tion. He suggested that the reciprocal trade agreements 
program would open the needed markets and thus alleviate
the need "to put half of our cotton farmers and a fifth of
1 3our wheat farmers on the unemployment rolls."
^^Ibid., p. 59- ^^Ibid., pp. 46-51.
X X
Ibid., pp. 62-63- During the initial period of 
the trade agreements program, administration officials con­
tinually reminded farmers that expanded foreign markets, 
achieved through reciprocity, would lessen the need for
19
The announcement of congressional hearings on the 
reciprocity measure evoked little response from the major 
agricultural organizations representing midwestern inter­
ests. At that time, most farm groups had not held formal 
discussions on the program and thus had not adopted defi­
nite policy positions. However, the dairy and livestock 
industries did send delegations to testify. The dairy 
industry expressed particular concern about the importa­
tion of cocoanut oil and other vegetable and animal oils. 
When the Senate Committee on Finance met to consider the 
reciprocity bill, dairy representatives appeared and pro­
posed several amendments aimed at exclusion of competitive 
dairy products.
The American National Live Stock Association, which 
later emerged as a major critic and opposition lobby.
acreage restriction. U.S., Department of Agriculture, 
Farmers and the Export Market (Washington, 1935)i PP• 6-7; 
U.S., Department of State, Bargaining America's Way to 
Export Markets, Commercial Policy Series, No I o (Washing­
ton, 1935), PP- 3-4.
l4Charles Holman of the National Cooperative Milk 
Producers Federation with affiliates in Iowa, Minnesota, 
and Nebraska endorsed the following amendment. "No proc­
lamation shall be made reducing any import duty on any 
farm-produced commodity of which . . . was produced in
the continental United States in sufficient quantity to 
supply seventy percent or more of the quantity thereof 
consumed in the United States. . . ." U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements on H.R. 868?i 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
(April 2ë, 27, 30 and May 1, 1934), pp. 318, 344.
Cited hereafter as Senate Hearings, 1934.
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presented the most vigorous testimony. The repeated 
reference to "inefficient" industries during the hearings 
particularly disturbed the cattlemen. Their representa­
tives emphasized the substantial differences in cost of 
production and living standards between the United States 
and the principal competing foreign countries. Such dif­
ferences, they contended, justified tariff protection.
At the hearings, the cattlemen made it clear they 
expected lower tariffs and increased beef imports if the 
trade agreements bill passed. F. E. Mollin, Secretary of 
the A.N.L.A., testified that "cattle are accumulating in 
Northern Mexico with the hope of entering the United States 
when the bars are l o w e r e d . M o l l i n  objected specifically 
to the wording of the reciprocity proposal. Part 2 of 
Section 1 gave the President authority "to proclaim such 
modifications of existing duties and other import restric­
tions . . . appropriate to carry out any foreign trade
agreement. . . . Due to the inclusion of the phrase,
"other import restrictions," Mollin indicated that the
President could lift the present sanitary restrictions
17provided for in the Smoot-Hawley act. The Committee
^^Ibid., p. 288.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 7 3d Cong., 2d Sess., 
March 27, 1934, p. 5533-
17Argentina and several other foreign nations peri­
odically experienced hoof-and-mouth disease among their 
cattle. American producers pushed to have all dressed and
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assured Mollin that no such intent was anticipated, and 
the wording remained the same. Nevertheless, the live­
stock representatives left the hearings still expressing 
doubts about the merits of the bill.
Due to strong administration pressure and partisan
support, the proposal received a favorable recommendation
from both the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance
Committees. However, Minnesota's Representative Knutson
and several others issued a strong minority report which
offered twenty-four objections to the bill. The minority
cautioned against going on a "wild-goose chase" in search
of export markets that did not exist. Referring to the
Wallace testimony on "inefficient industries," the minority
suggested that Roosevelt would "destroy one industry in an
attempt to find a foreign market for the surplus products 
1 A
of another."
During the three-month debate on the floor of Con­
gress, representatives from the agricultural Midwest lined 
up both for and against the proposal. The substantial mid- 
western support for the trade agreements bill can be attrib­
uted to several factors. By 1934 the Democratic party had
live cattle from such areas excluded, supposedly for sani­
tation reasons. The foreign nations involved continually 
suggested that this was simply an excuse to exclude imports 
of competing beef.
l8U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Commit­
tee on Ways and Means, Report to Accompany Bill to Amend 
the Tariff Act of 1930: Reciprocal Trade Agreements,
7 3d Cong. , 2d Sess., Report No. 1000, p"^! 20.
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captured twenty-one congressional seats in the six states 
of the Upper Midwest, and these individuals generally sup­
ported the early New Deal legislation. Those supporting 
the measure claimed a new and more sophisticated under­
standing of the tariff and its relationship to export 
trade. Also, the prospect of reducing the acreage restric­
tion program appealed to many.
On the other hand, both economic and political fac­
tors contributed to the opposition of several midwestern 
congressmen. A number of commodities such as beef, sugar- 
beets and dairy products required the protection of a high 
tariff. Thus, the reciprocal trade program designed to 
lower tariffs caused deep concern among producers of these 
commodities and their spokesmen in Congress. However, 
political considerations were probably more important. 
Conservative Republicans opposed the measure as part of 
the New Deal legislative program devised by impractical 
brain trusters who knew little about agriculture or the 
Midwest.
Shortly after Representative Doughton introduced 
the administration's reciprocity proposal, two veteran 
Republicans, L. J. Dickinson, the senior senator from 
Iowa, and Minnesota Representative Harold Knutson, emerged 
as the most vociferous midwestern critics of the legisla­
tion. Staunch protectionists, the two had supported the
23
Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley tariffs, and they were
19
not prepared to reverse their previous position.
Both men, joined by Kansas Representative Harold
McGugin and Clifford Hope, and Senator Thomas Schall of
Minnesota, questioned the bill's constitutionality. In
their estimation, the measure enabled the Executive to
circumvent the constitutional requirement of senatorial
advice and consent of all treaties and also infringed
upon the congressional authority to regulate foreign 
20trade. Senator Dickinson labeled President Roosevelt
a "domestic trade dictator" and cautioned against a
I I revision" of the Constitution enabling him to become an
21"international dictator." Echoing Dickinson's senti­
ments, Knutson pictured the proposed executive tariff-
making authority as a "hysterical" grant contrary to the 
2 2Constitution. Thus, it is evident that to many of the
midwestern Republicans, the reciprocal trade agreements
19Knutson entered Congress in 1917 £.nd Dickinson
in 1919.
20 Section 8 of Article I gives Congress the power 
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises and 
also to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Section 
2 of Article II specifies senatorial advice and consent 
of all treaties. Henry S. Commager, ed.. Documents of 
American History (New York, 1963)1 PP- l4ll 143•
^^New York Times, January 3 i 1934, p. 8.
2 2U.S., Congressional Record, ?3d Cong., 2d Sess.,
March 24, 1934, p. 5344.
2k
act represented yet another step in the extension of
executive power by the New Deal.
When challenging the economic feasibility of the
measure, midwesterners frequently pointed to the possible
importation of competing agricultural products. According
to Dickinson, most of the countries likely to negotiate
reciprocal trade agreements with the United States would
offer only agricultural products in return for American
2 3
manufactured goods. Consequently, he insisted that
reciprocity offered little to the midwestern farmer.
Because of the nature of their particular farm 
constituencies. North Dakota's Representative William 
Lemke and Terry Carpenter of Nebraska concurred with those 
who feared agricultural imports. Both the Nebraska sugar 
interests and the North Dakota ranchers and flax farmers 
produced costly commodities which benefited from tariff 
protection. Lemke expressed concern about the already 
"excessive" importation of agricultural goods--especially 
of farm animals and meat products. He suggested that 
reciprocal trade agreements would serve only to increase
2kcompetition for the domestic market. Lemke pointed to 
the $600 million worth of agricultural imports in 1933 as 
evidence. He failed to add that only slightly over 50
23Ibid., May 31, 1934, pp. 10107-108.
? 4
Ibid., March 28, 1934, pp. 5633-634.
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percent of the imported products competed with those pro-
25duced on the American farm.
Terry Carpenter, the fiery Nebraskan who blasted 
precedent by appearing on the floor of the House in shirt­
sleeves, was the only midwestern Democrat to vote against 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements bill. Carpenter lost lit­
tle time rising to the defense of his constituents' sugar- 
beet industry- He pointed out that sugarbeet growers in­
curred a high cost of production and thus needed tariff 
protection. He criticized Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
Wallace's earlier statement that the American sugar in­
dustry was "inefficient" and did not deserve extensive 
tariff p r o t e c t i o n . C a r p e n t e r  charged that Secretary 
Wallace would use the trade agreements program to destroy 
the domestic sugar industry. He concluded that, "if they 
are going to trade something off in this country, I am 
willing to have them trade something off that you men
have, but they will not trade off the beet-sugar industry
27that I represent, except over my dead body."
25 In 1933 the United States imported agricultural 
products valued at $7^3 million dollars; however, only 
$377 million were competitive. Also, if imported sugar 
is discounted only $269 million dollars worth were com­
petitive. U.S., Department of Agriculture, The Signifi­
cance of Agricultural Imports, 7^th Cong., 2d Sess., 
Senate DocT No. 263 (Washington, 1936), p. 3 «
26U.S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
March 24, 1934," p . 5338.
^^Ibid.
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Representative Lloyd Thurston of Iowa supported 
Lemke and Carpenter in their assertion that the American 
farmers' cost of production put him at a disadvantage in 
competition with foreign imports. Thurston presented a 
series of detailed charts which analyzed differences in 
wage levels and freight costs. He maintained that any 
tariff reduction would pose a serious threat to American 
domestic producers because of "the vast differences that 
exist in the wage levels" between the United States and
28
foreign nations. Foreign nations benefited not only
from a favorable wage level, he said, but also from lower
freight costs. Thurston pointed out that products could
be shipped from Australia or South America to "our Atlantic
seaboard for a lesser charge than a like article can be
transported from the State of Iowa, in the center of the
29Upper Mississippi Valley, to an Atlantic port." If the 
reciprocal trade agreements program was implemented, 
Thurston predicted increased importation of industrial and 
agricultural products from the nations with low costs of 
production.
Senator Dickinson, in a brief statement on the 
economic effects of the program, captured the plight of 
many in the Midwest as they sought to evaluate the possible
? A
Ibid., March 20, 19^4, pp. $664-66$ 
^^Ibid., p . $664.
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results of the program. Dickinson suggested that the 
reciprocity proposal posed somewhat of an economic para­
dox for much of the Midwest. He pointed out "that the
best corn section of Iowa is also the sugar-beet-producing
30section of Iowa." Therefore, if the United States were 
to buy more sugar from Cuba in order to sell more lard 
produced by corn-hog farmers, it would severely hurt the 
sugar-beet growers in Iowa. Corn and hogs were much more 
important than sugar-beets, but this fact would be of lit­
tle consolation to the sugar-beet growers who would be 
driven out of business by cheap imports. A similar situa­
tion existed with wheat growers and cattlemen in the same 
area. In fact, as Clifford Hope remarked, about two-thirds
of the farmers in his district produced both cattle and
^  ^ 31wheat.
Underlying much of the midwestern congressional 
opposition to the reciprocity proposal, was a basic dis­
trust of "powerful eastern interests." According to these 
midwesterners, agriculture had always fared second best to 
manufacturing interests in tariff policy. Now the eastern 
concerns sought to use reciprocal trade agreements to 
serve their own welfare. Minnesota Senator Thomas Schall 
remarked that the International Bankers Association had
3°Ibid., May 21, 19]4, p. 9132.
^^Clifford Hope to the author, March 22, I968.
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loaned some #15,000,000,000 in foreign countries. Now, 
he said, this eastern establishment sought to regain its 
investment by encouraging foreign importations through 
trade agreements.
Harkening to the Populist era, William Lemke 
envisioned a "brain trust-devised" conspiracy against the 
American farmer. He intimated that Roosevelt's advisers 
would negotiate the trade agreements and in the process
"barter away the domestic market of the farmers in the
3 3interest of our international manufacturers." After 
expressing "fear for the independence, the freedom, the 
protection, and the prosperity of the American farmers 
. . - ," Lemke concluded that the brain trust was "more
interested in the welfare of foreign than of our own
.>34people."
Several congressmen from the Midwest opposed the
bill for partisan reasons alone. Clifford Hope of Kansas,
for example, represented a wheat-growing area which in all
probability would profit from reciprocal trade agreements.
In fact, a number of wheat grower associations in Kansas
expressed support of the reciprocal idea, yet Hope actively
35attacked the proposal. Espousing a nationalistic outlook.
3 2U.S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
May 29, 1934, p. 9832.
^^Ibid., March 28, 1934, p. 5632. ^^Ibid.
^^House Hearings, 1934, pp. 284-85-
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he maintained that any export market presently available
to wheat growers would offer prices "far below the cost
of production in this c o u n t r y . I n s t e a d ,  he suggested
the United States momentarily forget "the illusion of
foreign markets" and "arrange to protect the American
farmer in what he can produce for consumption in this 
37country."
Republican opposition to the bill aroused the cry
of "partisanship" from the Democrats. However, Republican
Harold McGugin quickly returned the charge. He referred
to the tariff debate in 1930 and quoted several speeches
from the Congressional Record which defined the Democratic
position at that time on the provision to grant tariff-
38making powers to the President. According to McGugin, 
the Democrats in 1930 based their opposition on the claim 
that the proposed grant was transferring too much power 
from the Congress to the President. Now, he said, they 
had reversed their position and supported such a grant of 
power to a Democratic president. McGugin agreed with the 
1930 Democratic position and called for limitations on the 
Presidential power to negotiate agreements. In McGugin's 
view Congress should insert in the bill a provision "that
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
March 28, 1934, p. 563^.
3?Ibid., p. 5637.
^^Ibid., March 24, 1934, pp. 5364-365.
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trade agreements shall go into effect immediately and
remain effective unless within 60 legislative days after
the execution of such trade agreements the House or the
Senate shall by a majority vote decide against any speci-
39fic trade agreement." It was evident that some of the
opposition to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act stemmed
from congressional fears of excessive presidential powers.
The majority of the Midwest delegation did not
concur with the nationalistic outlook supported by Hope,
40Lemke and several other Republicans. Although not as 
vocal as the opposition, Republicans Arthur Capper and 
George Norris, joined by several midwestern Democrats, 
offered qualified support for President Roosevelt's trade 
agreements proposal. Most of the congressmen who favored 
reciprocity, chided the advocates of the nationalistic 
interpretation of future world markets. Ignoring the 
possibility of additional agricultural imports, Iowa's 
Otha Wearin enthusiastically supported the measure and 
suggested that the United States had "only scratched the
4lsurface" of the world markets. And if the markets were 
there, Ashton Shallenberger was certain that "the most
^^Ibid., p. 5365.
40All the Republicans with the exception of Arthur 
Capper, Peter Norbeck and George Norris.
41U.S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
March 28, 1934, p. 5^55-
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efficient [farmers] in the world,” those of the United
States, could win them back through the implementation
k2of reciprocal trade agreements.
Wearin repeated the arguments advanced years before 
by Henry Clay and William McKinley. He reminded his col­
leagues that the Midwest's prosperity was linked to that 
of the industrial East. If reciprocal trade agreements 
expanded markets for industrial products, then employment 
would rise, consumer purchasing power would increase, and
the laborer would once again be in a position to purchase
43
numerous products from the American farm.
George Norris and Arthur Capper, the two senior 
Republican Senators from the Upper Midwest, expressed only 
qualified support for the bill. Yet, due to their stature 
in agricultural circles, this support was important. After 
reaffirming his belief in the protective tariff. Capper 
conceded that the United States should make every possible 
effort to revive world trade. He questioned the likelihood 
of completely restoring previous United States export mar­
kets but agreed that the reciprocity proposal offered the
44best possibilities. Senator Norris revealed his hesi­
tancy by acknowledging that many legitimate arguments could
42Ashton Shallenberger represented Iowa. Ibid., 
March 24, 1934, p. 5335- 
^^Ibid., March 28, 1934, p. 5655-
^^Ibid., June 4, 1934, pp. 10378-380.
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be lodged against the bill. He added that under normal 
conditions the bill would be unacceptable to him also. 
However, in light of the emergency situation prompted by 
the depression, extraordinary measures such as executive
45
tariff-making powers were a "necessity."
Early in the congressional debate Representative
Magnus Johnson of Minnesota questioned the advisability
of the President's proposal and expressed the concern of
his constituents. "Many have been writing me from my own
state, and they seem to be afraid the President will net
46take care of the farmers under this measure." However, 
several days later he spoke on behalf of the bill and 
voiced confidence that the President would see that far-
47
mers got a "square deal." Although he apparently had 
some reservations about the program, Johnson seemed wil­
ling to trust the President.
Early in June, after three months of intermittent 
debate, the administration forces in the Senate began to 
push for a vote on the President's proposal. In response 
to these efforts, the opposition attempted a brief fili­
buster which included the introduction of a number of 
amendments. Several midwestern Senators presented amend­
ments pertaining specifically to agriculture. All met
4s 
^Ibid., May ]0, 1934, p. 9955- 
^^Ibid., March 24, 1934, p. 5337- 
^^Ibid., March 28, 1934, p. 5653.
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defeat. In essence, all the agricultural amendments were 
the same as that presented by Senator Thomas Schall of 
Minnesota which stated that "no reciprocal tariff treaties 
or agreements made pursuant to the provisions of this act 
shall reduce existing tariff duties on products of agri­
culture imported into the United States in competition
with like products grown or produced in the United 
48States."
Senators in the Upper Midwestern states voted seven 
to five in favor of the amendments. Senator Capper and 
Norbeck were the only two advocates of the amendments who 
later voted in favor of the trade agreements bill despite 
the exclusion of any specific protection for agriculture. 
Before casting his ballot for the reciprocity measure, 
Capper expressed regret that the amendment insuring pro­
tection to agriculture against tariff reductions had not 
49been included. In the final vote on the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act, the Upper Midwest voted twenty-seven to 
seventeen in favor of the measure and the prospect of low­
ering the tariff wall.
Presented as an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley Tar­
iff Act of 1930, Roosevelt's trade agreements proposal 
transferred with some limitations the tariff-making power
48
Ibid., June 4, 1934, p. 10345. 
^^Ibid., p. 10380.
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50from the .legislative to the executive branch. It
empowered the President to enter into negotiations with 
foreign nations and to increase or decrease existing tar­
iff duties 50 percent without congressional consent or
51without regard to any specific guidelines. It was anti­
cipated that the President would seek to lower tariff 
duties in exchange for mutual concessions to United States 
exports. He could not transfer articles between the duti­
able and free list, and any trade agreement concluded under
5 2the act could be terminated at the end of three years.
During the course of the congressional debate on 
the reciprocity proposal, several important amendments 
were attached. The President's authority under the act 
would extend for only three years, and then the Congress
The Executive Commercial Policy Committee, com­
posed of officials from the Departments of State, Treasury, 
Commerce and Agriculture, the A.A.A., N.R.A., and Tariff 
Commission drew up the administration's reciprocity meas­
ure. Whitney H. Shepardson, "Nationalism and American 
Trade," Foreign Affairs, XII (April, 1934), 4l4.
^^After considerable interdepartmental discussion 
the administration decided to employ the principle of un­
conditional most-favored-nation to all reciprocal trade 
agreements. This choice illustrates the freedom that the 
administration had to mold the program. Francis Sayre to 
Henry Grady, November 2, 1934, National Archives, Washing­
ton, D.C., Record Group 59, State Department Central File, 
611.0031/1332; Henry Grady to Herbert Feis, March 7, 1935, 
ibid., 611.0031/1404-1/2. Cited hereafter as N A , RG 59.
5 2For a comparison of the original proposal with 
the one finally approved b, Congress see: U.S., Congres­
sional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., March 27, 1934,
P- 5533; U.S., Statutes At Large, IIL, Pt. 1, pp. 943-45.
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would consider the renewal of the program. Also, the
President was instructed to "seek information and advice"
from the Tariff Commission, the Departments of State,
Agriculture, and Commerce and other "appropriate" sources.
Lastly, after considerable debate. Congress specified that
public hearings were to be held before the conclusion of
5 3any trade agreement.
Once the bill passed Congress, the administration 
quickly fashioned the working structure for its new tariff 
policy. The overall conduct of the program was to be su­
pervised by the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy. 
Most important, in accordance with the public hearings 
amendment, Roosevelt created by executive order the Com- 
mittee for Reciprocity Information. Any person or per­
sons desiring to register their views on a proposed trade 
agreement were instructed to present them to this Commit­
tee. In the administration's words, the Committee was to 
"provide a central point of contact between the public and
5 5
the inter-departmental trade agreements organization."
^^Ibid., pp. 944-45.
54President, Executive Order, Public Notice and Pre­
sentation of Views in Connection with Foreign Trade Agree­
ments, June 271 1934, No. 67501 p . 1. Cited hereafter as 
Executive Order, 1934.
55U.S., Department of State, How Trade Agreements 
Are Made, Commercial Policy Series, No. 5t (Washington,
1938), p. 4.
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Roosevelt's executive order specified that at least 
thirty days before any trade agreement was concluded the 
State Department was to issue a notice of intention to 
negotiate with a particular c o u n t r y . A t  that time inter­
ested parties could file a written brief or schedule oral 
testimony before the Committee for Reciprocity Information. 
Once the necessary data was collected, a secret and 
"strictly nonpartisan" committee would negotiate the final 
agreement. The membership of this Trade Agreements Com­
mittee included high officials from the Departments of
State, Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture, the Tariff Com-
57mission and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.
In the course of the implementation of the program, mid- 
westerners were to become thoroughly familiar with the 
above committees and procedures.
As mentioned previously. President Roosevelt's 
announcement of a new foreign trade policy generated wide­
spread interest in the Upper Midwest. Discontented mid- 
westerners, disturbed by the continuing depressed state of 
agriculture, analyzed the proposal and attempted to predict
Originally the notice was to be issued to the 
press and published in Press Releases of the Department of 
State, the Treasury Decisions and Commerce Reports. How­
ever, after a short time the State Department supplemented 
this with the compilation of a mailing list of interested 
parties. Executive Order, 1934, p. 1.
57U.S., Department of State, How Trade Agreements 
Are Made, Commercial Policy Series, No. (Washington,
1938), p. 5.
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■what the President would do with the new executive power 
and what it would mean to their particular area. In con­
trast to the congressional debate with its sharp political 
overtones, the opinions expressed in the distant Midwest 
reflected a serious concern for the future of that area's 
embattled residents.
Editors of several leading farm journals and mid- 
western newspapers came out in support of reciprocal trade 
agreements. Among other things, the editors related high 
tariffs to the disappearance of foreign markets previously
r O
open to products from the American farm. They repeatedly 
emphasized that trade was based on the interchange of 
goods, and thus the United States must accept imports in 
order to create a foreign market for its own surplus com­
modities. In their mind, reciprocal trade agreements would 
be employed to re-negotiate tariffs and thus open foreign 
markets. According to H. G. Keeney, President of the 
Nebraska Farmers Union, the extraordinary executive powers
embodied in the proposal would enable the President to
5 9open these markets in the shortest possible time.
Kansas City Star, April 30, 193^; Nebraska Union 
Farmer, XXI (July 11, 1934, 4 ; Bureau Farmer^ IX (Septem- 
ber, 1934), 7; Kansas Farmer, LXXll (June 5, 1934), 5? 
Wallace's Farmer! LXl (January 30, 1934), 5; Omaha World- 
Herald, March 10, 1934; Dodge City Daily Globe, January 13, 
1934 ; Topeka Daily Capital, April 2*9"^ 193^ ; Minneapolis 
Tribune, May 21, 1934.
^^Nebraska Union Farmer, XX (March l4, 1934), 3.
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The loss of foreign markets for farm products was 
not the only evil midwesterners attached to high tariffs.
By excluding foreign competition from the domestic market, 
high rates enabled American industrialists to charge exor­
bitant prices for manufactured products needed by the far­
m e r . A  continuation of high tariffs would impede efforts 
to achieve parity for the farmer. Consequently, farmers 
suffered from a cost-price squeeze with farm prices going 
down as foreign markets disappeared while domestic indus­
trial prices remained relatively high behind a tariff wall.
To many in the Midwest, the trade agreements pro­
posal offered a possible alternative to the crop-restriction 
program of the A.A.A.^^ Faced with the prospect of contin­
ued low prices and cognizant of the starvation in the world 
and even in the United States, farmers looked with little 
favor upon the government's efforts to restrict agricul­
tural production. According to H. G. Keeney, President of 
the Nebraska Farmers Union, the New Deal's decision to 
pursue a policy of economic nationalism with the accompa­
nying "artificial, arbitrary, and bureaucratic" regimenta­
tion of agriculture could be tolerated only as a temporary
^^Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, March 2, 1934; Nebraska 
Union Farmer, XX (March 28, 1934 ) , 4.
^^The administration viewed the reciprocal trade 
agreements program as a compliment to the A.A.A. rather 
than as an alternative. They reasoned that even after 
markets opened up some crop limitation would still be 
necessary.
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m e a s u r e . T h e  prospect of an extensive reorganization of 
agriculture in order to bring production permanently in 
line with the domestic market threatened to impose a seri­
ous hardship on thousands of farmers. In the words of one 
Kansas editor, the government should seek to generate for­
eign markets instead of placing agriculture in a "strait- 
jacket.
The Des Moines Register, a leading midwestern news­
paper, conducted a vigorous editorial campaign in support 
of the reciprocal trade agreements proposal. The Register 
pictured Congress as "incapable of framing a tariff based
64on national considerations." In contrast to the position 
of several midwestern congressmen, the editor expressed the 
belief that no "startling departure from constitutional 
precedent" was involved in the granting of tariff- 
negotiation powers to the President. Even if such a de­
parture did exist, "there would be plenty of reason now to
adopt extraordinary measures to recover some of our lost
t
66
export m a r k e t . T h e  Register called upon Republicans o
drop all partisanship and line up in support of the bill.
^^Nebraska Union Farmer, XX (September 13, 193^)i 4. 
^^Dodge City Daily Globe, January l8, 1934.
^^Des Moines, Register, March 2, 1934.
^^Ibid., March l8, 1934.
^^Ibid., March 4, 1934.
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Even though editorial opinion in general favored 
the reciprocity proposal, the response was by no means 
unanimous. North Dakota and South Dakota editors in 
particular attacked the trade agreements proposal. One 
South Dakota editor wrote repeatedly about the present 
"alarming" rate of agricultural imports and predicted a 
virtual flood of imports if the reciprocity bill became 
law.^^ According to the editor, in light of the "present 
emphasis upon factory employment in Washington, agricul­
ture may be forgotten while such deals are being nego­
tiated- Devious methods will be employed to silence the
69farmers by promises of something in the future." When
President Roosevelt signed the bill into law, the editor
bemoaned that "it is a measure that moves sharply in the
direction of dictatorship. It is contrary to the ideals
of democracy. History will record this step as one of
70the most drastic in the New Deal."
The Fargo Forum printed a series of editorials 
charging that reciprocal trade agreements would inevi­
tably result in importations of agricultural products.
6 7
Editors of the Sioux Falls (South Dakota) Argus- 
Leader, Fargo (North Dakota) Forum, Grand Forks (North 
Dakota) Herald, The Nebraska Farmer, Sioux City Journal, 
and The Leader (Bismarck, N .D .) in particular opposed the 
proposal.
°^Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, January 3, 1934.
^^Ibid., March 21, 1934. ^^Ibid., June 6, 1934.
kl
According to this editor, "eastern industrialists are
going to bend every possible effort to get this country
to chiefly open up the way for the importation of foreign
agricultural products in exchange for a foreign market for
71manufactured goods." He dwelled on the probable impor­
tation of products basic to North Dakota's economy such 
as beef, flax and rye. If the United States sought trade 
agreements with such countries as Argentina, Canada and
Russia, it would have no choice but to accept such agri-
7 2cultural imports.
As evidenced by the varied editorial comment, the 
appearance of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act engen­
dered a mixed reaction in the Midwest. This divided atti­
tude contrasted sharply with the earlier near unanimous 
support of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff act. Undoubtedly, 
party factors in Congress contributed to the great vari­
ance of attitudes by 19^4. The newly elected Democrats 
in the Upper Midwest supported H.R. 8687 as part of 
Roosevelt's New Deal program, while many of the Republi­
cans remained true to the traditional protectionist prin­
ciples of their party.
Yet, political considerations assumed less impor­
tance than economic matters. The division in the Upper 
Midwest on reciprocity reflected the recently emerging
^^Fargo F orum, April I9 , 1934.
^^Ibid., March 19, 30, April 1, 1934.
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tariff dilemma facing certain economic interests in the 
Midwest. In contrast to the 1920's, many were now asso­
ciating high tariffs with the disappearing world markets. 
Thus, to those agriculturalists in the Midwest who de­
pended heavily on export markets the protectionist position 
was no longer tenable. However, those engaged in indus­
tries with high production costs and which produced little 
or no surplus such as ranching and dairying had every rea­
son to retain their support for protection. In general, 
the first installment of the midwestern discussion of the 
reciprocal trade agreements reflected what people thought 
or hoped the program would do for them. As the adminis­
tration began to implement the program, the resulting 
political and economic controversy gathered momentum 
throughout the Midwest.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE RECIPROCAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
Farmers were an important element in the political 
coalition which Roosevelt began to mold together early in 
his administration. Consequently, the President viewed 
with keen interest the initial reaction of the principal 
farm organizations to the reciprocal trade agreements 
program, as well as to other legislation affecting far­
mers. During the 1930's, the American Farm Bureau Feder­
ation, the Farmers Union, the Grange and the American 
National Live Stock Association were all active in the 
Midwest, and the trade agreements program evoked a varied 
and somewhat uncertain response from each of these organi­
zations. Almost immediately after its implementation, the 
trade agreements program became a very lively issue within 
the American Farm Bureau Federation and the American Na­
tional Live Stock Association. Both groups worked vigor­
ously to make their positions known and felt in Washington. 
However, when confronted with the new tariff policy, the 
Grange and the Farmers Union did little more than offer 
policy statements through resolution.
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Louis J. Taber, a staunch protectionist from Ohio, 
presided over the Grange and that organization's early 
reaction to the trade agreements program reflected Tabor's 
personal philosophy. Meeting in Hartford, Connecticut, in 
November 1934, the Grange delegates noted the recent pas­
sage of the reciprocity measure and expressed some concern 
that the Department of State was presently negotiating 
trade pacts with several South American countries.^ In 
the convention's view, any agreements with these agricul­
tural nations would undoubtedly lead to imports of com­
petitive farm products. In view of this possibility,
Taber called for a protective policy that would "insure
2
the American market to the American farmer."
By 1936 the Grange had become even more disenchanted 
with several aspects of the trade agreements program. Spe­
cifically, the Grange criticized the unconditional most- 
favored-nation principle which had been employed in nego­
tiating the trade agreements. Under this principle, the 
concessions granted by the United States to a particular 
country were extended to all other nations affording the 
United States most-favored-nation status. According to 
Tabor, the "entire" unfavorable position of agriculture 
under the tariff could be attributed to the unconditional
^National Grange, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 




most-favored-nation clause- In addition to reiterating
its traditional demand of the "American market for the
American farmer," the Grange called for Senate ratifica-
4
tion of trade agreements before they became effective.
Much like the Grange, the National Farmers Union 
paid scant attention to the trade agreements issue during 
1934 and 1935" Delegates at the 1934 convention recorded 
their opposition to the negotiation procedure, complaining 
that agricultural interests had been unable to secure of­
ficial information as to the progress of the negotiations 
or as to the manner in which they should present their 
cases when farm commodities were affected.^ The delegates 
did not attack the philosophy of high tariffs, but rather 
asked that agriculture be placed on equality with industry. 
If necessary to achieve this equality, an immediate embargo 
should be imposed "against foreign importations of agricul­
tural products in which this country produces more than 
enough for home consumption.
While the trade agreements program stirred little 
interest among officials of the national Farmers Union,
^Ibid., November 11-19, 1936 (Columbus, Ohio),
p . 18.
4
Ibid., Resolutions of the Annual Meeting, Novem­
ber II-I9 , 1936 (Columbus, Ohio), pp. 155-56.
^National Farmers Union, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, November 20-21, 1934 (Sioux Falls, South Dakota), 
p . 6 .
^Ibid., p . 4.
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the state organizations in the Upper Midwestern states 
were viewing the program with considerable interest and 
some alarm. The North Dakota Farmers Union with a large 
constituency of ranchers, sugarbeet growers and flax far­
mers bemoaned the prospect created by the reciprocity pro­
gram. The Dunn County Farmers Union complained that the 
"secrecy with which negotiations for trade pacts . . .
have been and are being conducted is injurious to agri­
cultural industries dependent upon tariff protection for
7
their very existence." They called for less secrecy and 
a minimum 90-day period for all affected interests to 
prepare their case for presentation to the Committee for
g
Reciprocity Information.
In contrast to the North Dakota group, the Nebraska 
Farmers Union suggested that farmers take a broad, posi­
tive view of the trade agreements program. "Some of these 
treaties may contain injustices to agriculture; but it is 
a beginning in opening trade channels. This will not only 
give us wider markets, but it will curb the profiteering
9
of domestic trusts." Thus, the initial implementation of 
the trade agreements program prompted widespread interest 
but little consensus among the midwestern Farmers Union.
7
Dunn County Farmers Union, Resolutions of the 
Annual Meeting, November 9, 1934 (Dunn Center, North 
Dakota).
^Ibid.
^Nebraska Union Farmer, XXII (May 3, 1935), 4.
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In contrast to the Grange and Farmers Union, the 
American Farm Bureau Federation considered the trade agree­
ments act highly important almost from the beginning. The 
Nation's Agriculture and the News Letter, major publications 
of the A.F.B.F., followed the program's progress closely 
with informational articles and editorial comment. From 
1933 onward tariff policy discussions occupied a major 
role at the Federation's national conventions. Secretary 
of Agriculture Wallace and Secretary of State Hull ap­
peared before the conventions several times to explain 
and defend the progress of the trade agreements program.
By the mid-1930's the A.F.B.F. under the leadership 
of Edward A. O'Neal had emerged as the leading farm pres­
sure g r o u p . I n  light of its superior organization and 
large membership among midwestern farmers, the A.F.B.F. 
position on reciprocal trade agreements stood to influence 
greatly the attitude of many midwesterners. President 
O'Neal was one of the strongest supporters of the program, 
and he did all in his power to sell it to the midwestern 
elements of the Farm Bureau. A Democrat, a southerner, 
and a close friend of President Roosevelt, O'Neal had 
always believed in and supported efforts to enhance freer
^^Stuart Chase, Government Under Pressure: Special
Interests vs The Public Welfare (New York, 1945)1 PP. 96-
sF:
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international t r a d e . H e  viewed the reciprocal trade 
agreements program as a major step in the right direction.
It was apparent from the beginning that not all 
within the Farm Bureau shared O'Neal’s enthusiasm for the 
reciprocity program. Delegates to the 1933 national con­
vention in Chicago sanctioned a resolution which at best 
offered cautious approval.
While we appreciate the possibilities of reciprocal 
trade agreements with foreign countries, we must not 
minimize their dangers. The welfare of the American 
producers of dairy, cereal, livestock . . . and other
agricultural products must not be sacrificed in any 
efforts to expand industrial markets abroad. No 
power should be delegated by act of Congress to nego­
tiate and put into effect reciprocal executive trade 
agreements with foreign countries that would be detri­
mental to agriculture.12
Not discouraged by the hesitant expression of the 
convention, O'Neal met with Roosevelt and Secretary Wallace 
several months later and then announced his support for the 
reciprocity program. O'Neal explained to the press that 
"agriculture demands a foreign outlet for a certain portion 
of its surplus commodities as an economic necessity. We 
have the President's assurance that he will give proper 
protection to American agriculture. I agree with the phi­
losophy of Secretary Wallace that . . .  a greater outlet
Christiana M. Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the 
New Deal (Urbana, I962), pp. $8 , 142; Edward O'Neal to 
Marvin McIntyre, December 6 , 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Papers, P.P.F. 1011.
12A.F.B.F,, Resolutions of the Annual Meeting, 
December I3 , 1933 (Chicago, Illinois).
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for our surpluses, offers a sound and constructive attack
1 3on the farm problem." A short time later, the A.F.B.F. 
News Letter carried an editorial from Wallace's F armer 
which outlined how the reciprocal trade treaties would
l4help agriculture.
Despite President O'Neal's enthusiasm for the pro­
gram, A.F.B.F. members in the Midwest continued to express 
reservations. On August 15, 1934, leaders of the Midwest 
State Farm Bureaus met in Chicago and sent the following 
resolution to Secretary of State Hull: "We believe in
development of foreign trade and in retention of the home 
market for the producers of our farm crops; we are not in 
favor of developing foreign trade and at the same time 
losing the home m a r k e t . T h e  State Department immedi­
ately reassured the group that agricultural interests 
would not be sacrificed during the negotiations of any 
trade p a c t s . T h e  Department pointed out that all inter­
ested parties would be given a chance to present their
17views at public hearings. At approximately the same
^^A,-F.B.F. | Official News Letter, April 3, 1934,
p. 12.
14
Ibid., November 13, 1934, p. 2.
15Chester H. Gray to Cordell Hull, August 21, 1934, 
NA, RG 59, 600.1115/787.
^^Francis B. Sayre to Chester H. Grav, September 8,
1934, NA, RG 59 , 600 .1115/ 787. 
l^ibid.
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time, the A.F.B.F. Executive Committee met and issued a 
statement calling for the "proper assurances" that agri­
culture would be fully protected in the negotiation of 
trade p a c t s . T h u s ,  in the initial period the A.F.B.F. 
expressed interest in the program's possibilities but 
refused to wholeheartedly endorse it. Undoubtedly, the 
midwestern element within the A.F.B.F. prevented a com­
plete endorsement.
The Roosevelt administration was well aware of the 
reservations expressed by some members and officials of 
the A.F.B.F. With this in mind. President O'Neal arranged 
for Secretary of State Hull to address the opening session 
of the 1934 national convention. In an address entitled 
"Agriculture and Foreign Trade Agreements" Hull emphasized
19the recent collapse of foreign trade. He reminded his
listeners that much of agriculture's prosperity was tied 
to foreign markets. In view of this fact, the trade agree­
ments program offered an excellent opportunity to regain
foreign markets for staple agricultural products such as
20cotton, tobacco, hog products and wheat. However, Hull 
cautioned that if the United States failed "to rise to
1 A
A.F.B.F., Minutes of the Board of Directors,
June 6, 1935) FDR Papers, O.F. I35O.
19U.S., Department of State, Agriculture and 
Foreign Trade Agreements, Commercial Policy Series, No. 5 
(Washington, 1935), PP• 1-7.
^*^Ibid. , p . 8 .
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this opportunity, similar and generally inferior products
of agriculture will be sold by other countries to meet the
needs of populations not producing them at all or in satis-
21factory quantities or qualities."
The Secretary also touched on the controversial
question of increased agricultural imports. He suggested
that increased imports would be "stimulated on the basis
of causing the least possible disturbance to domestic
production." However, he reassured the delegates that
"careful and scientific study" by experts would precede
22any tariff reductions. Hull portrayed the reciprocal 
trade agreements program as a moderate tariff proposal.
The administration could reduce rates only $0 percent, 
and in light of the present extremely high tariff rates,
2 3the program, even if fully applied, could not be drastic. 
Hull concluded his address with several remarks about the 
recently negotiated trade pact with Cuba. He emphasized 
the trade concessions made to United States by Cuba in­
cluded lard products, wheat flour, cottonseed oil and other
24agriculture products. The Secretary suggested that if 
agriculture demonstrated faith in and support for the pro­
gram, future trade agreements would offer even more to 
agriculture.
21 2 2
Ibid. Ibid., p. 9.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., pp. 11-14.
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Following Secretary of State Hull's speech, the 
A.F.B.F. delegates discussed at length the tariff situa­
tion. The possibility that manufacturers would again dom­
inate this tariff program weighed heavy on the minds of 
many delegates. Clifford Gregory pictured the reciprocity 
proposal as the crucial element in agriculture's future 
position within the tariff system. In his estimation, 
agriculture stood to benefit in the long run, but only 
if its representatives battled for the rights which far­
mers deserved.
Before we really get anywhere, before we really 
develop a foreign market of any volume, any volume 
adequate to take care of our agricultural surpluses 
in this country, we must face this fact squarely, 
that the only way that can be done is to reduce the 
tariff walls that protect our highly monopolized 
great interests of this country. . . .  If we are to 
attack the tariffs on those highly monopolized in­
dustries we have a real battle, and that is why I 
say that I think in going down this road American 
agriculture is undertaking the greatest battle of 
its whole history.25
The tariff resolution adopted by the convention 
echoed Gregory's attack on industrial tariffs and reiter­
ated the demand that agricultural interests be offered 
specific protection.
We are in accord with the purpose of reciprocal 
trade treaties which is, primarily, to restore 
agricultural exports by judicious lowering of in­
dustrial tariffs, thus admitting more goods into 
this country and making it possible for us to sell 
more of our farm products abroad. We insist that
25A .F .B .F u, Proceedings of the Annua] Meeting, 
December 10-12, 1934 (Nashville, Tennessee).
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this purpose be adhered to in framing reciprocal 
trade treaties and that there be no reduction that 
would have the effect of holding or reducing domes­
tic price levels below parity on such products.26
The resolution also called for a farm representative to be 
on the committee which negotiated the trade agreements.
The proposed reciprocal trade agreements program 
also evoked a guarded, nationalistic response from the var­
ious state branches of the Farm Bureau. The editor of the 
Kansas Bureau F armer asked for "approval of the proposed 
tariff bargaining bill, but with adequate safeguards to
27
agriculture. . . ." However, delegates at the annual
state convention expressed no reservations and recommended 
that foreign markets be developed "by means of trade agree-
28ments including tariff reciprocities. . . ." Iowa Farm
Bureau members favored "fair reciprocal trade agreements," 
but reiterated the demand for "adequate tariff protection" 
against the importation of all fats, oils, and other com-
29peting agricultural products. The Nebraska and Minnesota 
Farm Bureaus made no mention of reciprocal trade agreements 
but urged the administration to bar foreign agricultural
30products from the American market.
A.F.B.F., Resolutions of the Annual Meeting, 
December 10-12, 193*5 (Nashville, Tennessee ) .
27Bureau Farmer (Kansas edition), IX (June, 193^)
28Kansas Farm Bureau, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, October 2?, 1934 (Atchison).
29Iowa Farm Bureau, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, January, 1934 (Des Moines).
30Nebraska Farm Bureau, Resolutions of the Annual
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For the next two years, O'Neal campaigned within 
the A.F.B.F. to build up greater support for the reciprocal 
trade program. In addition to public appearances, he pub­
lished several articles in The Nation's Agriculture re­
minding midwesterners that agriculture's welfare was 
closely tied to the reestablishment of foreign markets--
markets which could be opened through reciprocal trade 
31agreements- However, an increasing number of complaints
32about agricultural imports filtered out of the Midwest.
The implication was that the reciprocal trade agreements 
program had prompted this increase. To counter this crit­
icism, O'Neal contacted Secretary of State Hull and re­
quested information on the import situation. The State 
Department prepared a special memorandum which attributed 
the increased imports to drought conditions rather than to 
the reciprocal trade agreements program. The report con­
cluded that such imports eased the farmer's plight rather
3 3than injured it. Moreover, the State Department claimed
that most of the imports were not competitive with those
Meeting, 1934 (Lincoln); Minnesota Farm Bureau, Resolu­
tions of the Annual Meeting, January I8 , 1934 (St. Paul).
^^The Nation's Agriculture, X (April, 1935), 2, 13-
3 2U.S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
March 11, 1935 , PP • 3304-305, Land O'Lakes News, XV (April, 
1935), 8 ; Nebraska Farmer, LXXVII (September l4, 1935), 4; 
Greenwood County Farm Bureau to Henry Wallace, November I6 , 
1935, NA, RG 16.
^^Herbert Feis to Edward O'Neal, November 5, 1935, 
NA, RG 59, 611.0031/1945.
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3kof the American farm- O'Neal also requested information, 
of a positive nature--statistics concerning increases in 
agricultural exports due to reciprocal trade agreements 
and the possibilities for expanding agricultural exports
35in exchange for concessions on needed industrial products.
In response to this request, the State Department hurriedly 
prepared for A.F.B.F. distribution a pamphlet entitled 
"Agricultural Exports and the Trade Agreements Program.
Throughout 1935 and early 1936 O'Neal worked to 
provide the entire membership with positive information 
on the reciprocity program. He also continued his efforts 
to get unqualified endorsement from the A.F.B.F. leader­
ship. Many Executive Committee meetings were highlighted 
by lively discussions on the program's effectiveness. To 
reinforce his arguments at these meetings, O'Neal asked 
the administration early in 19 36 to work up a memorandum
which would "show improvement in trade as a result of our
37trade agreements program." Due to the short time the
program had been in affect and to a number of other
3kThe State Department memorandum broke down the 
imports to classifications under drought-caused, seasonal, 
and non-competitive. Ibid.
R. Ogg to William Phillips, April 28, 1936,
NA, RG 59, 611.0031/2158.
^^Cordell Hull to W. R. Ogg, May 8 , 1936, NA,
RG 59, 611.0031/2158.
37William Phillips to Francis Sayre, February 28, 
1936, NA, RG 59, 611.0031/2339.
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variables, the State Department was unable to produce 
a document which would substantiate such a conclusion.
The announcement and subsequent negotiation of a 
trade agreement with Canada in late 1935 revealed that 
O'Neal's efforts had not been entirely successful. As 
the first pact with a major agricultural nation, the 
Canadian treaty generated a great deal of discussion in 
the Midwest. Farm representatives watched closely to 
see what concessions would be exchanged by the two 
nations. Chester Gray, Washington representative of the 
A.F.B.F., used the public hearings on the pact as a forum 
to express the "official" Farm Bureau position on the
o Q
reciprocity program. Gray stated that the A.F.B.F. was 
arriving at the conviction "that the reciprocity treat­
ment is not that complete cureall for regaining foreign
trade in farm products, which it was thought to be a
39year ago. . . ." According to Gray, "a reciprocity
spasm comes along about every twenty years in our nation.
koThis is not the first one we have had." He went on to 
state that Tariff Commission studies had revealed "that 
in the former eras of reciprocity no substantial good
38
Committee for Reciprocity Information, Steno­
graphic Report of the hearings before The Committee for 
Reciprocity Information in connection with the negotia- 
tion of a reciprocal trade agreement with Canada,
March 18-21, 1935 (Washington, 1935), P . 622. Cited 
hereafter as Canadian Hearings, 1935-
39lbid. ^°Ibid., p. 637-
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has come either to American agriculture or to American 
4l
industry." Gray informed the Committee for Reciprocity 
Information that the A.F.B.F. was "holding in abeyance
42our final determination on this matter. . . ."
Several months after the public hearings concluded 
in March 1935 the Canadian trade pact was finalized.
Among the concessions granted by the United States were 
tariff reductions on several classifications of cattle, 
potatoes, cream and several other products produced in
43substantial quantity in the Midwest. Before long the
agreement drew considerable fire from several midwestern 
agricultural spokesmen. Elements of the protectionist- 
minded North Dakota Farmers Union, joined by a Minnesota 
group, telegraphed a protest to President Roosevelt and
44Secretary of State Hull. The two groups complained 
that once again the administration had traded the far­
mers ' interests for those of domestic manufacturers and 
foreign agricultural producers. More important the critics
claimed, the Canadian agreement set a dangerous precedent
45for additional trade pacts with agricultural nations.
^^Ibid., p. 638. ^^Ibid., p. 643.
4 3U.S., Department of State, Reciprocal Trade Agree­
ment Between The United States of America and the Dominion 
of Canada, Executive Agreement Series, No. 91 (Washington,
19 36) .
44Farmers Union to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Decem­
ber 9, 1935, NA, RG 59, 611.4231/1487.
^^Ibid.
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A. J. Olson, President of the Minnesota Farm Bureau, 
agreed that the Canadian treaty established a dangerous 
precedent and remarked that if it was "the purpose of 
the Administration to trade a lower tariff on agricul­
tural products for trade in manufactured articles then
46farmers and stockmen should be on their guard."
L. S. Herron of the Nebraska Farmers Union viewed
the new agreement in a different light. Herron pictured
the pact as part of the process of "whittling the tariff
mountain." While acknowledging that some of the pact's
provisions might not be fair to United States farmers,
he suggested that on the whole, it was "probably about
as fair as any negotiated trade treaties we could ex- 
47pect." Aware of the fact that the pact was unpopular 
in the Midwest, the administration used the A.F.B.F. 
national convention as a forum to explain and defend the 
trade a g r e e m e n t s  in general and the Canadian agreement in 
particular.
At O'Neal's suggestion. Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry Wallace was invited to deliver a major address to 
the annual convention in December 1935* Prior to his 
appearance at the A.F.B.F. convention, Wallace solicited
46Minnesota Farm Bureau, Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting, January 6-9, 1936 (St. Paul).
47Nebraska Union Farmer, XXII (December 11,
1935), 4.
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suggestions from Clifford Gregory of The Prairie F armer.
In particular, Wallace asked the midwestern editor what 
points in the Canadian pact most troubled the farmers. 
Gregory informed the Secretary that the treaty threatened 
"to create the first definite rift between farmers and
48the present administration." He urged Wallace to make 
every effort to reconcile the increasing volume of farm 
imports with the crop adjustment program of the A.A.A.
In Gregory's view, the general feeling among farmers was 
"that the only policy that is compatible with the agri­
cultural adjustment program is a policy of reserving the 
home market exclusively for the farmers of this country 
in the case of the products which they can produce effi­
ciently and in sufficient amount." He added that farmers 
were upset because the pacts negotiated to date had not 
lowered the tariff rates of the highly monopolized indus­
tries. He urged Secretary Wallace to give concrete an-
49swers in clear and understandable language. After care­
fully evaluating the suggestions posed by Gregory, Wallace 
admitted that many farmers were ready to rebel over the 
Canadian pact and that the administration had better move 
to reassure them.^^
48Clifford V. Gregory to Henry A. Wallace, Novem­
ber 27, 1935, NA, RG 16.
^^Ibid.
^^Henry Wallace to Harvey Ingham, December 12, 
1935, NA, RG 16.
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Once before the convention, Wallace devoted the
majority of his address to a discussion of the Canadian
trade treaty. He cautioned farmers to take a careful and
objective look at the agreement. Although Canada was a
major exporter of agricultural commodities, a flood of
such products, he said, would not be permitted to enter
the American market and wreck farm p r i c e s . W a l l a c e
pointed out that most of the concessions were limited by
5 2quota restrictions.
Speaking in more general terms, the Secretary
warned against a policy of exclusion. If imports were
excluded, then the United States stood to lose its export
markets. Those areas once producing for the export market
would be forced to change crops and move into competition
5 3with other producers within the United States. He then
related agricultural prosperity to industrial prosperity. 
Wallace maintained that midwestern farmers would "unques­
tionably gain from the increased exportation of manufac-
54tured products to Canada." He pointed to studies indi­
cating that "an increase of $150 million dollars in United 
States factory pay rolls have added from $4 to $6 million 
dollars to the income of farmers in Minnesota, Nebraska
51U.S., Department of Agriculture, Farmers and the
Export Market (Washington, 1935), P- 8 . 
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^^Ibid., pp. 9-10. ^^Ibid., p. 13
Ibid., p . 12.
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5 5. . . and Iowa," In conclusion, Wallace asked the far­
mers to take the long view of reciprocal trade agreements 
as a link in the overall chain to restore prosperity.
Thus, in the initial phase of the trade agreements
program, the administration with O'Neal's assistance used
the A.F.B.F. as a forum to explain and defend to farmers
the reciprocal approach to tariff adjustments. At the
same time, however, discussion continued within the
A.F.B.F. as to the program's merits. Certainly, many in
the state Farm Bureaus of the Upper Midwest did not share
56President O'Neal's enthusiasm."
While the administration worked with the American 
Farm Bureau Federation to promote the trade agreements 
program, another agricultural organization with strong 
ties in the Midwest actively opposed it. From the outset, 
the American National Live Stock Association criticized 
the principle and implementation of reciprocal trade agree­
ments. Upon announcement of the proposal, ranchers imme­
diately equated trade agreements with a lowering of tariff 
rates on beef imports. At the 1934 national convention. 
President Charles Collins voiced the concern of his indus­
try. "Our ambassadors of good will are touring South
55ibid.
^^Minnesota Farm Bureau, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, January 17, 1935 (St. Paul); Kansas Farm Bureau, 
Resolutions of the Annual Meeting, November 1936 (Topeka),
62
America and preaching the glories of reviving foreign
trade by lowering the tariff. It is a beautiful theory,
but it has never been satisfactorily demonstrated just
how the cattlemen would benefit by increased automobile
sales to the Argentine, if these sales are to be paid
57for in dressed beef- . .
The livestock industry vigorously defended its 
right to and need of a high protective tariff. Its 
representatives pointed to the high cost of operation 
which confronted ranchers in the United States. This 
high cost of production made it exceedingly difficult 
for American cattlemen to compete for the domestic mar­
ket with the cheaper-produced foreign beef imports such 
as those from Argentina and Canada. Secretary Wallace's 
repeated comments concerning "inefficient industries" 
did little to calm their fears. The Executive Committee 
of the American National Live Stock met in July 1934 and 
issued a reply to Wallace's statements on "inefficient 
industries. "While an attempt has been made to class 
as inefficient any industry which exists only because of 
tariff protection," the Executive Committee explained.
5 7Materials cited from the American National Live 
Stock Association are located in the collection of that 
organization's records at the University of Wyoming. 
A.N.L.A., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, January 10, 
1934 (Albuquerque, New Mexico).
^^A.N.L.A., Resolutions of the Executive Committee 
Meeting, July 21, 1934 (Denver, Colorado).
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"we maintain that the protective tariff policy is fully
justified by differences in costs of production and living
standards between this country and the principal competing
5 9foreign countries."
The announcement of the proposed trade pact with 
Canada in November, 1935, triggered a tremendous reaction 
within the livestock industry, especially when it was re­
vealed that some concessions to Canadian beef imports 
would be made.^^ The American Cattle Producer, the prin­
cipal organ of the A.N.L.A., issued a stinging attack on 
the trade agreement. The editor informed his readers that 
"a storm of protest, nationwide, has met the announcement 
of the agreement. According to the editorial, the 
United States had granted substantial tariff reductions 
on Canadian surplus agricultural products, while Canada 
reciprocated with some "chickenfeed reductions" on fruits 
and vegetables. Once again, according to the editor, the
^^Ibid.
^^The Canadian trade agreement called for a reduc­
tion in the United States duty from three cents a pound 
to two cents a pound on animals weighing 700 pounds or 
more. However, this reduction applied to only 155,795 
head each year. The United States also granted a reduc­
tion from 2-1/2 cents to 1-1/2 cents a pound on calves 
weighing less than 175 pounds. This reduction applied 
to 51,933 head a year. U.S., Department of State, Reci­
procal Trade Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Dominion of Canada, Executive Agreement 
Series, No. 91 (Washington, 1936), pp. 19-20.
^^The American Cattle Producer, XVII (December, 
1935), 23.
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automobile and manufacturing interests had been the major 
beneficiaries of the tariff while agriculture had lost.^^
The writer in The Producer declared that even more 
important than the granted concessions was the dangerous 
precedent established by the treaty. "Already announce­
ment had been made that Mexico and Argentina will push 
for negotiation of trade agreements long under considéra- 
tion but not at an active stage." The editor went on 
to predict that the trade pact would not remain in force 
very long. "Secretly arrived at, with only farcial oppor­
tunity given American producers to appear in their own 
interests, and with our official cabinet representative 
an ardent advocate of foreign trade, American agriculture 
will rise up and demand that the American market be pre-
64served for the American producer. . . . "
At the 1936 convention of the American National 
Live Stock Association in Phoenix, Arizona, the Canadian 
Trade Agreement emerged as the focal point of discussion.
M. L. Wilson, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, addressed 
the delegates and defended the administration's decision 
to seek an agreement with Canada. He assured the assembled 
ranchers that the Department of Agriculture and others 
involved had carefully studied the proposed tariff reduc­
tions on cattle and had concluded that the agreement would
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 24. ^^Ibid.
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not "significantly" affect the cattle i n d u s t r y . W i l s o n  
also reiterated the oft-repeated administration argument 
that "the cattle industry would benefit through increased
purchasing power in industrial centers resulting from the
, „ 66  agreements."
President Collins acknowledged that the agreement 
might not seriously cripple the cattle industry because 
the total number of cattle permitted to enter at the re­
duced rates was not l a r g e . H o w e v e r ,  he quickly added 
that the United States did not need the imports no matter 
how small they were. Collins again suggested that the 
real "menace" contained in the Canadian agreement was the 
"precedent" it established. In his words, "agriculture 
can no longer depend upon the protection it has formerly 
enjoyed, but must operate with the threat constantly 
hanging over it of further tariff cuts as treaty after 
treaty is being n e g o t i a t e d . A t  the close of the con­
vention, the delegates passed a resolution officially 
condemning the rate reductions in the Canadian pact, and 
criticized the dangerous precedent it established. Also,
Ç\ c
A.N.L.A., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 
January 7-9i 1936 (Phoenix, Arizona), pi 32.
G^ Ibid.
President Collin's address to the convention was 
recorded in the association's journal. The American Cat­
tle Producer, XVII (January, 1936), 11.
^®Ibid.
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the convention urged that "all future tariff or trade
6 9agreements be ratified by the Senate."
It is readily apparent that in 1935 and early 1936 
the reaction of the major farm organizations in the Midwest 
ranged from uncertainty and indecision to outright opposi­
tion. The Roosevelt administration was certainly aware of 
this situation and reacted quickly to counteract the criti­
cism. Members of the Departments of Agriculture and State 
worked vigorously to explain the program's general goals 
and meet the specific complaints which arose. Yet, much 
indecision remained and by mid-1936 the reciprocity pro­
gram in general and competitive imports in particular had 
emerged as a major political issue in the Midwest. As 
November approached more and more Republicans struck out 
at the program in an attempt to win the agrarian vote of 
the Midwest.
69A.N.L.A., Resolutions Adopted at the Annual 
Meeting, January 9, 1936 (Phoenix, Arizona).
CHAPTER IV
NEW DEAL TARIFF POLICY AND THE ELECTION OF I936
As mentioned previously, during the'1932 political 
campaign Franklin Roosevelt made a number of promises to 
agriculture including assurances that tariff rates on 
agricultural products would not be reduced. However, 
several of the early trade agreements such as those with 
Canada and Cuba had included some concessions on agricul­
tural products. The administration explained that most 
of the concessions pertained to non-competitive products 
and those of a competitive nature were limited by quota. 
Inspite of the administration's explanations and justifi­
cations, the question of increased agricultural imports 
deeply troubled many farm leaders in the Midwest. A great 
deal of confusion surrounded the import issue, and farmers 
were uncertain as to whether the imports actually damaged 
their industry or were of little consequence as the admin­
istration claimed. Also, the precise relationship of the 
reciprocal trade agreements program to the increased im­
ports remained unclear. The Republican party sought to 
convert this uncertainty and concern into political gain.
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The division and uncertainty in the Midwest over 
the effects of the trade agreements program was reflected 
by the lack of editorial consensus among the leading farm 
journals. Several of these journals offered considerable 
critical comment on the "increase" of agricultural imports 
and related this increase to the reciprocal trade agree­
ments program. The Dakota F armer portrayed the "deadly 
reciprocal trade treaties" as a guise under which foreign 
agricultural products could be imported into the United 
States.^ This "immense increase" was graphically illus­
trated with a series of charts outlining the increased 
imports of beef and cheese products. The editor attributed 
these increases to the 1935 Canadian trade pact. The ad­
ministration admitted that the cattle market experienced 
a price drop in early 1936; however, it attributed this
"recession" to "heavy domestic marketings of fat cattle"
2and not to Canadian imports. The Dakota F armer informed 
its readers that Washington showed little concern over the 
import issue. Inquiries were either ignored or "passed
^The Dakota Farmer, LVI (April 25, I936), 222.
2
For the period January to June, the 1936 cattle 
imports from Canada amounted to 158,000 head compared to 
72,000 head in the first six months of 1935* With re­
spect to Cheddar cheese, 4?8,000 pounds entered the 
United States during the first six months of 1935 com­
pared to 31826,000 pounds in the same period in 1936.
The 1936 total was equivalent to I .63 percent of domestic 
production. U.S., Department of State, The Midwest and 
the Trade Agreements Program, Commercial Policy Series,
No. 27 (Washington, 1936 T , pp. 59-6l.
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along to someone else 'for attention.'" "Why should this 
great country," asked the editor, "equipped as is no other 
with manpower, intelligence, lands and crops to produce 
all meat and meat products required for its own consump­
tion" permit foreign nations to profit at the expense of
3
the American farmer.
The influential Kansas publication. Capper's F armer, 
unequivocally attributed the increased agricultural imports 
to the trade agreements program and suggested that such 
imports did indeed compete with produce from the American 
farm.^ According to the editor, corn imports jumped from 
347,627 bushels in 1932 to 43,242,296 bushels in 1935. Oat 
imports increased from 38,786 to 10,106,903 bushels, while 
wheat imports soared from 10 to 27 million bushels. Cattle 
imports rose from 95,407 to 364,623 head. In contrast to 
administration statements that drought conditions had ne­
cessitated the majority of the imports. Capper's F armer 
suggested that the American farmer could produce
^The Dakota Farmer, LV (March l4, 1936), I38.
^Capper's Farmer, XLVII (October, 1936), I8 .
^The wheat imports equaled 3*6 percent of domestic 
production. The Agriculture Department attributed corn 
imports to the drought loss of 1 ,003,336,000 bushels in 
1934. U.S., Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Imports; Their Significance to American Farmer^ (Wash­
ington , I93&), P^ o. There were no tariff reductions on 
the grain products mentioned. Corn paid 25 cents a 
bushel, oats I6 cents, and wheat 42 cents a bushel.
U.S., Department of Agriculture, The Drought and Current 
Farm Imports (Washington, 1935), P* 9»
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sufficiently to meet the domestic need.^ These editors 
tried to leave midvrestern farmers with no doubt that they 
were being victimized by the reciprocity program.
The Nebraska Farmer's editorial staff also ques­
tioned the worth of the trade agreements program and took 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace to task for defending 
agricultural imports. "The Secretary produces an array 
of figures in defense of his contention that imports are 
chiefly an imaginary devil, without tails, horns or
pitchforks. Mr. Wallace might have a hard time to con-
7
vince cattle feeders that this is so. . . ." The editor
belittled administration suggestions that the present
volume of imports was too small to appreciably affect
farm prices. To the contrary, he pointed out that even
a small volume of a cheap product could significantly
affect the market. "When there is a surplus above the
normal requirements, the depressing influence on price
is out of proportion to the number involved, creating a
g
buyers market."
These farm journals with wide circulation in the 
Midwest did very little to clarify the tariff issue and 
in fact contributed to the controversy which surrounded
^Capper's Farmer, XLVII (October, 1936), l8 .
^The Nebraska Farmer, LXXVIII (May 23, 1936), 4. 
®Ibid.
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the trade agreements program. The editors made no attempt 
to analyze the program carefully or to define its precise 
relationship to agricultural imports and farm prices. The 
publication of certain figures and charts without qualifi­
cation or explanation tended to offer a one-sided, unfav­
orable image of the trade agreements. Such presentation 
made it extremely difficult for the individual farmer or 
businessman to evaluate the program objectively.
In addition to the editorial criticism of the pro­
gram a number of controversial exhibits, illustrating in­
creased agricultural imports, appeared throughout the
9
Midwest at fairs and farm gatherings. The banner over 
one such exhibit read, "This exhibit proves conclusively 
that we are taking the American farmer and stockman out 
of the foreign market and putting the foreign farmers in 
the American m a r k e t . M a n y  of the exhibits included 
displays of foreign imports such as Canadian wheat, corn 
from Argentina and barley from Holland.
Thus, it was apparent in 1936 that many midwest- 
erners had not abandoned their economic nationalism and 
insisted that the entire domestic market should be re­
tained for the American farmer. This nationalistic
^Wallace's Farmer, LXI (September 12, 1936), 5; 
Nebraska Union Farmer, XXIII (September 9, 1936), 3»
^^The Kansas Stockman, XX (July 1, 1936), 4.
^^Ibid.
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sentiment manifested itself in an Import Conference held 
in Sioux City, Iowa, in April 1936. Sponsored by the 
Sioux City Chamber of Commerce, delegates from Illinois, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Missouri and Iowa attended. The announced intention of 
the meeting was to "protest against importations of agri­
cultural products and their substitutes which we believe
do now and will in the future seriously affect prices of
12American agricultural products." Several midwestern 
farm leaders including H. G. Keeney, President of the 
Nebraska Farmers Union, South Dakota Governor Tom Berry,
J. C . Hohler, Secretary of the Kansas State Board of
13Agriculture and George N. Peek endorsed the meeting.
The administration refused to acknowledge the meeting, 
and Secretary of Agriculture Wallace declined an invita­
tion to attend.
After a series of seminars and general convocations, 
the Conference adopted a number of resolutions attacking 
the New Deal tariff policy and the administration's per­
missive attitude toward agricultural imports. The dele­
gates called for farmers and farm organizations to unite
in an effort to induce Congress to enact legislation
l4leading to a new tariff policy. Above all. Congress
1 2
Sioux City Journal, April 12, 1936. 
^^Ibid., April l4, 1936.
^^Ibid., April 15, 1936.
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should be encouraged to repeal the trade agreements act
and abrogate all trade agreements previously negotiated
under that act. At the same time, imports of all raw
materials should be restricted "in order that American
producers of all goods, materials and commodities may
profit in full measure by adequately developing the
15potentialities of the great domestic market." To 
round out the proposed program. Congress was urged to 
"affect an immediate, adequate and upward revision of 
tariffs on raw materials . . .  to the extent that there 
shall be tariff parity between raw materials and manu­
factured goods. . . .
The positions expressed by the Import Conference 
did not go unchallenged in the Midwest. The Nebraska 
Farm Bureau in its publication Nebraska Agriculture and 
the Des Moines Register declared that the Import Confer­
ence was a hoax. In their opinion, the meeting was 
"staged" in order to "give the appearance of violent agri­
cultural opposition to reciprocal trade pacts and to the
17gradual lowering of tariffs." The Register's editor 
intimated that "eastern" interests and representatives of 
the manganese industry had staged the conference to further
l^ibid. 
l^Ibid.
^^Nebraska Agriculture, V (May l 4 , 1936), 1; 
Des Moines Register, April 19, 1936.
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18their protectionist desires. The editors suggested 
that the meeting certainly did not represent a genuine 
expression of midwestern sentiment.
In addition to the Des Moines Register and the 
Nebraska Agriculture, a number of other midwestern farm 
journals and organizations defended the trade agreements 
program and supported the necessity of limited agricul­
tural imports. 0. 0. Wolf, President of the Kansas Farm 
Bureau, cautioned farmers to be on guard "against propa­
ganda about farm imports when the purpose of this propa-
19
ganda is to prejudice the farmer. . . ." Before they
condemned the program in its initial stages. Wolf asked
farmers to consider the fact that the total value of
agricultural imports in 1935 was approximately one-half
of the 1929 total and also less than the 10- and 20-year
averages. He concluded that the present small volume of
imports did not necessitate the extreme protective meas-
20ures advocated by some.
The Nebraska Union F armer and The Prairie Farmer 
also sought to discount the importance of the agricultural 
imports. The Nebraska publication related the imports to 
the administration's attempts to increase foreign purchasing
1 8
Des Moines Register, April 19, 1936.
^^The Nation's Agriculture (Kansas edition), XV
(November, 1936 ) , 6 
^°Ibid.
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power so necessary before foreign farm markets essential
21to the agricultural industry could be reopened. The
editor of The Prairie F armer explained that the drought
was responsible for the increase of corn and grain imports
so severely criticized by Capper's Farmer. In view of the
fact that livestock men needed additional grain for feed
purposes, it was "only fair to permit grain imports to
come in to make up partially for the shortage and to keep
22grain prices from going much higher." The editor as­
sured Midwesterners that the additional imports would not 
force down the domestic price level because they would 
have to come in over the tariff wall- Thus, livestock 
men stood to benefit, and the grain growers would not be 
hurt in view of the continued high prices. The import
situation,according to the editor, was temporary and next
2 3year's crop would more than fill domestic needs.
Wallace's Farmer, a usual administration supporter,
questioned the motives behind the attack on agricultural
imports. The editor accused the "high tariff crowd" of
trying to trick the farmer with an old type of shell 
24game. "The tariff shell game, in which the farmer is
21
Nebraska Union Farmer, XXII (August l4, 1935)i 10
2 2
The Prairie Farmer, CVII (January 19, 1935), 6 .
^^Ibid.
24
Wallace's Farmer, LX (March 30, 1935), 2.
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the perennial victim, consists in getting the farmer
excited about imports of farm products, so that he can
be persuaded to agree to high tariffs all the way down
the line. Such high tariffs are usually worth a nickel
or less to farmers, but are worth millions to industrial
25beneficiaries." Farmers were cautioned to examine im­
port figures carefully. Isolated figures might sound 
impressive, but when compared to total domestic produc­
tion their significance diminished considerably. The 
journal's editorial staff also implied that the Repub­
lican party was encouraging the import controversy with 
the hope it would pay dividends in the November election.
Without doubt, the reciprocal trade agreements pro­
gram and agricultural imports had emerged as a leading 
political issue in the Midwest. In fact, shortly after 
the program was initiated in 1934, several midwestern 
Democrats acknowledged that the reciprocity proposal was
a touchy issue and one which could have unfavorable polit-
27ical consequences for the party in power. Republican 
leaders in the Midwest had quickly sensed the concern 
over agricultural imports and the uncertainty about the
26
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., LXI (September 12, 1936), 5.
^^Edward C. Richer to Cordell Hull, August 27,
1934, NA, RG 59, 611.0031/1013; Harry B. Coffee to 
Cordell Hull, July I6 , 1935, NA, RG 59, 611.423 Cattle/30.
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trade agreements program. The national Republican plat­
form of 1936 "condemned the secret negotiation of recip­
rocal trade treaties without public hearing or legislative
28approval." If placed in office, the Republicans promised 
to repeal the reciprocity law. Mindful of the import con­
troversy, the platform called for protection for the Ameri­
can farmer against importation of all livestock, dairy, and 
agricultural products, substituted therefor, and deriva-
29
tives therefrom,which will depress American farm prices."
The Republican Congressional Committee distributed 
a number of press releases, pamphlets and broadsides in 
the Midwest in an attempt to discredit the New Deal tariff 
policies. One pamphlet announced that "Roosevelt the Im­
porter" had "torn down the tariff walls, lowered tariff
rates all along the agricultural line, and almost wrecked
30the country's great dairy industry." The pamphlets con­
tained page after page of isolated figures with no quali­
fication or explanation--the implication being that all 
the enumerated products now came in duty free because of 
the reciprocal trade agreements program. For example, one 
pamphlet decried the great loss in wheat exports without
28Henry S. Commager, ed.. Documents of American 
History (New York, I963), p. 356.
^^Ibid.
30Republican Congressional Committee, Roosevelt 
the Importer (Washington, I936), p. 3 , Drawer 175, 
Agriculture Folder, Francis Case Papers.
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mentioning the drought and its relationship to wheat 
31production. The Republican brochures were particularly
critical of the most-favored-nation clause. The imple­
mentation of this principle allowed many nations to profit 
from tariff concessions while making no concessions to the 
United States.
The Republican Congressional Committee concentrated 
much of its criticism on the Canadian trade treaty. Sev­
eral press releases detailed the "disaster" within the 
cattle industry due to the agreement. According to this 
announcement, the pact had unleashed a "flood of foreign
33cattle" into the United States which had wrecked prices.
The dairy industry stood to lose almost $380,000,000 while
the beef cattle industry faced losses approaching 
34$650 000,000. The Republicans insisted that additional
imports of pork and cheese products further compounded the
farmers' plight.
Pamphlets distributed by Republicans in the Midwest
featured statements by Minnesota Representative August H.
Andresen. Andresen suggested to his fellow midwesterners
that the New Deal tariff policy was "giving our American
35market to foreign farmers." Andresen attributed three
^^Ibid., p. 2.
32
Ibid., p. 5. Press Release by Republican Con­




domestic problems to the administration tariff policy. 
First, the large quantity of agricultural imports de­
pressed and reduced the price level on domestically pro­
duced farm commodities. He also suggested that the trade 
agreements program as implemented by the New Deal was in­
consistent with administration efforts to reduce domestic 
production. Andresen pointed out that American farmers 
had retired forty million acres of farm land, but on the 
other hand foreign farm imports equaled production from 
twenty-five to thirty million acres a b r o a d . L a s t l y ,  
the Minnesota Republican equated imports with domestic 
unemployment. According to Andresen, a translation of 
agricultural imports for 1935 into persons employed dis­
closed that from 2 ,500,000 to 3,000,000 persons could have 
been employed in the United States in the production and
processing of the imported products had they been pro-
37duced in the United States.
Once the political campaign of 1936 commenced. 
Republicans flooded farmers in the Upper Midwest with 
materials highly critical of the trade agreements program. 
Political dialogue on the tariff issue was particularly 
prominent in Iowa, Nebraska and South Dakota. In Secre­
tary Wallace's home state of Iowa, the trade agreements 
program received widespread attention during the campaign.
3^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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The state's two major newspapers, the Sioux City Journal 
and the Des Moines Register split over the issue. The 
Journal had opposed the measure in 1934 and now carried
o O
Republican attacks on the program. The Des Moines
Register, despite its traditional Republicanism, supported
the Roosevelt proposal and criticized the Tandon ticket
39for adopting an anti-trade agreements plank.
The Iowa Republican platform sternly criticized
the administration's tariff policy, and the Republican
congressional candidates discussed the program at length
40on the campaign trail. Fred Biermann, Democratic can­
didate for the House of Representatives in the Fourth 
District, acknowledged that the Republicans were winning 
votes on the tariff issue. In a letter to Secretary of 
State Hull, Biermann encouraged the administration to 
step up its defense of the program and also to counter
the Republican Congressional Committee by providing mate-
41rial in defense of the reciprocal tariff policy.
While the Fourth District race stirred a great 
deal of interest in northeast Iowa, the eyes of the entire
^^Sioux City Journal, March 31, 1934.
^^Des Moines Register, October 5, 1936.
*^^ Ibid. , July 11, 1936; Sioux City Journal,
May 12, October 8, 21, 1936.
^^Fred Biermann to Cordell Hull, July I8 , 1936, 
Folder 17, Box 5, Fred Biermann Papers.
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state were on the battle between incumbent Republican 
Senator L. J. Dickinson and Democrat Guy Gillette of 
Cherokee. Both men were well known in Iowa political 
circles, especially Dickinson who had emerged as an out­
spoken critic of the New Deal. Dickinson had represented 
Iowa since 1919--first as a congressman and after 1930 in 
the Senate. In 1934 when the Roosevelt administration 
introduced the reciprocity proposal, Dickinson lead Mid­
west opposition to the bill. After voting against the 
measure, he had constantly criticized the program and 
the agricultural imports that it supposedly permitted. 
Gillette on the other hand, had voted for the bill as a 
congressman in 1934 and had continually supported the 
administration's efforts to reopen world trade through 
reciprocity.
At every opportunity Dickinson lashed out at 
New Deal tariff policy. On many occasions he quoted 
figures and percentages which, without qualification, 
appeared very startling. In an article for The Rotarian, 
Dickinson suggested that the wheat imports for the first 
ten months of 1935 represented an increase of 59,700 per­
cent over 1932 and seriously threatened the American far- 
42mer. He failed to mention the drought or to show that
42A copy of the original manuscript for Dickinson's 
article, along with a number of radio speeches dealing 
with the reciprocal trade agreements program are in the 
Dickinson Collection. Folder IO3 , Box 6, L. J. Dickinson 
Papers.
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imported wheat had to clear the tariff wall and thus did
not significantly affect the domestic price level. He
also implied that the trade agreements program had thrown
open United States markets to Argentine grain, livestock
and dairy products despite the fact that no trade agree-
4 3ment had been negotiated with that country.
Wallace's F armer endorsed Gillette and took 
Dickinson to task for his "irresponsible" statements 
about New Deal tariff policy. According to the editor, 
by his support of the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill and oppo­
sition to the reciprocity program, Dickinson had opposed 
every constructive effort by Washington to regain foreign
44markets essential to agricultural prosperity. While it 
received much attention, it is impossible to estimate the 
effect of the trade agreements issue on the outcome of 
the election. But for whatever reasons, Gillette ousted 
the Republican incumbent in a close race.
The Republicans may have emphasized the trade 
agreements issue even more in Nebraska than in any other 
midwestern state. In Nebraska, as in the other midwest­
ern states, the Republican National Committee publicized 
the position of George Peek. Pamphlets reminded farmers 
that the former administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment
^^Ibid.
44
Wallace's Farmer, LXI (April 2$, 1936), 4; 
(June 2, 1936 ) , 5 .
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Act opposed the New Deal's tariff policy and believed that 
the trade agreements program was "breaking down the Ameri­
can market for American agriculture and industry" and was
45
"contributing to the prolongation of the farm crisis."
The livestock industry was very important to Nebraska's
economy and the Republicans were well aware of cattlemens'
46
concern over the reciprocity program. With this concern 
in mind, the Republican publicity releases dwelled at 
length on the Canadian trade treaty. Charts and figures 
detailed the recent increase in livestock imports and 
related them to the Canadian pact.^^
Nebraska Democrats expressed the fear that the 
trade agreements issue would cost them votes in November.
In an attempt to counter Republican criticism, Democratic 
leaders and candidates discussed the New Deal tariff policy 
in general terms and emphasized the overall gains for agri­
culture under the New Deal. Farmers were reminded that 
foreign markets could not be reopened if the United States
48refused to accept any imports in return. Democratic
Political Parties, Campaign Material Distributed 
in Nebraska. Folder 29, Box 2, MSS 497, Nebraska Histori­
cal Society.
46Representative Harry Coffee stated that ?2 percent 
of Nebraska's gross farm income was derived from the sale 
of livestock or livestock products. Canadian Hearings, 
1935, p. 399.
4?Political Parties, Campaign Material Distributed 




advertisements dealt at length with the question of agri­
cultural imports. The Democrats maintained that these 
imports were largely non-competitive. In the case where 
incoming agricultural products might have been competi­
tive, quotas imposed sufficient restrictions. In response 
to Republican statements on corn and wheat imports, the 
Democrats informed Nebraskans that no tariff reductions 
had been granted on either product, and whatever the case, 
the amount of corn and wheat that came over the tariff 
wall was insignificant. In 1935 wheat imports amounted 
to less than 4 percent of the domestic crop. Total corn
imports equaled an amount that could be grown in one
49Nebraska county.
In order to counter the Republican criticism of 
livestock imports, the Democrats published several pam­
phlets dealing with the state of the livestock industry 
under the New Deal, and the effect of imports on prices.
One publication noted that, despite the Canadian trade 
pact, cattle imports in 1936 would be smaller than in 
1935 and, more important, well under the years prior to 
the "Hoover D e p r e s s i o n . W h i l e  de-emphasizing imports, 
the pamphlets pointed to increases in farm income since 
1933- F or example, during the first six months of 1933 
the United States imported only 460 head of cattle and 
farm income from beef cattle totaled $175i792,000. However,
^^Ibid. ^°Ibid,
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in the first six months of 1936 the United States imported 
158,000 head of Canadian cattle, but farm income from beef 
cattle totaled $382 , 357,000.
Nebraska Democrats offered farm income figures to 
support a basic Democratic contention that in times of 
higher prices imports were always going to be greater 
than during periods of low prices. Nebraska cattlemen 
were told that the "tariff-monopoly gang has its errand 
boys and clackers among the western cattlemen and their 
associations. They are misrepresenting the Canadian Trade 
Agreement to serve political ends, in an attempt to ob­
scure the real and unprecedented support the Roosevelt
5 2administration has given the cattle industry."
During the course of the campaign, several leading
Republicans came to Nebraska to support congressional
candidates. Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg and
Arthur Capper of Kansas made several appearances and con-
5 3centrated on New Deal tariff policies. Capper acknowl­
edged that he had voted for the trade agreements program 
in 1934, but now opposed it because it had not provided 
the foreign markets promised. Instead, Capper contended
that the American farmer was losing his own domestic mar-
54ket to the foreign importer.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
5 1
Scottsbluff Republican, September 13, 1936; 
Beatrice Daily Sun, October l4, 1936.
54
Beatrice Daily Sun, October l4, 1936.
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Capper's political appearances sparked substantial 
editorial comment- The Lincoln Star suggested that 
Capper's reversal on the trade agreements program repre­
sented political considerations rather than a conscientious
5 5
evaluation of the program's merits. The Kansas Senator
had not been deceived as he claimed, said the editor;
rather, Capper voted for the measure knowing that it was
right and beneficial to agriculture. When the Republican
party adopted an anti-trade agreements position, however.
Capper was then forced to reverse his position or not
remain a "regular" within the p a r t y . T h e  Norfold Daily
News defended Senator Capper and echoed his criticism of
the reciprocity program. According to the editor. Capper
and others in the Midwest "did not understand that the
administration was about to open our markets to the cat-
57tie, wheat, corn and dairy products of Canada." Devel­
opment of foreign trade was desirable, but the editor sug­
gested that many midwesterners questioned the reciprocal
, 58 approach.
The 1936 election in Nebraska produced few sur­
prises and neither party gained or lost congressional 
representation. George Norris, the dominant political
^^Lincoln Star, October I6 , 1936.
56.Ibid.
^^Norfolk Daily News, October 22, 1936
^^Ibid., October 13, 1936.
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figure in Nebraska, supported Roosevelt's reciprocal
trade agreements program, but he said little about it
5 9during the campaign. Norris had become such a polit­
ical institution that he easily defeated the Democratic 
candidate and the regular Republican candidate, Robert 
Simmons, who had devoted much of his campaign to an
attack on the trade agreements program and agricultural
 ^ 60 imports.
As in Nebraska and Iowa, South Dakota Republicans 
sought to turn concern over the trade agreements program 
into votes in November- This issue caused grave concern 
among Democrats. Democratic Governor Tom Berry, a 
rancher, on several occasions publicly expressed his con­
cern over agricultural imports and requested that Presi­
dent Roosevelt look into the m a t t e r . T h e  Democratic 
State Central Committee urged Secretary of Agriculture 
Wallace to come to the Midwest and "put away the bogey" 
of agricultural i m p o r t s . C o m m i t t e e  Chairman Herbert E. 
Hitchcock informed the administration that South Dakota
S 9
Hastings Daily Tribune, October 23, 1936.
^"Norfolk Daily News, October 21, 1936; Omaha 
World Herald, October 28, 1936; Chadron Journal, Octo- 
ber 16, 193^ •
^^Thomas Berry to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 4,
1935, R.L., O.F. 6l-A.
^^Herbert Hitchcock to Roscoe Retich, May l8,
1936, NA, RG 16.
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Republicans had launched "the most intensive system of
propaganda the Corn Belt has ever witnessed. Every import
from a pint of Scotch or a gill of cream to a ship load
of Argentine corn has been duly recorded over the radio
through local Chamber of Commerce speakers and through
6 3local political sources.” In Hitchcock's estimation, 
if the administration did not strongly present its case 
in the Midwest, the issue could result in political 
disaster for the Democrats.
The pleas from midwestern Democrats did not go 
unheeded. In fact, the Roosevelt administration was 
fully aware of the midwestern concern over the trade 
agreements question long before the summer of 1936. As 
early as June 1934 the State Department had suggested 
that the public might have to be educated on the merits
64of the program. Shortly after Congress passed the
reciprocity measure, the State Department and the Depart­
ment of Agriculture began to issue a series of pamphlets 
designed to explain the program. Later, these memoranda 
dealt with specific problems such as agricultural imports 
and the d r o u g h t . A s  November of 1936 approached. New
^^Ibid.
^^Henry Grady to Francis Sayre, June 28, 1934,
NA, RG 59, 611.0031/785.
^^The publications in the first 2-1/2 years in­
cluded: U.S., Department of Agriculture, Farmers and the
Export Market (Washington, 1935); U.S., Department of
89
Deal spokesmen undertook a concerted effort to sell the 
trade agreements program in the Midwest. Over a period 
of several months, President Roosevelt, Secretary of State 
Hull and Secretary of Agriculture Wallace all toured the 
Midwest and vigorously defended the reciprocity program.
Early in May 1936 , Secretary Wallace traveled to 
Lincoln, Nebraska, to address a gathering of farmers. The 
main part of his speech dealt with the tariff. Speaking 
in generalities at first, Wallace warned the farmers 
"that they would be sold down the river if they accept a 
high tariff policy as a 'cure-all for agriculture.'"^^
He reminded the audience that manufacturing concerns and 
not agriculture had always profited the most from the 
high protective tariff.
Cognizant of the concern in the livestock industry, 
Wallace sought to calm the fears of Nebraska cattlemen.
He declared that there was no reason for livestock raisers 
to fear that the Canadian pact would allow the importation 
of enough cattle to depress the domestic market. In fact, 
Wallace explained that "the new markets which the pact is
Agriculture, Agriculture's Interest in America's World 
Trade (Washington, 1935); U.S., Department of Agriculture, 
Agricultural Imports : Their Significance to American Far­
mers (Washington, 1936) ; U.S., Department of Agriculture, 
The Drought and Current Farm Imports (Washington, 1935); 
U.S., Department of State, The Midwest and the Trade Agree­
ments Program, Commercial Policy Series, No. 2? (Washing- 
ton, 1936).
^^Lincoln Star, May 4, 1936.
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creating for manufactured goods in the eastern part of 
the United States is improving conditions there and 
enabling those people to buy more livestock, dairy and 
farm products from Nebraska farmers." The Secretary 
was also careful to discredit reports that agricultural 
imports in general were greatly damaging the domestic 
market- He estimated that imports of wheat, corn, beef 
and pork products did not affect Nebraska farm produc­
tion more than $10,000 a year one way or another.
The Republicans, however, kept attacking the 
reciprocity program. When Republican candidate Alfred M. 
Tandon toured the Midwest he repeatedly attacked trade 
agreements. On September 25 in Minneapolis, Tandon de­
livered a major address on trade agreements entitled
6 9"Sold Down the River." He informed his audience that
he did not oppose the principle of reciprocity, nor did
70he favor a policy of isolation. However, for several 
reasons the Roosevelt approach to reciprocity was damag­
ing the interests of the American farmer. According to 
Tandon, the administration had chosen the wrong countries 
with which to negotiate trade agreements. To deal with 
major agricultural nations such as Canada meant certain 
concessions on competing agricultural commodities.^^
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
^^Vital Speeches, III (October 15, 1936), 23 - 
^*^Ibid. , p. 24. ^^Ibid. , p. 25 .
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Landon also questioned the method of negotiating 
the treaties. In his view, the whole process was a "star- 
chamber proceeding," and the public hearings amounted to 
little more than window dressing. Commodities under con­
sideration were not enumerated and thus a witness might 
be wasting his time and that of the Committee. In addi­
tion, Landon suggested that the administration paid scant
heed to the statements of the "little fellow" once he did
7 2offer testimony.
The Republican candidate viewed the unconditional 
most-favored-nation principle as another major shortcoming 
within the program. He conceded that the principle might
7 3have some merit if the other nations would employ it also.
But most nations did not, and thus the United States was
making concessions without receiving anything in return.
Finally, Landon questioned the original congressional grant
7 kof tariff-making power to the President.
As Landon indicated, the New Deal's decision to 
employ the unconditional most-favored-nation principle 
caused some concern in the Midwest and this concern mounted 
as the number of agreements increased. The critics rea­
soned that such a policy enabled nations to obtain conces­
sions from the United States without granting reciprocal 
concessions of their own. The administration answered the
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid,
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criticism with several arguments. First, Secretary of 
State Hull maintained that it was the responsibility of 
the United States to take the lead in fostering a spirit 
of goodwill and cooperation in international trade. Sec­
ond, and most important, the administration pointed out 
that in most cases the United States limited its duty 
concessions to those products of which the negotiating 
country was the "principal supplier." That is, should 
Russia be the major international producer of manganese, 
the United States would seek to reach a concession set­
tlement on manganese with that nation. Administration 
spokesmen suggested that by pursuing the "principal sup­
plier" policy the United States limited the advantages 
gained by other nations through the most-favored-nation 
clause and thus, this country retained its bargaining 
position with other nations.
Shortly after Tandon's speech. President Roosevelt
visited the Midwest and replied to Tandon's charges. In
speeches at Minneapolis and Omaha, the President accused
the Republicans of harboring a narrow, nationalistic view
of world trade. Roosevelt referred to figures reflecting
increased consumption and better farm prices as proof that
"the New Deal reciprocal tariff program was benefiting
7 5American industry and agriculture." He reminded his
^^Minneapolis Tribune, October 10, 1936; Omaha 
World Herald, October 11, 1936.
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listeners that prior to the reciprocity program, national 
tariffs, embargoes, and import quotas had dropped farm 
prices throughout the world to their lowest point in his­
tory. This condition had by no means been completely 
eliminated; however, the trade agreements program had be­
gun to reopen the foreign markets so vital to agricultural 
prosperity - To abandon the program at this time, would 
mean the loss of all gains made in the past several years. 
In the closing weeks of the campaign. Secretary Hull and
Secretary Wallace followed up Roosevelt's visits and re-
77enforced his defense of the reciprocity program.
The tariff had become a vital issue in the Midwest 
during the 1936 campaign. However, the impact of this 
issue on the outcome of the election is difficult to 
assess. Roosevelt carried the six upper midwestern states 
by a margin of 77^,416 votes which represented a loss of 
approximately 70,000 votes from his 1932 m a r g i n . H e  
suffered his greatest losses in North and South Dakota.
In 1932 Roosevelt gathered 69.6 percent of the vote in 
North Dakota, but slipped to 59*6 percent in 1936. In 
South Dakota his 1932 percentage of 63.6 percent fell to 
54 percent in 1936.^^
^^Ibid. ^^Des Moines, Register, October 30, 1936. 
7 A
Edgar E. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt: The
Presidential Vote, 1932-1944 (Stanford, 19^7), pp. 43-44.
79lbid.
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While Roosevelt's overall loss in the six states 
was not dramatic, an examination of a number of county 
returns indicates that many ranchers and dairymen had 
become disenchanted with the New Deal. In northeastern 
Iowa, the four counties of Allamakee, Howard, Mitchell 
and Winneshiek housed a substantial dairy industry. In 
1932 Roosevelt carried these four counties by over 8,000 
votes. However, in 1936 his margin slipped to less than 
2,000. In the southern section of the state, many ranchers 
also deserted the New Deal camp. In one five-county area, 
Roosevelt's 1932 margin of 6,000 votes was reduced to
801 ,500. The same pattern existed in the ranching areas 
of Nebraska and South Dakota.
No dramatic change in the congressional delegations 
occurred. Despite the fears of some midwestern Democrats,
82the Republicans gained only three seats. While no great 
political turnover transpired, the campaign did demonstrate
^^Ibid., pp. 89-93.
81In seven ranching counties of Fall River, Harding, 
Haakon, Jones, Meade, Perkins and Ziebach in western South 
Dakota, Roosevelt carried the 1936 vote by 646 after win­
ning by a margin of 3345 in 1932. The same was true in a 
ten-county section of western Nebraska where Roosevelt's 
1932 margin of 3497 was reduced to 973 in 1936. Ibid.,
pp. 123-37, 151-54.
82In Minnesota, the Republicans lost 3 seats to 
the Farmer-Labor party; however, in the other five states 
the Republicans gained a total of three seats at the ex­
pense of the Democrats. C. B. Deane, comp., Congressional 
Directory, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1937).
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some rather deep hostility in the Midwest toward the trade 
agreements program. Midwesterners were certainly care­
fully watching the progress of the program. Should the 
administration negotiate another agreement with a major 
agricultural nation such as Canada, and farmers become 
convinced that the program was not in their best inter­
ests, the next election might reveal a more marked politi­
cal turnover.
CHAPTER V 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM RENEWED
With a convincing mandate from the people, Franklin 
Roosevelt returned to Washington to begin his second term. 
The reciprocal trade agreements program emerged as one of 
the most important pieces of administration legislation 
before the new Congress. The trade agreements act re­
quired congressional renewal at the end of every three 
years; thus, early in January the Roosevelt administration 
mapped its strategy to insure renewal for the program. In 
a letter to Robert Doughton, Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee and administration floor manager for the 
reciprocity bill. President Roosevelt outlined the pro­
gram's merits and the need for its continuation. He pic­
tured the fifteen trade agreements already negotiated as 
a great step forward in the movement to liberalize world 
trade.^ According to Roosevelt, only through "painstaking 
effort had the administration been able to improve the
U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Commit­
tee on Ways and Means, Hearings on H. J. Res. 96: Extend­
ing Reciprocal Foreign Trade Agreement Act, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (January 21, 22"^  23, 25, and 2’é”7 1937), P* 2. 
Cited hereafter as House Hearings, 1937»
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American export market while at the same time '’scrupu­
lously" protecting the interests of producers in the 
domestic market. Roosevelt expressed satisfaction with 
the program's accomplishments, but emphasized that the 
overall task was far from complete. In order to sustain 
this "favorable and promising trend toward a normaliza­
tion and expansion of international trade," the President
2
urged Congress to extend the trade agreements program.
While acknowledging the important economic ramifi­
cations, Roosevelt emphasized even more the program's po­
tential contributions to the maintenance of world peace. 
"Economic strife," he explained, "resulting from inordinate 
or discriminatory trade barriers is one of the most fruit­
ful sources of political animosity of military conflict.
A policy designed to reduce excessive trade barriers and 
to establish equality of trade rights is a powerful instru­
ment of economic appeasement and stability. It thus serves
3
to strengthen the foundations of world peace."
Again as in 1934, the Senate Finance Committee and 
House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the tariff 
act concurrent with the congressional debate. Several mid- 
western congressmen and farm organizations figured promi­
nently in the congressional floor debate and the hearings. 
The House Ways and Means Committee commenced its hearings
^Ibid. ^Ibid,
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late in. January with the Senate Finance Committee begin­
ning in mid-February. Secretary of State Hull headed the 
delegation of administration witnesses appearing before 
the Committees to defend the program- Secretary Hull 
stressed the United States role in international leader­
ship and the positive contributions of the reciprocity 
program to world peace. He expanded upon Roosevelt's 
message to Congress by relating such domestic ills as 
unemployment, low living standards, and "general economic
distress within nations" to the nationalistic, protection-
4
ist policies predominant in the past. Hull also reiter­
ated his 1934 contention that an emergency situation as 
now faced the nation necessitated emergency measures such 
as the trade agreements program--the implication being
that in normal times such a grant of power to the Presi-
5
dent might not be necessary or even admissable.
During the course of his testimony, several Com­
mittee members asked the Secretary to evaluate the rela­
tionship of the trade agreements program to the agricul­
tural industry. Not fully equipped to do so, Hull replied 
mostly in generalities. Concerning the question of agri­
cultural imports, he suggested that the increased imports 
signaled a rise in farm prosperity rather than a threat to 
that prosperity. He pointed out that at the height of the
4 c
Ibid., p. 5* Ibid., p. 6.
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Depression imports had been reduced to a dribble; however,
at the same time the farmer was getting practically nothing
for the commodities he produced for the captive market.^
Now, in spite of the increased imports, the farmer received
higher prices even though he produced more. According to
Hull, the increased farm income of $3,000,000,000 was much
more significant than the limited imports so loudly de-
7
nounced by some.
Hull's general remarks on the import issue aroused 
Minnesota Representative Harold Knutson. A constant critic 
of agricultural imports and the trade agreements program, 
Knutson requested and received permission to enter a list 
of import-export figures in the record. Knutson's quota­
tions referred to the period 1934-193^i the first three 
years of the reciprocity program. In an attempt to relate 
an increasingly unfavorable balance of trade to the trade 
agreements program, Knutson pointed out that American ex­
ports had increased 7 percent, but at the same time imports 
had expanded 24 percent.^
The Hull-Knutson exchange mirrored the larger dia­
logue on the issue of imports taking place in the Midwest. 
By 1937 a virtual war of words had commenced as both sides 
bandied about numbers and percentages in an attempt to 
justify their position. The opponents of reciprocity
^Ibid., p. 10. ^Ibid., p. 11. ^Ibid., p. l4,
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tried to show how much imports were increasing to the 
detriment of midwestern farmers by stressing the in­
crease in bushels or pounds of a particular commodity.
On the other hand, supporters of the program attempted 
to show how insignificant agricultural imports were by 
using percentages of total United States production.
The discussion of wheat and corn imports by the 
administration and the critics provides a case in point. 
Referring to wheat, the critics, using specific amounts, 
claimed that the United States had imported over twenty- 
seven million bushels in 1935* This seemed like a 
frightening figure to farmers who were not getting over 
60 cents a bushel for wheat. The administration, on the 
other hand, tended to discount the wheat imports. While 
acknowledging that there had been an increase, the admin­
istration stressed that the imports represented only 3*6 
percent of domestic production. This was an obvious 
effort to make wheat imports appear inconsequential.
The same was true with corn. Opponents of reciprocity 
informed midwestern farmers that over forty-three mil­
lion bushels had entered the United States in 1935, 
while administration officials pointed out that the corn 
imports equaled only 2 percent of domestic production. 
There is no doubt but that the war of figures confused 
many farmers, as well as others, and made it difficult
101
for supporters and opponents of the program to reach any
9
common understanding.
The conclusion of a major trade agreement with 
Canada introduced a new element into the import contro­
versy as the subject of quotas arose. Administration 
spokesmen noted that tariff concessions to Canadian live­
stock amounted to only slightly over 1 percent of domestic 
production or some 207,000 head. However, the critics 
pointed out that in 1936 a total of 399,113 head entered 
the United States. While not all of this larger total 
was eligible for the tariff concession, the critics main­
tained that the increased imports had a depressing effect 
on the domestic market price. In order to illustrate the 
magnitude of the increase in livestock imports, the crit­
ics pointed out that the 1936 total of 399,113 compared 
with the 1934 figure of 57,679*^^ While the administra­
tion tended to minimize the imports, to the midwestern 
farmer, struggling to stay in business and operating on a 
marginal basis, any competitive imports appeared threat­
ening and senseless.
9
Report of the Republican Agricultural Committee. 
Agricultural Committee Folder, Box 477, Hope Papers; U.S., 
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Imports: Their
Significance to American Farmers (Washington, 1936),
ppT l-l4.
^^Report of the Republican Agricultural Committee. 
Agricultural Committee Folder, Box 477, Hope Papers; U.S., 
Department of State, The Midwest and the Trade Agreements 
Program, Commercial Policy Series, No. 27 (Washington,
1936), pp. 56-6 0.
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Hull refused to engage Knutson in a statistical
debate and accused the Minnesota Representative and the
other critics of being short-sighted. He remarked that
he had "not heard a single gentleman who has been looking
for some little temporary change or trend of exports or
imports whisper the word 'peace' or show the slightest
interest in carrying forward a program such as we have
for that purpose, or offer one h i m s e l f . H u l l  claimed
that the increased importation referred to by Knutson had
not been prompted by the trade agreements program. Hull
offered the administration argument that the majority of
the foreign imports could be attributed to the recent
drought conditions and thus the imports stood to enhance
12rather than threaten farm prosperity.
In addition to the import issue, Representative
Knutson questioned the administration's decision to employ
the most-favored-nation principle. He implied that the
trade agreements program had been utilized as a diplomatic
1 3lever by the State Department. He referred specifically
to negotiations with Great Britain. According to Knutson,
a possible trade pact with the British was contingent upon
a United States promise not to pass mandatory neutrality
legislation and an agreement to make a new war-debt settle- 
14ment. Secretary Hull remarked sharply that such "rumors"
11 1 ?
Ibid. Ibid.
^^Ibid., pp. 18-1 9 . l^Ibid., p. 2 0 .
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are usually initiated by "some trouble-making person who 
is a thousand percent more interested in some little, 
picayunish personal consideration than he is in peace
15
and well-being among the important civilized nations."
Only two farm "spokesmen," August Andresen of Min­
nesota and Charles Holman of the National Cooperative Milk 
Producers Federation, appeared before the Ways and Means 
Committee. Congressman Andresen expressed "strenuous 
opposition" to renewal of the trade agreements program.
He suggested that the reciprocity program in general and 
the Canadian pact in particular had been "serious detri­
ments" to the dairy and cattle farmers of Minnesota. Con­
trary to administration reports, Andresen maintained that 
the influx of Canadian products had indeed driven down 
domestic prices of certain commodities produced in the 
Upper Midwest. He raised again the oft-repeated contention 
that the admittance of agricultural imports was inconsist­
ent with the crop restriction program sponsored by the New
Deal. Andresen portrayed the trade agreements program as
17"wrong, un-American" and a program deserving repeal.
The National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation 
was the only agricultural organization with a midwestern 
constituency to appear before the House Committee. Charles 
Holman, the Federation's secretary, discussed at length the
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 530. ^^Ibid.
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effect of the trade agreements program on the dairy indus­
try and submitted several amendments for consideration. 
Contrary to the testimony of Secretary Hull, Holman sug­
gested that real farm income had not improved and that the 
reciprocity program certainly had not benefited the dairy 
industry. In particular, he maintained that higher farm 
prices did not necessarily mean increased profits. Due 
to higher labor cost and the high price of feeds, the cur­
rent 33-cent butter was less profitable to Minnesota dairy-
18men than 25- or 26-cent butter had been in 1934. Holman 
informed the Committee that, despite glowing administra­
tion reports, a number of major midwestern dairy interests 
such as Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. and Twin City Milk
Producers Association of Minnesota were currently operat­
ic
ing at substantial losses.
The Milk Producers representative^along with Repre­
sentative Knutson, also questioned Hull's assertion that 
small quantities of imports did not adversely affect a 
particular industry. Like many midwestern critics, both 
men referred to the Canadian treaty. Holman complained 
that internationally controlled dairy organizations picked
out strategic markets and flooded them with Canadian cheese 
20or butter. This action momentarily broke the market and
caused great losses. Holman also criticized the beef con­
cessions granted by the administration in the Canadian
^^Ibid., pp. 362-63. ^^Ibid., p. 363. ^^Ibid.
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agreement. In his opinion, despite the quota provisions,
cattle imports had depressed the American market when
Canadian producers flooded the market in a rush to get
cattle into the United States under the quota provision
21and the accompanying rate reduction.
Much of Holman's testimony consisted of a two-man 
dialogue with Representative Knutson on the evils of the 
trade agreements program and the Canadian agreement. How­
ever, on several occasions Otha Wearin, Committee member
from Iowa, interrupted to defend the administration tariff 
2 2policy. When Knutson attacked increased butter imports,
Wearin reminded his colleague from Minnesota that the
23Canadian pact included no concessions on butter. Wearin 
also belittled Knutson's criticism of canned beef imports 
by pointing out that the American cattle producer did not 
"produce the type of beef that is produced in South America
2kfor the purpose of canning."
At the conclusion of his testimony, Holman offered 
several amendments favored by the dairy industry. In par­
ticular, the Federation called for Senate ratification of
21
Ibid., p. 370.
2 2While a number of midwestern congressmen supported 
the reciprocal trade agreements program with their votes, 
Wearin was about the only one to defend the program actively 
both in committee and on the floor of Congress.
^^ibid., p. 367.
24
Ibid . , p . 36 9 •
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all trade agreements and cancellation of the most-favored- 
25nation clause. Holman also labeled the public hearings
procedure most inadequate. Under the present framework, 
rather than a specific enumeration of commodity concessions 
under consideration, the formal notices published by the 
government included only a general list of imports and ex­
ports between the two countries. In Holman's view the 
"unusual" practice of requiring interested industries to 
file a written brief a week in advance and then not allow­
ing any discussion on items included in the brief worked 
an unnecessary hardship on witnesses.
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace's absence from 
the hearings was noted by the midwestern critics. Kansas
Representative Clifford Hope and others suggested that the
27Secretary's absence implied disapproval of the program. 
Consequently, when Secretary Wallace did appear before the 
Senate Finance Committee several weeks later, he immedi­
ately discounted Hope's assertion and reassured the Com­
mittee that the Department of Agriculture supported without
^^Ibid., pp. 387-88.
^^The Federation also recommended an amendment 
calling for a proviso to be "inserted into the act to 
prohibit trade agreements from interfering with the 
sanitary requirements or regulations which may be 
adopted in this country." Ibid., pp. 390-92.
27U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess., February 5, 1937, P- 909; February 23, 1937, P ' 
1510.
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28any reservations the trade agreements program. Once 
he had reaffirmed his support for the program, the Secre­
tary moved to the question of agricultural imports. He 
acknowledged that the administration had found it neces­
sary to grant limited tariff concessions on a number of 
agricultural products. However, he quickly added that 
such reductions had been "so carefully considered and
safeguarded as to preclude significant injury to our
29
domestic agriculture."
In response to the midwestern critics of imports, 
Wallace suggested that the affected branches of agricul­
ture stood to gain far more than they would possibly lose. 
Any "slight" injury would be offset by two important ad­
vantages. First, if export markets could be opened, those 
sections currently producing commodities for export would 
not be compelled to convert their production to products 
which would compete with the non-export industries such 
as cattle and dairy. Secondly, the non-exporting branches 
of agriculture stood "to gain from increased purchasing
power in our urban centers brought about by larger exports
30of manufactured goods."
28U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Hearings on H.J. Res. 96 : A Joint Resolution to Extend
the Authority of the President under Section 350 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(February 10, IT, 12, and 15, 1937), pp. 159-60. Cited 
hereafter as Senate Hearings, 1937-
^^Ibid., p. 160. ^^Ibid., p. 16I.
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The Secretary chided the critics for not differen­
tiating between competitive and non-competitive agricul­
tural imports. According to Wallace, much of the import
increase could be attributed to such products as rubber,
31
coffee, cocoa, tea and silk. At the same time, figures
revealed that the largest increases in competitive imports 
occurred in "drought-affected products." He also pointed 
out that in most cases no duty reductions had been made on 
the imported products. Thus, in Wallace's estimation, it 
was "unfavorable weather and improved economic conditions" 
that had prompted larger agricultural imports and not the 
trade agreements program. The Secretary made it clear 
that the Department of Agriculture certainly did not con­
sider the trade agreements program a cure-all, but rather
3 2"an important and highly desirable supplementary program."
In reference to the Canadian agreement, Wallace
sought to calm the fears of the livestock industry. He
noted that the administration had carefully calculated the
quotas in order to prevent any serious hardship on American
ranchers. He estimated that an increase of 1 percent in
the supply of cattle would only depress the domestic price
3 3a corresponding 1 percent. The Secretary urged the live­
stock industry to take a broad, long-range view of the 
trade agreements program's effects. "If the particular
^^Ibid. 3^Ibid., p. 162. ^^Ibid., p. l66.
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effect of the trade agreements program were to increase 
the exports of automobiles sufficiently, the demand at 
Detroit for dairy products and fat cattle might be suf­
ficient to more than offset any imports of dairy products 
and fat cattle from Canada into the Michigan area."
Unlike Secretary of State Hull, Wallace appeared 
before the Committee armed with statistical data to sub­
stantiate his arguments. He produced one study which 
showed that agricultural exports to trade agreements coun­
tries had increased by $21,000,000, while exports to the 
non-agreement nations decreased some $37,000,000. With 
respect to agricultural imports, the Secretary reported an 
increase of $72,000,000 with trade agreement nations as 
compared with an increase of $84,000,000 with the non-
35
agreement countries. Thus, in the administration's
view the report demonstrated that the trade agreements 
program had not substantially altered the percentage of 
agricultural imports entering the American market.
At the close of his testimony. Secretary Wallace 
reiterated his plea that agriculture abandon its national­
istic posture and consider the economic welfare of the 
nation as a whole. The present system with agriculture 
and manufacturing "giving a little here and there" but 
with no substantial damage incurred by any group, he said.
3^Ibid., p. 167. ^^Ibid., p. 171
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offered the best hope of rebuilding America's total
economy and its important world t r a d e . W a l l a c e ,  like
Secretary Hull, asked agricultural leaders to take into
consideration that "the most significant fact of all in
connection with the trade agreements is the fact that it
is leading in the direction of peace instead of in the
37direction of hard feelings as between nations."
Senator Arthur Capper, committee member from Kansas, 
appeared at the end of Wallace's testimony to question the 
Secretary and to register his own opposition to the pro­
gram. In addition to criticizing the present negotiation 
method, Capper informed Wallace that many in the Midwest 
believed that the "gains" prompted by the trade agreements
O o
program had been made at the expense of agriculture.
Capper also called the Committee's attention to a resolu­
tion passed by the Kansas State Board of Agriculture which
called for Senate ratification of all trade agreements and
39the elimination of the most-favored-nation clause- After
listening to the resolution. Secretary Wallace suggested 
that if the Kansas organization studied the provisions of 
the most-favored-nation clause, it might reach a vastly
kodifferent conclusion. He also repeated for Capper's
^^Ibid., p. 176. ^^Ibid., p. 177-
^^Ibid., p. 180. 39lbid., p. 179-
^^Ibid., p. IBO.
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benefit his earlier assertion that industry had sacrificed
4l
as much as agriculture in the reciprocity program.
A short time after the administration witnesses ap­
peared, representatives from the Grange, Farmers Union and 
American National Live Stock Association came before the 
Committee to register the position of their organizations 
on the proposal to renew the trade agreements program.
Again as in 1934, F . E. Mollin represented the A.N.L.A.
Most of Moilin's testimony concerned the Canadian treaty 
and the cattle importations prompted by that agreement. 
According to Mollin, his organization did not suggest that 
the Canadian treaty would by itself ruin the cattle indus­
try. However, cattlemen did believe that Canadian imports
seriously dislocated the domestic market and caused unneces- 
42sary losses. More specifically, Mollin informed those
present that over 70 percent of the total Canadian beef 
imports had entered the American market within a four
43month period. He recorded market reports from St. Paul,
Minnesota, which enumerated the number of Canadian cattle 
on the market. In response to questioning, Mollin admitted 
that the entire market decline could not be attributed to 
the Canadian imports. However, he reiterated the basic
4lThe Secretary informed Capper and the rest of the 
Committee that the reciprocal trade agreements already 
negotiated had reduced the ad valorem rates on the indus­
trial products from 42.4 percent to 38.6 percent. Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 182. ^^Ibid., p. l84.
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contention of the livestock industry--American ranchers 
could produce enough cattle to supply the domestic market 
and thus no Canadian cattle imports were necessary or 
advisable.
At the conclusion of his testimony, Mollin sub­
mitted for consideration several amendments relating to 
the reciprocity program in general and the Canadian agree­
ment in particular. The A.N.L.A. recommended a monthly
quota for Canadian cattle imports to replace the general, 
45yearly quota. This provision would prevent flooding of
the market in the early months of the year and help sta­
bilize market prices. If the Congress saw fit to renew 
the trade agreements program, the A.N.L.A. recommended two 
major changes "which should be made in order to adequately 
protect American agricultural producers." First, the 
A.N.L.A. proposed that public hearings be held before the 
committee which actually negotiated the trade treaties
46rather than the Committee for Reciprocity Information. 
Second, all agreements should be submitted to the Senate 
for confirmation. Rather than stalemate the operation as
^^Ibid., p. 188. ^^Ibid., p. 190.
46During the first three years a number of mid- 
westerners suggested that the hearings held before the 
Committee for Reciprocity Information were no more than 
a place to let off steam and that testimony presented 
to that committee had no bearing on the final agreement, 
The American Cattle Producer, XVII (January, 1936), l4 ; 
Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily News, October 22, 1936; The 
Kansas Stockman, XVIII (November 1, 1934), 6 .
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the administration suggested it would, the A.N.L.A- sub­
mitted that such a requirement would simply constitute a
k7"healthy check" upon the trade agreements committee.
In contrast to 193^ when neither appeared, both 
the Grange and Farmers Union submitted a statement to the 
Senate Finance Committee. Realizing that the reciprocity 
program would in all probability be renewed, the two farm 
organizations recommended altering the present law, Fred­
eric Brenckman of the Grange, in a brief appearance, en­
tered into the record the trade agreements resolution 
adopted by the Grange's national convention. In addition 
to repeating the traditional Grange demand of the "Ameri­
can market for the American farmer," the resolution recom­
mended Senate ratification of all trade agreements and re-
48peal of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause.
In the opinion of the Grange, under the most-favored- 
nation principle, the United States gained concessions 
from only one country "while making concessions to prac­
tically all other nations producing and exporting any given 
49commodity."
E. H. Everson of South Dakota, President of the Far­
mers Union, informed the Committee that his organization 
was "quite generally in accord with the position of the 
Grange . . . and Mr. Holman of the milk producers.
^^Senate Hearings, 1937, pp. 194-95-
^^Ibid., p. 483. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 367,
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Everson related the "increased" agricultural imports to 
the trade agreements program, and he cast as "inconsistent" 
the government policy of curtailing farm production on the 
one hand and then importing farm products to supply the
51
deficit production on the other. Like Capper, Knutson 
and Mollin, Everson questioned the reasoning behind the 
administration contention that the allowed imports equalled 
only a small percentage of the total domestic production.
He reminded the Committee that even limited imports "thrown 
upon our markets in excess of what there is an effective 
demand for, can have the effect of reducing the price 
materially.
Despite their great concern over the issue, repre­
sentatives of the American Farm Bureau Federation failed 
to appear at the congressional hearings. Undoubtedly, this 
absence reflected the division with the A.F.B.F. leadership 
over the performance of the program. At the national con­
vention in December, 1936, several weeks before the hearings 
opened, delegates expressed less than unqualified enthusi­
asm for the reciprocity program. The A.F.B.F. trade agree­
ments resolution reminded the administration that Farm 
Bureau members viewed the program as a mode designed "pri­
marily to restore agricultural exports by a judicious low­
ering of industrial tariffs, thus admitting more goods into
^^Ibid., p. 366. ^^Ibid., p. 367.
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this country and making it possible for us to sell more
5 3of our farm products abroad." The delegates also in­
sisted that "official representatives of farmers" be 
heard at the public hearings before the conclusion of 
any agreement. Like the Grange and the Farmers Union,
the A.F.B.F. called for the elimination of the most-
54
favored-nation clause.
The 1937 hearings were much more spirited than 
those of 1934 as both supporters and critics appeared to 
offer their evaluation of the program. In general, the 
agricultural representatives on the Committees and those 
appearing as witnesses expressed a negative view. Sup­
porters repeatedly stressed the national outlook and the 
total benefits of the program, while the midwesterners 
and other agricultural leaders expressed a regional point 
of view--a view prompted by the specific problems the 
program posed for their region. Most of the critics con­
tended that Senate ratification of agreements would offer 
the necessary and proper protection for agricultural 
interests.
Concurrent with the hearings. Congress intermit­
tently discussed the merits of the program and the pro­
posed renewal. Midwestern representatives in particular
5 3A.F.B.F., Resolutions Adopted at the Annual 




spearheaded the opposition. The more vociferous critics
included Arthur Capper of Kansas, Lynn Frazier of North
Dakota, Harold Knutson and August Andresen of Minnesota.
As evidence of agriculture's displeasure, the midwestern
opposition referred to the lack of favorable comment by
agricultural representatives at the hearings. Senator
Capper quoted from a number of resolutions adopted by
various farm organizations--all critical of the trade
5 5agreements program. According to the Kansas Senator, 
the general criticism of the Farmers' Union, American 
National Live Stock Association, the Grange and other 
farm organizations did not reflect partisanship or oppo­
sition to the principle of reciprocity. Rather, these 
organizations expressed concern because they believed 
that "the trade agreements have failed to get the results 
hoped for but they also realized that the results attained 
have been, in the main, unfavorable to agriculture and 
inimical to the interests of the farmers of the United 
States.
To several midwestern congressmen, the New Deal 
approach to reciprocal trade agreements represented an­
other victory by industrial interests over those of agri­
culture. August Andresen suggested that the "un-American
55U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
February 3, 1937, P* 746 ; February 23, 1937, P- 15H*
5^ibid.
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scheme" greatly profited machinery manufacturers--par- 
ticularly manufacturers of agricultural machinery whose 
foreign sales enabled foreign farmers to produce and im­
port into the United States commodities that the New Deal
57had forced American farmers to reduce.
The floor debate offered North Dakota maverick, 
William Lemke, another opportunity to voice his "con­
spiratorial theory." According to Lemke, the reciprocity 
program was originally passed in 193^ because the Ameri­
can Manufacturers Export Association and several other 
international manufacturers such as General Motors and 
International Harvester "through a well-organized lobby 
and publicity machine," succeeded in misleading the major­
ity in C o n g r e s s . O n c e  the program was implemented trade 
agreements had been entered into secretly by the State 
Department and "in star-chamber proceedings with foreign 
diplomats." Lemke further suggested that the agreements 
previously concluded had been recommended "by the inter­
national bankers, who gambled and speculated in foreign
debts and who now desired that the American people should
5 9pay their foreign investments." The North Dakota iso­
lationist called for Congress to let international trade
^^Ibid., February 5, 1937, p . 936. 
^®Ibid., February 9, 1937, p. 101?.
59%bid.
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take care of itself. "It has meant nothing but humilia­
tion and loss to us in the past."^^
Representative Karl Stefan of Nebraska also voiced 
the isolationist sentiment traditionally prevalent in the 
Midwest. The attempt by the administration officials to 
relate the trade agreements program to world peace par­
ticularly concerned Stefan. In his estimation, "the plan 
of the administration to put the question of world peace 
ahead of the gist of the tariff problem may entangle our 
Nation in foreign alliances and eventually lead us into 
great international t r o u b l e . I n  his weekly press re­
lease to his constituents, Stefan commented that in the 
trade agreements "foreigners and the automobile and ma­
chinery people will benefit at the expense of the American 
f a r m e r . E v e n  more important was the fact that "foreign 
traders are too sharp for Uncle Sam and are getting the 
best of the deal and eventually we may be trading millions
of acres of farm produce for foreign made goods and foreign 
6 3farm produce." Stefan bemoaned that in spite of agri­
culture's opposition, the "big majority machine" in Con­
gress would roll over the opposition and "the people's
G°Ibid.
^^Ibid., February 5, 19371 P* 911 •
^^Press Release of February 1937, Folder 1937, 
Box 21, Karl Stefan Papers.
^^Ibid.
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representatives will have nothing, to say about this matter
64
of grave importance to the American producer."
While numerous midwesterners verbally attacked the 
trade agreements program, few of their colleagues from 
the Midwest chose actively to support the administration's 
program. Iowa's Otha Wearin was a significant exception. 
He accused his midwestern colleagues of blatant inconsist­
ency. Wearin chided the critics for suggesting that a 
surplus-producing nation such as the United States could 
refuse to pursue foreign trade relations in order to sell 
surpluses and at the same time refuse to limit production 
of the surplus commodities.^^
The Iowa Congressman took exception to Capper's 
numerous references to increasing imports and declining 
exports. He reminded Capper and the other critics that a 
creditor nation like the United States must buy foreign 
goods in order to enable debtor nations to discharge their 
obligations to the United States. In Wearin's words, "If 
the opposition are willing to take the position that all 
foreign debts to the United States ought to be cancelled, 
then, of course, they have the right to continue complain­
ing about increases in imports into the United States.
^^Ibid.
^U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
February 5, 1937, PP• 921-22.
^^Ibid.
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Wearin agreed with the suggestion by administration spokes­
men that the drought had altered normal trade conditions. 
Such a condition would naturally reduce the exports of 
agricultural products and increase the i m p o r t s . B e f o r e  
becoming alarmed over export and import figures, Wearin 
cautioned farmers to consider the unusual circumstances.
In course of his comments on the floor, Wearin 
discussed briefly the Canadian trade agreement and the 
response of the livestock industry to it. He pointed out 
that as a cattle feeder in Iowa, he was vitally interested 
in the effects of the agreement. In contrast to the oppo­
sition, he found no reason to become alarmed over the 
Canadian imports. According to Wearin, during the first 
six months of 1933 only 460 head of Canadian cattle crossed 
the border, and yet in spite of the limited imports farm 
income from cattle amounted to only #175,000,000. On the 
other hand, for the corresponding period in 1936, 1$8,000
head of Canadian cattle came in, yet income from cattle was 
fi ft
#382,000,000. Thus, Wearin cautioned ranchers not to 
equate prosperity with thç policy of exclusion.
On several occasions during the floor debate, the 
midwestern critics questioned the procedure for public 
hearings established by the administration to allow inter­
ested industries to express their views. From the first
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., pp. 922-23.
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days of the program, the hearings procedure had come under 
considerable criticism. Apparently, by 1937 the adminis­
tration felt the need to respond to this criticism, for
in early January the State Department announced a proce- 
6 9durai change. The new practice included a study of
trade between the two countries even before the intent to 
negotiate was announced. If the study showed basis for an 
agreement, then formal announcement of intention to nego­
tiate was made. But most important, and unlike before, 
the formal announcement would include a list of the prod­
ucts on which the United States was considering granting 
concessions. With this specific information in hand, in­
terested parties now knew whether or not their particular 
interests would be involved.
In the course of the congressional debate, several
midwestern congressmen offered amendments to the trade
70agreements program. Most of the proposals sought specific
6q
Kansas City Star, January 12, 1937i U.S., Depart­
ment of Agriculture, Trade Agreements and the Farmer (Wash­
ington, 1937), PP- 6-7-
70Minnesota Representative Harold Knutson intro­
duced three different amendments. One called for an end 
to the reciprocal trade agreements program. Another amend­
ment would have prohibited reciprocal trade agreements with 
any nation that had defaulted on its obligations to the 
United States. The third called for publication of a list 
of all commodities under consideration in any agreement 
negotiation. H. Res. 58, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., January 17, 
1935; H .R . 8915I 74th Cong., 1st Sess., July 22, 1935; U.S., 
Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., February 9, 
1937, P- 1057; Edward Rees of Kansas introduced an amendment 
prohibiting tariff reductions on livestock and dairy prod­
ucts. U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
February 9, 1937, P- IO62.
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protection for agriculture in the negotiation of trade 
agreements. However, those submitted by Arthur Capper 
sought to incorporate in the program the changes ex­
pressed by the Grange, Farmers Union, and several other 
midwestern farm organizations- One amendment called for 
elimination of the unconditional most-favored-nation
principle and the other required Senate ratification of
71all trade agreements.
Capper's presentation of the Senate ratification
amendment evoked a critical response from Senator George
Norris of Nebraska. According to Norris, "if the pending
amendment should be adopted, we might just as well reject
the whole proposal. As I look at it, the adopting of the
pending amendment would be the death knell of the joint 
7 2resolution." Norris suggested that the Congress was 
incapable of devising a scientific tariff. With the lim­
ited grant of tariff-making power to the President, the 
Congress was proceeding in the direction of efficiency. 
Norris acknowledged that the trade agreements program 
might not be the perfect, complete solution, yet it repre­
sented an important step in the right direction. He sug­
gested that the Capper amendment would defeat the program
and return the tariff to the log-rolling, special-interest
73days of the past. All of the midwestern amendments
^^Ibid., February 25, 1937i PP• 1594, 1599
72fbid., p. 1598. ^^Ibid.
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failed to gain approval, and the joint resolution to 
extend the program finally came up for a vote without 
amendment.
Early in February, Roosevelt's floor leader for 
the proposal, Robert Doughton, called for a vote. The
resolution carried by a margin of 285 to 101 with 4? ab- 
74stentions. However, the midwestern delegation in the
House voted against the program's renewal by eighteen to
fourteen. This represented a shift of five votes against
75the program in three years. In addition to four Repub­
licans that had replaced Democrats since 1934, one Demo­
crat voted against the program. Several weeks after the 
House vote, the Senate also approved renewal of the trade 
agreements program. The Senate count showed fifty-eight 
for, twenty-four against and thirteen abstentions. The
midwestern position within the Senate vote changed little 
from 1934. In 1937 the Democrats still controlled the 
midwestern senatorial delegation and the six Democrats 
plus George Norris voted for the President's tariff policy.
Three Republicans and Minnesota Farmer-Labor Senator Ernest
77Lundeen voted against the program's renewal.
7 4
Ibid., February 9, 1937, PP• 1064-065-
75 The 1937 vote compared to nineteen for, thirteen 
against, and two abstentions in 1934.
^^Ibid., February 25, 1937, P- l6l2.
7 7In 1934 eight midwestern Senators voted for the 
bill and four against.
124
Thus, the Roosevelt tariff program received con­
gressional approval for another three year period. How­
ever, the position of the midwestern congressional delega­
tion had shifted from a twenty-seven to seventeen favorable 
margin in 1934 to a twenty-two to twenty-one rejection in 
1937- In view of the overwhelming Democratic majority in 
Congress at this time, the midwestern erosion did not alter 
the outcome. However, should the Midwest swing completely 
against the reciprocity program and Roosevelt lose his 
large majority in Congress, the chances for renewal in 
1940 would be endangered.
In general, midwestern editorial comment shifted 
little on this issue from the presidential election in 1936 
to the discussions in Congress in 1937- A hard core re­
mained on both sides of the issue. Several of the larger 
newspapers continued to express unqualified support for 
the program's renewal. The Kansas City Star followed the 
congressional hearings and debate closely and commended
Secretary of State Hull for his testimony before the Ways
7 Q
and Means Committee. The Star's editors also saluted the
decision by the administration to institute a change in the 
hearings procedure and suggested that the move should "go 
far to meet the chief practical objection raised by critics
of the [state] Department trade expansion progr am „79
^^Kansas City Star, January 22, 1937-
^^Ibid., January 12, 1937-
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In Iowa, the Sioux City Tribune and the Des Moines 
Register engaged in an editorial debate on the propriety 
of supporting the trade agreements program. In a lengthy 
editorial, the Tribune accused the traditionally Republican 
Register of "masquerading" under a banner of international­
ism. In the editor's words, "When the esteemed Register 
advocates reduced tariffs--almost to the point of free 
trade, as it does in defending the reciprocal trade agree­
ments . o . without demanding equal--or even greater--tar- 
iff reductions for industry it is inconsistent to the point 
of rank deception. The Regist er, whether intentionally or
not, is serving the purposes of the industrialist tariff
8 0racketeer at the expense of the American farmer."
The Register responded immediately to the Tribune's 
accusations.^^ The Register editors denied any "tradi­
tional" support for protectionism. On the contrary, they 
pointed out that the Register had urged both parties for 
years to depart from the extreme protectionism which had 
dominated American tariff policy. According to the edi­
tors, the Register supported the trade agreements program 
in the hope that they would offer "a method of very grad­
ually getting trade barriers down. Meantime, we don't 
want farmers to get sucked again into reliance on tariffs 
as the cureall for its [sic] own trouble. Every time that
Q ^
Sioux City Tribune, March 17, 1937•
81
Des Moines Register, March 19, 1937
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has happened in the past industry has gained by it--and
82at agriculture's expense."
The renewal debate of early 19371 while bringing 
to the surface a number of grievances felt in the Midwest 
served to reveal that in the initial period there was no 
consensus on the program's merits. On the one extreme, 
the Nebraska Farmers Union called for the "immediate re­
peal" of the program and a return of the tariff-making
8 3power to the Senate. On the other hand, the Kansas Farm
Bureau favored continuation of the program, but insisted
84
that trade agreements at least be approved by the Senate.
Yet the vast majority in the Midwest assumed a posi­
tion somewhere between the above two extremes. A resolu­
tion passed by the Nebraska Farm Bureau reflected the dom­
inant state of mind in the Midwest. Its membership re­
solved that "Whereas, farmers are widely divergent in their 
opinions as to the value of reciprocal trade agreements, 
we, therefore, request the American Farm Bureau Federation 
to ascertain and report whether the existing reciprocal
82While many editors retained their original posi­
tions on the reciprocal trade agreements program, a few 
editors such as the one for the Omaha World Herald began 
to question the program and to suggest that it may have 
been an unwise grant by Congress. Omaha World Herald, 
February 25, 1937*
81
Nebraska Union Farmer, XXlll (February 24, 1937),
14.
84The Nation's Agriculture (Kansas edition), XV 
(December! 193^) , b!
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trade agreements are working to the disadvantage of the
85American farmer." After three years, most midwesterners 
were still undecided as to the exact worth of the trade 
agreements program and its contribution to agriculture's 
recovery-
^^Nebraska Agriculture, VI (December 9i 1937 )i 4.
CHAPTER VI
AMERICAN NATIONAL LIVE STOCK ASSOCIATION 
OPPOSES THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
The first three years of the trade agreements pro­
gram evoked an uncertain and divided response from the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, the Farmers Union and 
other farm spokesmen in the Midwest. However, amidst this 
general indecision, livestock men adopted an immediate and 
consistently hostile attitude toward the New Deal tariff 
policy. The American National Live Stock Association, 
chief spokesman for the livestock industry in the Midwest, 
loudly voiced the criticism of the program and actively 
worked against its continuation.^ The active participa­
tion of the A.N.L.A. at the congressional hearings and the 
public hearings conducted by the Committee for Reciprocity 
Information demonstrated the measure of concern among ran­
chers. Also, the statements offered by the livestock
The activities of the A.N.L.A. were particularly 
relevant to the Midwest for the livestock industry was 
the predominant agricultural pursuit of that area. U.S., 
Department of State, The Midwest and the Trade Agreements 
Program, Commercial Policy Series, No. 27 (Washington, 
193b) , pp. 4-5.
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representatives revealed that industry's philosophy on 
foreign trade and its relationship to the American market. 
The A.N.L.A. supplemented its public appearances and ex­
pressions with considerable correspondence to government 
officials and interested congressmen. At the same time, 
the A.N.L.A. leaders conducted a continuing dialogue with­
in the industry by fully discussing the issue at each 
national convention and by closely following the program's 
progress in their official ,journal-- The American Cattle 
Produe er.
A review of the activities and statements of the 
A.N.L.A. during the period 1934 to 1937 reveals that organ­
ization's great concern over the implementation of the rec­
iprocity program. The extreme nationalism espoused by ran­
chers was understandable in view of the fact that their 
industry had little interest in the export trade. Conse­
quently, most ranchers believed that they had very little 
to gain and much to lose in the movement to lower the 
American tariff wall.
The general livestock brief included considerable 
comment on current conditions within the industry. Ran­
chers consistently demanded 100 percent of the American 
market and despite administration doubts, steadfastly 
maintained that they could meet the demand of the growing 
American population. According to its spokesmen, only a 
set of unique circumstances had enabled the industry to
130
successfully absorb livestock imports up to this time. In 
particular, the drought condition of the mid-1930's had 
reduced American production and made room on the domestic 
market for imports. However, they quickly added that such 
a condition was only temporary and that American producers 
could fill the market. In addition to the drought, the 
New Deal-sponsored slaughter program had also cut into the 
normal American output. To substantiate their demands for 
continued tariff production, livestock spokesmen pointed 
out that the industry had seldom achieved parity levels in 
the past decade and a half.
Initially, the ranchers offered little constructive 
criticism; however, when it became apparent that the pro­
gram would continue, the A.N.L.A. did make several sugges­
tions. One of the most consistent demands was that all
2
trade agreements be submitted for Senate ratification.
Also, the ranchers constantly expressed displeasure with 
the negotiation and hearing procedure established by the
3
administration. These and other recommendations recurred 
periodically during the dialogue within the cattle industry, 
Shortly after the passage of the trade agreements 
act in June, 193^, members of the A.N.L.A. Executive
2
A.N.L.A., Resolutions of the Annual Meeting, 
January 7-10, 1936 (Phoenix, Arizona); January 12-14,
1937 (El Paso, Texas).
3
A.N.L.A., Resolutions of the Annual Meeting, 
January 9-Hi 1935 (Rapid City, South Dakota) ; January 7- 
10, 1936 (Phoenix, Arizona).
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Committee made it clear that they believed the program
4
constituted a very real threat to the livestock industry. 
With this thought in mind, the A.N.L.A. undertook an ex­
tensive campaign to justify tariff protection for the 
livestock industry and to protect that industry's inter­
ests within the trade agreements program. The Canadian 
treaty of 1935i more than any other trade agreement nego­
tiated in the first three years, alarmed the livestock 
industry. An investigation of the A.N.L.A.'s reaction to 
the negotiation announcement and the subsequent hearings 
reveals the efforts extended to influence the livestock 
provisions within the agreement. Immediately after the 
announcement. Secretary Mollin contacted the State Depart­
ment and was assured that there was little chance that 
reductions in the cattle tariff would be granted by the 
United States.^ Not satisfied with assurances, Mollin 
contacted Nebraska Representative Harry Coffee in Wash­
ington and expressed to the Congressman the Association's 
concern over the proposed agreement. He suggested to 
Coffee that the "senators and representatives who have 
the welfare of the industry at heart ought to try to 
'assure themselves' that no cut was contemplated in the 
treaty with Canada."^
4
A.N.L.A., Resolutions Adopted at the Executive 
Committee Meeting, July 20-21, 1934 (Denver, Colorado).
F. E. Mollin to Harry B. Coffee, July 13, 1935, 
NA, RG 59, 611.423 Cattle/30.
^Ibid.
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Coffee passed Moilin’s letter along to Secretary of 
State Hull and asked for "definite assurance" that the 
tariff on cattle would not be reduced in the proposed
7
trade agreement with Canada. Coffee informed Hull that 
any such tariff cut would be political suicide in the West 
for the Roosevelt administration. According to the 
Nebraska Representative, farmers and ranchers for the 
first time in several years faced the happy prospect of 
achieving cost of production for their cattle and hogs.
Any rate reduction on Canadian livestock would endanger 
the possible gain and be unexplainable to midwesterners. 
Coffee reminded Hull of Roosevelt's 1932 campaign promise 
to maintain tariffs on agricultural commodities. In 
closing, Coffee again requested a "definite assurance" 
from the State Department that no cut in cattle tariffs 
would be allowed.^
In addition to his contact with Secretary Hull, 
Coffee also represented the livestock interests at the 
hearings on the proposed Canadian pact conducted by the 
Committee for Reciprocity Information. He informed the 
Committee that in the past fifteen years ranchers had
9
shown a profit only four times. Thus, a reduction in the
^Harry B . Coffee to Cordell Hull, July l6, 1935i 
NA, RG 59, 611.423 Cattle/30.
^Ibid.
^Canadian Hearings, 1935, P • 399.
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tariff at this time would further retard and even jeop­
ardize the industry's recovery. Coffee advised the Com­
mittee to allow only selected imports which would not
impair the operation of any branch of the agricultural
. ^  ^  10 industry.
Shortly before the finalization of the Canadian 
agreement, the A.N.L.A. sent a telegram to Secretary Hull 
expressing "strenuous protest" against any reduction in 
cattle tariffs in the pending agreement. According to 
Mollin, ranchers were among the few in the agricultural 
industry that could stand on their own feet and would con­
tinue to do so if the administration did not subject them 
to "unfair" foreign competition.^^ He assured Hull that 
the current "relatively high" cattle prices were not 
caused by an inability of ranchers to produce cattle, but 
rather by drought-imposed feed shortages to feed cattle 
and by the A.A.A. reduction program. Mollin asked the 
administration to consider the fact that livestock pro­
ducers unanimously believed that there was "absolutely no
12occasion for a cut in the tariff."
Despite the pleas of livestock representatives, the 
Canadian trade agreement included several concessions to
^^Ibid., p. 401.
. E. Mollin to Cordell Hull, September 25, 1935, 
NA, RG 59, 611.4231/1258.
^^Ibid.
l]4
Canadian cattle imports. The A.N.L.A. expressed shock at 
the announced concessions and then settled down to care-
13fully watch the affects of the imports on their markets. 
Before long, the A.N.L.A. announced that Canadians were 
"dumping" too many cattle on the American market at one 
time. In addition to forcing down the price level, Cana­
dian imports flooded the American market at the precise 
time when American ranchers needed to empty their feedlots. 
Mollin estimated that the Canadian agreement cost American 
cattle producers a million dollars in the first four months 
of 1936.^^ In order to protect this major shortcoming in 
the Canadian agreement, the A.N.L.A. asked the administra­
tion to consider a monthly quota as opposed to the yearly 
quota then governing Canadian imports. According to Mol­
lin, such a quota system would prevent dumping and make the
15
best of a bad situation.
In addition to public appearances and correspondence 
from representatives of the A.N.L.A., the cattle industry 
made its sentiments felt through a number of sympathetic 
congressmen in Washington. Harry Coffee, an officer in 
the Nebraska Livestock Association, headed the congres­
sional livestock bloc. Joining Coffee were Lynn Frazier
1 3The American Cattle Producer, XVII (December, 
1935), 23-24.
E. Mollin to Cordell Hull, May 1?, 1936, NA, 
RG 59, 611.123 Cattle/100.
^^Ibid.
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of North Dakota, Edward Rees and Arthur Capper of Kansas, 
Francis Case of South Dakota and several others. Whenever 
Congress considered tariff policy, the above congressmen 
offered the basic agruments employed by the A.N.L.A. In 
addition to constant reference to resolutions passed by the 
A.N.L.A., these congressmen cited Moilin's testimony at the 
various hearings and quoted figures apparently provided by 
the A.N.L.A.l^
The leadership of the A.N.L.A. also kept the member 
ranchers informed of the organization's efforts to influ­
ence the direction of the trade agreements program. At 
each national convention reports submitted by the Presi­
dent and Secretary invariably included considerable com­
ment on the New Deal tariff policy. At the 1935 conven­
tion, Secretary Mollin informed the assembled ranchers that 
he had appeared at the congressional hearings to oppose the 
grant of tariff-making authority to the President. Accord­
ing to Mollin, "it was known that the hearing was cut and 
dried, and that the measure would pass, but I wanted our
attitude on such high-handed methods of tariff-making
17clearly recorded." The Secretary went on to state that 
the "fears" of the livestock industry had been partially
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess 
February 9, 193T1 pp. 1062-063 i February 23, 1937, PP• 
1510-511; February 25, 1937, PP• 1590-592.
17A.N.L.A., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 
January 9-11, 1935 (Rapid City, South Dakota).
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justified- "The negotiations are conducted in a strictly 
star-chamber manner, no information is given in advance, 
and we have even been refused official direct notice. Only 
'public' notice, released in Washington, that treaties are 
under negotiation is given out. However, Mollin assured 
the delegates that the A.N.L.A. was keeping in constant 
touch with Washington. He noted that his office had al­
ready filed eleven protests against tariff reductions and 
planned to register even more in the future.
President Charles Collins also questioned the "extra­
ordinary powers" granted to the President and suggested that
"purchasing power, and not tariffs," was the principal bar-
19rier to foreign trade. In his view, the nations seeking
trade agreements with the United States had little other 
than agricultural surpluses to offer in exchange. He added 
that no industry, no matter how efficient, could "compete 
with the producers of Mexico, and Central and South America,
without a distinct lowering of our present standard of
, , . ,,20 living."
At the 1936 convention. Secretary Mollin was even 
more critical. He bemoaned the fact that the A.N.L.A.'s
1 Q
Ibid. In December 1936 the A.N.L.A. was placed 
on a mailing list of those industries expressing a desire 
to receive copies of notices of intention to negotiate 
trade agreements. Harry Hawkins to F. E. Mollin, Decem­
ber 31, 1936, NA, RG 59, 611.0031/2620,
19A.N.L.A., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 
January 9-11, 1935 (Rapid City, South Dakota).
^°Ibid.
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protests over the Canadian agreement had been "completely 
21ignored." As for the public hearings conducted by the
Committee for Reciprocity Information, Moilin's experience
had led him to conclude that the hearings were a mere "ges-
22
ture" which had no influence on the final agreement- 
Despite the apparent futility of their efforts, the Asso­
ciation's Legislative Committee suggested that the organi­
zation continue its policy of opposition to the trade 
agreements program, file briefs and make personal appear­
ances in opposition to rate reductions on livestock
 ^ 23imports.
In addition to his Washington appearances, Mollin 
spent considerable time touring the West and Midwest, 
meeting with stock growers and explaining the problems 
posed by the reciprocal trade agreements program. Speak­
ing in Broken Bow, Nebraska, he asked the Nebraska cattle­
men to support efforts by the A.N.L.A. to get a monthly
24quota within the Canadian agreement. Minnesota farm 
leaders were told that the New Deal tariff policy placed 
American producers in "unfair competition" with foreign 
producers. Mollin mentioned "new policies" implemented
21Ibid., January 7-10, 1936 (Phoenix, Arizona). 
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., January 12-14, 1937 (El Paso, Texas).
24Nebraska Stockgrowers Association, Report of the 
Annual Meeting, June 10-12, 1937 (Broken Bow).
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to increase American foreign trade "with scant regard for 
the possible effect on American farmers and wage earners." 
He also suggested that concessions granted in the reciproc­
ity program were "designed as overtures to the goddess 
'Peace.'" According to Mollin, "the reciprocal trade 
agreements are such in name only. They are actually de­
vices to lower the tariff, piece by piece, in order to in-
25crease foreign trade. . . ." Mollin also carried the
Association's anti-trade agreements message to North and 
South Dakota cattlemen's organizations.^^
In addition to speaking tours and discussions at 
the national conventions, the A.N.L.A. used its official 
journal, The American Cattle Producer, to inform and edu­
cate the member ranchers on the trade agreements program. 
The journal followed closely the hearings and congressional 
debates, published special articles, and offered consider­
able editorial comment. At the same time administration 
officials stressed the importance of foreign trade to mid- 
westerners, The Producer decried the "fable" of export 
trade. The editor suggested that the prosperity created 
when exports were the largest was "a false prosperity, and
25U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess, 
February 8, 193^ "i Appendix, p"! 48é-88.
^^North Dakota Livestock Association, Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting, May 19-20, 1935 (Dickinson); The 
American Cattle Producer, XVIII (July, 1936), 15-
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27was made possible only by the extention of huge credits."
In a characteristic expression of nationalism, the editor 
reminded ranchers that the domestic market consumed 90.2 
percent of production and he proposed that too much stress 
had been placed on the value of foreign markets and too
little on the development and protection of the domestic
1 +  28 market.
In an editorial entitled "Tariffs, Treaties, and
Tripe" The Pro due er suggested that in effect the trade
29
agreements program robbed Peter to pay Paul. While mid- 
western wheat growers and hog raisers attained some bene­
fits, the program threatened disaster for the ranchers, 
sugarbeet farmers and flax growers. The editor asked, 
"Whither are we drifting? Why all the concern for the 
'little brown brothers' of the Philippines, the cane-
producers of Cuba, and the cattle- and sheep-growers of
30other foreign lands?" The editor also raised the "red 
flag" by suggesting that the New Deal tariff policy would 
encourage Argentine agricultural imports in payment for 
American automobile exports.
Virtually every trade agreement negotiated by the 
administration received some comment in The Producer. The
^^Ths American Cattle Producer, XV (May, 193^ )i 11• 
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., XV (March, 1934), 19-20. ^°Ibid.
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first agreement negotiated by the United States, with Cuba,
31evoked a predictable response. In belittling the pact,
the editor suggested that the administration had sold out 
American sugar raisers and growers of winter vegetables 
while obtaining export concessions for several other bran­
ches of agriculture. These limited agricultural conces­
sions by the administration alarmed the editor. In his 
view, the present agricultural tariffs which were "the 
best ever in relation to industrial tariffs" had been se­
cured only after hard, shoulder-to-shoulder fighting with 
all branches of agriculture participating. Now, the recip­
rocal trade agreements program threatened to pit one branch 
of agriculture against another and destroy the unity of 
purpose so necessary in order for farmers to protect their 
interests within the tariff system. He complained that the
New Deal tariff policy threatened to bring "chaos into the
3 2whole agricultural situation."
The January 1935 issue illustrated the vigilance of
The Produc er's editor. He informed his readers that the
State Department was considering trade agreements with
3 3Finland and the Netherlands. According to the editor, 
agriculture could look for few exports to Finland, but at 
the same time Finland would seek to increase imports of
^^Ibid., XVI (October, 1934), 15-
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., XVI (January, 19 35), l6.
I4l
cattle hides and calf-skins. In all likelihood, the 
Netherlands -would also press for concessions on imports 
of "all kinds of hides and skins." In the editor's 
view, the present tariff on hides was "wholly inadequate" 
and any move to lower the rates would be "fatal." Despite 
the administration's repeated assurances about safeguard­
ing agriculture's interests, the editor cautioned live­
stock men to be "-vigilant" and he informed the readers
that the A.N.L.A. had filed briefs on the proposed agree-
35ments with Finland and the Netherlands.
Criticism of the Canadian agreement by the A.N.L.A. 
and the livestock industry in general, prompted the State 
Department to publish a bulletin entitled "The Canadian 
Trade Agreement and the American Cattle Producer." The 
Produc er immediately branded the report "misleading and 
unfair." In particular, the editor took exception to 
the administration's suggestion that the American cattle 
producer could not satisfy the needs of the growing Ameri­
can population. "It is a well-known fact that during this 
period we have been in a position to produce all we con­
sume, that imports have been comparatively nominal and
attracted by higher prices prevailing in this country than
37were available elsewhere. . . ." These remarks certainly
^^Ibid., p. 17. ^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., XVlll (October, 1936), 13- ^^Ibid.
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contradicted the editor's previous statements. While 
defending the industry's ability to meet domestic needs, 
he admitted that imports had been only "nominal" and 
attributable to high prices and not the trade agreements 
program.
Even more serious, the editor accused the admin­
istration of attempting to "drive a wedge" between the
38western breeder and the Corn Belt feeder. The State
Department bulletin stated that approximately half of 
the Canadian steers coming in through Minnesota and the 
Dakotas entered as stockers and feeders--a development 
favorable to Corn Belt feeders. The editor produced 
figures from the St. Paul market to refute the adminis­
tration bulletin. According to the St. Paul report, not 
over 5 percent of the Canadian steers shipped to that
market sold as feeders, whereas 95 percent of the steers
39went to slaughter. Thus, the editor of The Producer
suggested that the Roosevelt administration was reporting 
less than the truth relative to Canadian cattle importa­
tions. According to the editor, "live-stock producers 
have already made up their minds that they do not like 





In January 1937 at the time Congress was considering 
renewal of the New Deal tariff program, The Producer re­
ported that agriculture in general and not just stockmen 
was "apprehensive" about the continuation of the trade
4lagreements program. In an attempt to legitimize the
livestock position, the editor cited trade agreements 
resolutions adopted by several agricultural organizations 
including the National Grange, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation and the National Cooperative Milk Producers' 
Federation. In his view, the next two years would "tell 
the story" on the New Deal's approach to tariff policy 
and if the administration continued to negotiate trade 
agreements lowering tariffs on agricultural products 
"then American agriculture will rise in protest and demand 
the repeal of the Reciprocal Trade Act. In the meantime, 
we can only continue to object as new agreements are 
made, and place in the record such information as is
42available to show our side of the question."
^^Ibid. , XVlll (January, 1937), H -
^^Ibid.
CHAPTER VIT
MIDWESTERN REACTION TO TRADE AGREEMENTS 
WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA
The editor of The American Cattle Pro due er un­
doubtedly captured the prevailing midwestern sentiment 
as of 1937 when he suggested that the verdict on New Deal 
tariff policy was still undecided. Many in the Midwest 
had followed with some interest the program's progress 
in the initial period without reaching any definite con­
clusions as to whether the program was harmful or helpful 
to agriculture, the basis of the region's economy. How­
ever, developments within the reciprocal trade agreements 
program in 1938 and 1939 ended the period of passive in­
terest and initiated one of strong action. Early in 1938 
the administration announced intention to renegotiate the 
Canadian trade treaty and also to seek a major agreement 
with Great Britain. A short time after the conclusion of 
these two treaties, the State Department announced plans 
to open negotiations with Argentina. The move by the 
Roosevelt administration to expand the trade agreements 
program, possibly at the expense of American agriculture,
l44
1^5
aroused a tremendous reaction in the Midwest and helped 
crystalize midwestern sentiment against the New Deal 
tariff policy.
Even before the administration initiated this 
second phase of the trade agreements program trouble 
appeared in the Midwest. Kansas Senator Arthur Capper, 
who had once supported the legislation, publicly announced 
his intention to initiate a "grassroots campaign" through­
out the Midwest against the reciprocity program. Capper 
denounced the Roosevelt tariff policy as a "disguised 
method of selling out the farmer for the benefit of east­
ern manufacturers."^ He revealed that his campaign would 
take him to over forty fairs, farm picnics and agricul­
tural gatherings throughout the Midwest. Relating both 
the decline of exports and the increase of imports of 
agricultural commodities to the trade agreements program, 
Capper suggested that in the months ahead the reciprocity 
program would spark an increasing volume of protest from 
farmers.^
In view of the fact that the Kansas Senator was well 
known and respected throughout farm circles in the Midwest, 
his announcement caused considerable concern within the 
administration. In a lengthv letter to Capper, later made
^The Dakota Farmer, LVIJ (September 11, 1937)i 488. 
^Ibid.
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public, Secretary of State Hull presented an elaborate 
defense of the trade agreements program and reprimanded 
Capper for his "ill-founded" statements. Hull complained 
that much of the criticism directed at the trade agree­
ments program was a deliberate attempt "to alienate pub­
lic, and particularly farm, support by means of an incom-
3
plete and biased presentation of trade figures." Unfor­
tunately, Hull added, such "distortions" had misled many 
sincere but ill-informed individuals. According to the 
Secretary, the evidence cited by the critics contained 
"just enough admixture of partial fact, or of half-truths 
with misleading implications, to convey, in a most insid­
ious manner, what are essentially complete untruths con-
4
cerning this whole situation."
Hull's letter also summarized the administration 
position on the question of farm imports. He acknowledged 
that during the period 1934-1937 the value of agricultural 
imports had increased by $699 million. However, he added 
that close analysis of these imports rendered that figure 
much less imposing. Of the total, $252 million could be 
attributed to non-competitive commodities such as coffee,
5
tea, silk and bananas. In a remark directed at earlier
Cordell Hull to Arthur Capper, October l8, 1937, 
Reciprocal Trade Folder, Agriculture Box, Arthur Capper 
Papers, p. 2.
4 5Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 5-
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Capper statements, Hull reminded the Kansas Senator that 
imports of this nature had "no proper place" in the dis­
cussion of the tariff problem. In the administration's 
estimation, the great droughts of 1934 and 1936 prompted 
another $l4l million worth of farm imports that would not 
under normal conditions have entered the United States.^ 
Due to the drought-imposed low domestic yield, the price 
on several commodities had risen sufficiently to make it 
profitable for foreign producers to import these products 
over the tariff wall. Hull suggested that these imports 
did not displace American products but rather supplemented 
domestic supply and relieved shortages of feedstuffs. 
Lastly, in addition to non-competitive and drought- 
necessitated imports, he pointed out that sugar imports 
contributed another $4$ million.^ Thus, in the adminis­
tration's view, the increase in "competitive" farm imports 
amounted to only #261 million rather than the #699 million
g
often quoted by the critics. For Capper's enlightenment,
Hull included a chart detailing the nature of farm imports.
From the value of agricultural imports, Hull turned
to another phase of the import controversy. He informed
Capper that there was no basis for the statements that the
increased imports were a result of duty reductions in the
9
various trade agreements. He cited figures showing that
6 *7
Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. ?•
^Ibid., p. 8 . ^Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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the majority of foodstuffs imports had not benefited from 
duty reductions- Also, a substantial portion of the im­
ports were already on the free list. Thus, 88 percent of 
the total import increase had experienced no duty reduc­
tions.^^ Such being the case, Hull concluded that factors 
other than the reciprocity program must have been respon­
sible for the import increases.
In addition to answering the criticisms of the 
trade agreements program, Hull referred briefly to the 
program's positive contributions to agriculture. In the 
trade treaties previously negotiated, tariff and tax reduc­
tions and liberalization of import quotas had been obtained 
on approximately one-third of United States agricultural 
e x p o r t s . A t  the same time, the agreements had secured 
foreign commitments not to raise duties on another third 
of American agricultural exports. The Secretary also re­
ferred to several indirect benefits such as increased pur­
chasing power for the American consumer. More important 
to midwesterners, according to Hull, the trade agreements 
program had increased significantly foreign outlets and 
thus had helped check "the diversion of land and labor from 
production of export crops to crops raised for domestic
^°Ibid., p. 12.
^^The concessions involved agricultural commodities 
which had comprised about one-third of 1929 United States 
agricultural exports. Ibid., p. 13.
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12consumption." He reminded Capper and the other mid- 
western critics that if foreign outlets disappeared large 
areas in the United States which usually produced for ex­
port would be forced into production of products custom­
arily produced only in the Midwest for the domestic market. 
This added competition from within would impose a much 
greater hardship than the current limited competition 
from without.
Secretary Hull concluded his open letter with a 
denunciation of the protectionist policies of the past. 
According to the Secretary, the extreme protectionism 
fostered by the Smoot-Hawley tariff had "ushered in the
most disastrous period in the history of American agri- 
1 3culture." In his opinion, "no greater disservice could
be rendered to our farm population than by alienating 
their support of our present liberal tariff policy, which 
is not only the most effective way of safeguarding our 
farmers from a return to the conditions prevailing under 
the Smoot-Hawley Act, but is also the policy which offers
l4the only solid foundation for peace."
A short time later in a reply to Secretary Hull's 
letter. Senator Capper summarized his differences with ad­
ministration policy on the trade agreements p r o g r a m . H e
ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 15. ^^Ibid., p. I6 . ^^Ibid.
^^Arthur Capper to Cordell Hull, October 27, 1937,
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agreed that reciprocity in foreign trade was a sound pol­
icy but questioned the propriety of generalizing the bene­
fits of all trade agreements negotiated. In his opinion, 
a particular trade agreement should affect only the two 
signatories and "any other nation, desiring the same fa­
vored treatment, should be required to grant to the United 
States comparable concessions in the matter of tariff re­
ductions, increased quotas and trade concessions."^^ Cap­
per maintained that the most-favored-nation principle sig­
nificantly weakened the United States position vis-a-vis 
nations which had not concluded agreements with the United 
States. He pointed to Great Britain as a case in point. 
Traditionally one of the best markets for American exports, 
the British had retired behind their commonwealth preferen­
tial system and had refused to participate in the trade 
agreements program. Capper implied that the British were 
receiving significant concessions through the most-favored- 
nation clause and thus felt no compulsion to reach an agree­
ment with the United States which would necessitate recip­
rocal concessions.
Capper also replied to Hull's statements on the im­
port issue. As a representative of an agricultural constit­
uency, he could not support a trade policy "which in any 
way encouraged the importation of those agricultural prod­
ucts of which we can produce our needs or a surplus.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid,
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He referred in particular to the Canadian trade agreement.
"I am not willing to import Canadian butter and cattle--at
the expense of our farmers--in order to aid industry in
selling Canada more manufactured goods. That is not good
business from the farmers point of view and farmers out
here in the Middle West, who normally have surpluses of
both butter and cattle, and cheese, are not sympathetic
18with that policy.” According to Capper, the proper trade 
program would seek foreign markets while at the same time 
allowing in exchange the importation of non-competitive 
commodities. Thus, in general terms the two men did not 
disagree on the basic principle of reciprocity but rather 
on its proper implementation.
A short time after the exchange with Secretary Hull, 
Senator Capper further delineated his position on the reci­
procity program in a feature article for the Saturday Even-
iq
ing Post entitled, "Good Old Neighbor Sam." The article 
reflected the growing criticism in the Midwest of the State 
Department employing the trade agreements program as a dip­
lomatic instrument rather than strictly as a method for 
improving United States foreign trade. Believing that the 
present implementation of the trade agreements program was 
"selling American agriculture down the river," Capper
^®Ibid.
19U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Appendix, p. 37.
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expressed the hope that he could "awaken the public to a
full realization of what is happening and the dangers to
20them in permitting the policy to be pursued." Capper
suggested that in applying the Good Neighbor Policy to the
trade agreements program the administration had been much
too generous.
In addition to reiterating his earlier criticism
of the most-favored-nation principle, Capper posed three
more objections to the New Deal approach to reciprocity.
First, he repeated the argument that in order to comply
with the Constitution, the trade treaties should be sub-
21mitted to the Senate for ratification. He pointed out 
that most of the nations negotiating agreements with the 
United States required some form of parliamentary ratifi­
cation. The Kansas Senator also objected to the atmosphere 
of secrecy which surrounded the negotiation of all treaties 
He suggested that before the formalization of any agreement 
interested parties should have the opportunity to protest 
the particular concessions included in the treaty. Cap­
per's final objection encompassed the original Republican 
complaint that the tariff-making grant by the Congress 
tended to further "concentrate authority in the hands of 
the Executive or the hands of a strong central government, 
and thereby swing away from the principles of democratic
9fl 21
Ibid. Ibid., p. 39-
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2 2and representative government. . . In conclusion,
Capper pointed to the objections voiced by the Grange, the
Farmers Union, the American National Live Stock Association,
and other farm organizations and suggested that "farmers
aren't being fooled by reciprocal trade agreements. They
23know they are getting the worst of it."
Almost simultaneous with the appearance of Capper's
article, the State Department announced plans to negotiate
a trade agreement with Great Britain and to renegotiate the
24Canadian treaty. The prospect of making treaties with
both England and Canada placed midwesterners in a difficult 
position. Renegotiation of the Canadian pact could mean 
further concessions on agricultural imports, while the 
British agreement offered potential gains for agricultural 
exports. In other words, one treaty might harm farm inter­
ests while the other could help. Secretary of Agriculture 
Wallace expressed considerable enthusiasm for the British 
agreement and went so far as to suggest to President Roo­
sevelt that a treaty with Great Britain was "essential" if
the trade agreements program was to be successful "from an
25agricultural point of view."
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 40.
24
Cordell Hull to Francis Case, December 15, 1937, 
Tariff Inquiry Folder, Drawer 7, Case Papers.
25 Henry Wallace to Franklin Roosevelt, November 15, 
1937, R.L., O.F. 48.
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The State Department announcements on the pending 
agreements kept the discussion on New Deal tariff policy 
at a high pitch in the Midwest. A number of farm editors 
in that region concurred with Secretary Wallace's assess­
ment of the need for a trade treaty with Great Britain.
The editor of the Lincoln Star remarked that if the State 
Department could negotiate a trade agreement with Great 
Britain it would be "the greatest stroke for American 
agriculture that has ever been made."^^ Theodore Schultz, 
a farm economist at Iowa State College, believed that the 
proposed agreement offered great possibilities to American 
agriculture. In an article published in the Iowa F arm 
Economist, he pointed out that most of the earlier trade 
treaties had been negotiated with agricultural nations
27
and thus offered little benefit to the American farmer.
In contrast to these earlier agreements, the proposed 
treaty with Great Britain would insure significant markets 
for exportable agricultural surpluses. Almost as impor­
tant, in Schultz's estimation, was the British desire to 
sell the United States products which would "benefit far­
mers and consumers in lowering their cost of living and to
28some extent the expenses of farm production." However,
^^Lincoln Star, January 27, 1937-




Schultz cautioned that two major obstacles stood in the 
path of a worthwhile agreement --the British commonwealth 
system and the United States tradition of high protection 
for industrial products. If these obstacles could be sur­
mounted, Schultz believed that the agreement would be "more
29
significant than all the other trade agreements combined."
Wallac e 's F armer also enthusiastically greeted the
30State Department announcements. With respect to the Brit­
ish agreement, the editor pointed to the possible reopening 
of the British market for midwestern hog products. He re­
minded his readers that during the period 1924-1929 Great 
Britain had purchased a yearly average of 64,747,000 pounds 
of bacon. However, by 1936 British purchases had fallen to
731,000 pounds. Despite its potential, the editor sug­
gested that the proposed agreement would draw some criti­
cism when the "corn belt stooges of the high tariff crowd" 
made their "usual remarks about the American market for
31the American producer."
While certainly not "stooges" for the high tariff 
crowd, several dairy and livestock journals did express 
concern over the British agreement. Once again it was the 
implementation of the most-favored-nation clause that
^^Ibid.
^^Wallace's Farmer, LXII (December 4, 1937), 6 .
^^Ibid.
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caused the despair. The Dairy Record, a Minnesota publi­
cation, informed its readers that the proposed treaty would
open American markets to 22,000,000 pounds of New Zealand,
32Australian and Canadian butter at a reduced rate. The
editor recalled that in the past The Dairy Record had not
joined "the wild chorus of antagonism stirred up by some
of the other trade pacts involving dairy products because
it felt that the effects of them had been considerably 
3 3exagerated." But in the case of the British agreement,
the concern was well justified. The editor urged his
readers to flood Washington "with an avalanche of protests"
in order to persuade Secretary of State Hull not to con-
34elude the agreement. The editor of The American Cattle
Produc er echoed the concern expressed by The Dairy Record 
and suggested that Great Britain would demand further 
American agricultural concessions to Canada as part of the
Commonwealth before agreeing to sign a pact of its own
35with the United States. Thus, while some midwesterners
viewed the proposed British agreement with great anticipa­
tion, others did not share their view.
Cognizant of the need to counter Capper's "grass­
roots campaign" and the need to soothe the latent hostility
^^The Dairy Record, XX.X.VIII (February l6 , 1938), 12.
^^Ibid. -^ I^bid.
o cr
The American Cattle Producer, XIX (January,
1938), 9 .
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toward the reciprocal trade agreements program in the 
Upper Midwest, the administration grasped every opportun­
ity to explain its tariff policy and its relationship to 
midwestern agricultural prosperity. Early in February, 
1938, several weeks before the hearings on the British 
trade agreement opened, Lynn Edminster, Chief Economic 
Analyst of the Trade Agreements Division, addressed the 
Farm and Home Week Convention at Iowa State College. 
Relating the trade agreements program to the midwestern 
farmer, Edminster told the assembled farmers that the 
Corn Belt had a "direct stake" in the proposed British
agreement. He emphasized in particular, the potential
37British market for midwestern pork products and lard.
At the same time, in view of the passage of drought condi­
tions, Edminster urged wheat farmers to weigh the need for 
additional export markets. Mindful of the ranchers, sugar- 
beet growers and other farmers oriented toward the domestic
market, he suggested that home consumption would increase
o
immensely with a healthy expansion of foreign trade.
Edminster also attempted to placate the midwestern 
concern over the original Canadian agreement and its pro­
posed successor. He cautioned farmers to evaluate care­
fully the impact of the treaty and to take into account
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess
Appendix, p. 637*
37lbid., p. 639. 3^Ibid.
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the overall benefits which would accrue to agriculture 
from the treaty. He noted, for example, that despite all 
the agitation over Canadian cattle and Cheddar cheese im­
ports, none of the "dire predictions" relative to these
39imports materialized. In fact, in the administration's
view, far from being hurt by the Canadian agreement, Ameri­
can farmers had benefited considerably. Now, the proposed 
British agreement, according to Edminster, offered the 
greatest opportunity yet for agriculture within the recip­
rocal trade agreements program.
Several weeks later Secretary of State Hull ad­
dressed the National Farm Institute in Des Moines, Iowa.
He discussed at length the goals and accomplishments of the 
reciprocal trade agreements program in its first three 
years. The Secretary pointed out that in the sixteen 
agreements previously negotiated, the United States had 
received improved treatment on nearly a third of its agri­
cultural exports and additional guarantees against any in-
40
creased barriers on approximately another third. He
singled out the Cuban agreement as concrete evidence of 
agricultural gains through reciprocity, pointing in par­
ticular to the Cuban reduction of the tariff on lard from
^^Ibid.
koU.S., Department of State, Foreign Trade, Farm 
Prosperity and Peace, Commercial Policy Series No. 5*5 
(Washington, 1938), p . 9•
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10.6 cents to 1-5 cents a pound. According to Hull,
"during the first year of the agreement shipments of lard
to Cuba practically doubled in quantity and tripled in 
^41value. . . .
In a brief reference to the proposed trade agree­
ment with the United Kingdom, Hull reminded the farm 
leaders that in 1935 the United Kingdom alone had pur­
chased 35 percent of the United States agricultural ex- 
k2ports. As was his custom, the Secretary related the
reciprocity program to the international community. "To­
gether the foreign trade of the United States and the 
United Kingdom constitutes more than a quarter of the en­
tire trade of the world," he said. "Pursuing liberal 
commercial policies the two countries can, in harmonious 
cooperation, accomplish much toward the rebuilding of
international commerce, with the world-wide benefits which
4 3would be certain to follow."
Hull also alluded to Capper's anti-trade agree­
ments campaign. "You and the rest of your people have 
been subjected to a veritable barrage of sinister propa­
ganda designed for narrow and selfish reasons, to wreck 
the most important policy which our country can pursue to
44promote its economic well-being and peace." According
4i 42
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to the Secretary, certain "responsible officials of the 
Government" were spreading falsehoods relative to the 
trade agreements program. In contrast to the extreme 
nationalism of the critics, Hull suggested that the rec­
iprocity program represented "enlightened nationalism"- - 
a practical middle course between internationalism and 
isolation. He cautioned his listeners that neither ex- 
trerae offered prosperity or peace to the American people.
Edward O'Neal of the American Farm Bureau Federa­
tion also addressed the National Farm Institute and he too 
concentrated on the New Deal tariff policy. He analyzed 
in detail the familiar slogan--"The American Market for 
the American Farmer." O'Neal emphatically stated that a 
narrow application of this slogan would spell disaster for 
American agriculture. If the United States shut out all 
imports, the adverse consequences would be immeasurable. 
"The producers of dairy products and beef cattle who do 
not now produce for export markets and whose price levels 
are protected by tariffs would be seriously injured, first 
by the loss of buying power for their products in the 
American market--which is their only market--and secondly, 
by the increased competition within our own American mar­
ket because of shifts in production from cotton, corn,
45^ Ibid., p. 15.
46Edward O'Neal to James Roosevelt, February 1$, 
1938, R.L., O.F. 1350.
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wheat and tobacco to the production of dairy products and 
beef c a t t l e . O ' N e a l  added that the same situation 
would apply to the corn-hog and wheat growers in the Corn 
Belt .
O'Neal supported Hull's contention that the British 
agreement offered the greatest opportunity yet to American
48agriculture within the reciprocity program. O'Neal sug­
gested that, equally important, the British treaty would 
reveal whether American manufacturers were willing to dis­
play an unselfish attitude and allow British industrial 
imports in exchange for agricultural concessions to the 
United States. The reciprocal trade agreements program, 
in O'Neal's estimation, offered an excellent opportunity
49to break the "strangle hold of monopolies." He encour­
aged the midwesterners to give the administration an op­
portunity to demonstrate that it had the interests of 
agriculture at heart and would do nothing to damage that 
important industry's welfare.
When the public hearings opened several weeks later 
on the British trade agreement, a number of midwesterners 
appeared before the Committee. Their testimony revealed 
the diversity of economic interests within that section. 
South Dakota Representative Francis Case appeared on behalf 
of the fledgling manganese and feldspar industries of his
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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50state. His testimony reflected the problems facing an 
agrarian state trying to bolster its economy with the 
development of industry. He pointed out that prior to 
1935 the General Manganese Company spent over $300,000 in 
exploration and preparation for placement of a factory in
51
South Dakota. However, the announcement of the Brazil­
ian trade agreement with its manganese concessions com­
pletely halted the project. According to Case, the agree­
ment with Brazil itself did not pose a serious threat, but
rather the extension of the tariff reduction to Russia
5 2
through the most-favored-nation clause. He reminded
the Committee that manganese was vital to the production
of steel and despite the fact the United States presently
imported 95 percent of its manganese, given the opportunity,
5 3South Dakota alone could fill the domestic demand. How­
ever, in view of the high production costs, the manganese 
industry needed and believed it merited substantial tariff 
protection.
Committee for Reciprocity Information, Steno­
graphic Report of the hearings before The Committee for 
Reciprocity Information in connection with the negotiation 
of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain, March 1^-15, 193Ô (Washington, 193Ô), 
pp. 69-82. Cited hereafter as Great Britain Hearings.
^^Ibid., pp. 71-72.
5 2Case pointed out that 40 percent of the United 
States manganese imports came from Russia. Ibid., p. 73*
^^Ibid., p. 76.
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The testimony of Representative Case dramatized 
the problem posed by the trade agreements program to some 
interests in the Midwest. High production costs of small 
industries and certain branches of agriculture necessi­
tated tariff protection. To operations of a marginal 
nature, a slight tariff concession could spell financial 
disaster. Case attempted to impress upon the Committee 
that many of the concessions to a particular nation within 
a trade agreement might not appear significant, yet when 
extended to other countries through the most-favored- 
nation clause the consequences were indeed significant. 
Because of the Brazilian case and several others, opposi­
tion in the Midwest to the most-favored-nation principle 
in the trade agreements program gathered momentum.
The testimony of Kansas Representative Frank Carlson 
contrasted markedly with that of Francis Case and graphi­
cally illustrated the other side of the midwestern dilemna. 
While Case suggested that the British trade agreement could 
greatly damage South Dakota's economic potential, Carlson 
informed the Committee that the successful conclusion of a
pact with Great Britain was essential to the prosperity of 
54his state. He made a special plea for the wheat growers 
of Kansas. According to Carlson, if the once rich wheat 
export trade with Great Britain could be reopened.
54U.S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Appendix, p. I89.
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midwestern wheat growers could resume normal production
with the assurance of a foreign market for their sur- 
5 5pluses. Consequently, the two midwestern congressmen
viewed the proposed agreement with equal but contrasting 
c one ern-
Edward O'Neal also appeared before the Committee 
in support of the proposed treaty. According to O'Neal, 
the A.F.B.F. was "vitally concerned in the proposed Trade 
Agreement with the United Kingdom because of its possible 
effects upon the welfare of American agriculture."^^ In 
O'Neal's estimation, the proposed pact offered a unique 
opportunity because most of the earlier trade agreements 
had been negotiated with agricultural nations. While 
enthusiastically supporting the conclusion of the agree­
ment, O'Neal proposed several guidelines to be followed 
in negotiation of the treaty. In particular, the Ameri­
can negotiators should concentrate primarily upon "secur­
ing increased outlets for our farm surpluses and reducing
57our excessive industrial tariffs." O'Neal stated that 
the present "excessive industrial tariffs" had penalized 
farmers, fostered monompolies and encouraged barriers 
against American farm p r o d u c t s . A t  the same time, he
55ibid.
^^Great Britain Hearings, p. 345•
^^Ibid., p. 349. ^^Ibid.
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requested that no reductions on agricultural tariffs be
made which would have the effect of reducing or holding
59the prices of farm products below parity levels.
The Farm Bureau President concluded with a refer­
ence to the long-time inequality between farm prices and 
industrial prices. The trade agreements with Great Britain 
could, if properly negotiated, go a long way toward allevi­
ating this unjust condition. In view of this "unusual 
opportunity" O'Neal urged speedy negotiation of the pact.^^ 
Less than a month after the Committee for Reciproc­
ity Information closed hearings on the British trade agree­
ment, it announced the opening of hearings on the proposed 
renewal of the Canadian treaty. As mentioned previously, 
the original pact had stirred considerable interest in the 
Midwest. The renewal announcement rekindled this interest 
and six representatives from the Midwest scheduled appear­
ances before the Committee to protest further concessions 
on agricultural commodities.
Three representatives from North Dakota, Congress­
men Lynn Frazier and William Lemke plus Oscar Hagen of the 
Potato Growers of North Dakota appeared to protest conces­
sions on commodities affecting producers in their state. 
Both Hagen and Frazier appeared on behalf of the North 
Dakota potato industry. In particular, the two men ob­
jected to the concessions previously granted to imports of
59lbid. GOfbid., pp. 356-57.
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Canadian seed potatoes. According to Frazier, North Dakota 
produced approximately two million bushels of certified 
seed potatoes each year.^^ Prior to the initial Canadian 
agreement, the southern states provided an attractive mar­
ket for these potatoes. However, the North Dakota pro­
ducers could not meet the Canadian competition because of 
a higher cost of production. Frazier pointed out that 
Canadian freight rates on farm products were about 60 per­
cent of what they were in the United States. Also, labor 
was considerably cheaper on the Canadian side of the border, 
In view of these inequities. North Dakota producers could
62not successfully compete with the Canadian imports.
Oscar Hagen attempted to substantiate the adverse 
impact of the Canadian imports. According to Hagen, the 
agreement had prompted a considerable increase in imports. 
In 1937; 752,975 bushels of Canadian seed potatoes entered 
the United States as compared to 89,266 bushels the year 
prior to the a g r e e m e n t . U n d e r  the Canadian treaty,
750,000 bushels came in under the reduced rates. He com­
plained that by allowing these imports the administration 
was "turning over to Canadian labor thousands of dollars
Committee for Reciprocity Information, Steno■ 
graphic Report of the hearing before The Committee for 
Reciprocity Information in connection with the negotia­
tion of a reciprocal trade agreement with Canada, April 4 
^  1938 (Washington, 1938) , pli 5^3 • Cited hereafter as 
Canadian Hearings, 1938.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 619.
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•which our American labor should rightfully have and which 
it is entitled to and very badly in need of."^^
Hagen illustrated the impact by referring to his 
home county of McKenzie in northwestern North Dakota. 
According to Hagen, the farmers of McKenzie county de­
pended almost exclusively on the sale of their seed 
potatoes. Due to the altitude and hot, dry climate the 
county's yield was not particularly heavy, but of good 
quality. While the quota concessions of the 1935 treaty 
might appear insignificant to members of the Trade Agree­
ments Committee, Hagen pointed out that the producers of 
McKenzie county and elsewhere in North Dakota did not 
view them as such. These farmers sincerely believed that 
they should have the "wholehearted support of their own 
government in protecting and building up this important 
and valuable industry. . . .
Representative Lemke did not present testimony on 
any particular commodity, but he offered an extremely 
nationalistic interpretation of the "correct" trade policy. 
He maintained that the American people were capable of 
"self-supporting and self-maintaining."^^ In contrast to 
the opinion of many farm and administration officials,
Lemke suggested that the American farmer had no surplus 
7
problem. In reference to the trade agreements program,
^^Ibid., p. 6l8 . ^^Ibid., p. 620.
^^Ibid., p. 931. ^^Ibid., p. 930.
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he stated that he could be a "free trader" also if the cost 
of living, cost of production and living standards were the 
same world over. However, these conditions did not exist 
and therefore Lemke was unwilling "to bring our farmer down 
to the level of the peons of Mexico.
Francis Case who had testified at the British hear­
ings several weeks earlier again confronted the Committee. 
He pictured his home state of South Dakota as a new, un­
developed section "practically identical with large parts
69of Canada." In view of this fact, Case suggested that 
almost every item on the Canadian negotiation list com­
peted with those produced in South Dakota. The South 
Dakota Representative listed the most competitive items 
and evaluated the impact of these imports on his state's 
economy. Again, as at the earlier hearings, Case expressed 
concern about the effects of the most-favored-nation clause. 
In fact, he suggested that the "danger from the lowered 
tariffs" considered by the administration was not primarily 
from Canada, but from the other nations receiving the tar­
iff concessions under the unconditional most-favored-nation
70clause.
Harry Coffee appeared on behalf of fifteen western 
states and a constituency greatly troubled by the possi­
bility of further concessions on livestock or livestock 
products. In particular, Coffee questioned the proposed
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 37- ^^Ibid., p. 4l.
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71tariff concessions on chilled beef. He pointed out
that while lowering duties on chilled beef would be of
little benefit to Canada, because of the most-favored-
nation clause, such a reduction would "open the flood
gates for the importation of beef from New Zealand,
Australia, South Africa and any other country that could
comply with our sanitary regulations and reciprocal trade 
7 2agreements."
Coffee reiterated a common complaint heard in 
agricultural circles that manufacturing industries con­
tinued to profit from a privileged position in the United 
States. He contended that "the trend of industrializa­
tion in this country at the expense of agriculture must 
be. stopped. In fact, the trend must be reversed and 
certain non-agricultural industries should make conces­
sions to facilitate the regaining of some foreign markets
7 3for our agricultural surpluses." He informed the Com­
mittee that if the livestock industry was forced to make 
any further concessions in the proposed agreement, it 
would constitute a serious threat to that industry and 
would "endanger the entire reciprocal trade agreements 
program." '
In a massive brief, F . E. Mollin, Secretary of the 
American National Live Stock Association, supplemented the
7^Ibid. , pp. 49-52. '^^ Ibid. , p. 52.
^^Ibid., pp. 44-45. ^^Ibid., p. 45-
170
testimony presented by Coffee and enumerated at great 
length the adversities suffered by the livestock industry 
under the previous agreement and the problems posed by the 
announcement of the new treaty. Referring to the atmosphere 
created by the State Department announcements, Mollin in­
formed the Committee that "no industry can operate satis­
factorily with the constant threat of increased competition
by way of either lower duties or enlarged quotas in new or
7 5revised trade agreements." According to the livestock
association Secretary, many ranchers had purchased slaughter
steers with the intention of marketing them later. However,
in the face of the "threat" of the pending treaty, the
steers "were dumped in despair at staggering losses.
Mollin summarized the impact of the initial Canadian
agreement on the livestock industry--reiterating the common
complaints uttered by cattlemen since the trade agreements
program's inception in 1934. He assured the Committee that
the American producer could adequately fill the domestic
demand for beef, and imports, no matter how small, tended
77to depress the market price. The Secretary also repeated 
the A.N.L.A. demand for a monthly or quarterly quota on
Canadian cattle imports so that dumping could be
, , 78prevented.
75ibid., p. 487. ^^Ibid.
^^ibid., pp. 472-74. ^^Ibid., p. 488
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Several months after the completion of the public 
hearings, the administration announced the provisions of 
the new agreement with Canada. The renegotiated treaty 
included a number of changes on items discussed by the mid- 
western representatives before the Committee for Reciproc­
ity Information. In the matter of Canadian livestock im­
ports, the yearly quota on cattle weighing over 700 pounds 
and eligible for the rate reduction was raised from 155,799 
head to 225,000 head.^^ However, only 60,000 head could 
enter at the reduced rate in any quarter of the year. At 
the same time, the 1938 rate was one-half cent a pound 
less than the 1935 rate. Also, the yearly quota on calves 
was raised from 51,933 head to 100,000 head with the duty 
remaining constant at one and one-half cents a pound.
The duty on Cheddar cheese, another controversial item, 
also experienced a cut from five cents in 1935 to four
O 1
cents in 1938.
The provisions governing Canadian imports of seed 
potatoes, so vigorously denounced by North Dakotans Lynn 
Frazier and Oscar Hagen, were also altered. The yearly 
quota on rate-reduced potatoes was increased from 750,000 
bushels in the first agreement to 1 ,500,000 bushels in the
79 U.S., Department of State, Text of New Trade 
Agreement Between the United States and Canada (Washing­
ton, 1938) , pi 'jk.
^^Ibid., p. 33. Gijbid., p. 34.
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821938 treaty. With respect to rate changes, in both the
1935 and 1938 treaties imports during the period from
December to February paid a duty of sixty cents per 100
pounds. However, for the imports in the period March to
November, the 1938 agreement called for a duty of thirty-
seven and one-half cents per 100 pounds compared to forty-
83five cents in 1935»
The United Kingdom agreement included a number of
concessions on commodities vital to the Midwest's economy.
Most important, wheat was placed on the free list. Hams
were also included on the free list with the provision
that from time to time the two countries would discuss the
84quantity to be permitted. The United States could export
lard to Great Britain duty free and without any restriction 
as to quantity.
Thus, the two treaties, both signed on November 1?, 
1938, affected a number of commodities produced in sub­
stantial quantity in the Midwest. The Canadian treaty in 
particular demonstrated the difference of opinion between 
midwestern farm spokesmen and the administration on the 
question of import quotas. The administration justified
^^Ibid., p. 38. ^^Ibid.
84U.S., Department of State, Text of Trade Agree­
ment Between the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Washington, 1938), pi 10 . ......
®^Ibid., p. 11.
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greater import quotas on the basis of increased domestic 
consumption, while midwesterners discounted the increase 
in domestic consumption and maintained that any increase 
was unjustifiable and harmful to their interests. In view 
of the concessions to Canadian imports of livestock, pota­
toes and cheese, it appeared to those farm spokesmen who 
opposed larger imports that their testimony had little 
influence on the final terms of the trade agreements nego­
tiated. Most certainly, there could be considerable dif­
ference of opinion in that section relative to the antici­
pated consequences of the two agreements.
The midwestern response to the official announce­
ment of the two agreements ranged from lavish praise to 
shock and dismay. W. C. Allen of The Dakota F armer read 
the State Department releases and remarked that he could 
not accurately gage the possible impact of the two agree­
ments.^^ However, he noted that much in the treaties sub­
stantiated his "long-time opinion" that the British and 
Canadians were smart traders and in fact in this instance 
had out traded the "Yankee"--especially with respect to
Q ^
agricultural concessions.
The editor of The Nebraska F armer evaluated the
8 8two agreements separately. In his estimation, the
^^The Dakota Farmer, LVIII (December 17, 1938), 524.
G^ Ibid.
88
The Nebraska Farmer, LXXX (December 17, 1938), 8 .
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British treaty offered possibilities for substantial ex­
ports of -wheat, lard, corn and pork. However, the state 
of the British economy tempered his enthusiasm. He con­
cluded that the decline in value of British currency would 
make it difficult for Great Britain to purchase American 
exports and at the same time this condition would benefit 
those exporting nations whose currency was cheaper than 
that of the United States. On the other hand, the editor 
suggested that the Canadian treaty appeared "to threaten 
Midwest agriculture because of our further reductions in 
tariff on beef cattle, dairy cattle and dairy products,
89hogs, and some feed grains." He reported that midwest­
ern dairymen were upset because quotas on dairy cattle had
been lifted along with rate reductions on whole milk, cream
and cheese at the very time butter surpluses in the United
States were at an "all time high."
A number of the midwestern congressmen received 
complaints from their constituents. The Western South 
Dakota Sheep Growers Association mailed a copy of its reso­
lution on the British agreement to both Representative 
Francis Case and Secretary of State Hull. In particular 
the Association protested the agreement's wool concessions 
because it believed that different and unequal growing and 
manufacturing conditions in the two nations placed the
G^ Ibid,
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United States woolen industry "at a very great disadvan- 
90tage." L . W. Babcock, a seventy-one year old wheat far­
mer from Belle Plaine, Kansas, suggested to Senator Capper 
that the Canadian trade agreement "was a slap in the face 
to the stock grower, and to the wheat grower, and indirectly
to the corn grower for their refusial [sic] to support the 
91New Deal." In Babcock's view, the treaty would "enable
Canada to unload her surplus cattle and low grade wheat
into our markets, which will depress prices for some time 
9 2to come."
The announcement of new concessions to Canadian 
cattle imports shocked many in the livestock industry.
The Kansas Stockman reported that Kansas cattlemen "har­
bored a secret fear that evil will come from the recently
made Canadian trade treaty with reference to tariffs on 
9 3beef cattle." The Kansas ranchers had opposed the orig­
inal agreement and now with the conclusion of the new 
treaty, the prospect of even greater damage appeared immi­
nent. The editor suggested that the pleas of American 
cattlemen had been ignored and now the abused ranchers
Wayne George to Francis Case, August 2, 1938, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Drawer 31i Case Papers.
W. Babcock to Arthur Capper, December 7, 1938, 
Reciprocal Trade Folder, Agriculture Box, Capper Papers.
^^Ibid.
^^The Kansas Stockman, XXIII ( January 1, 1939), 5 -
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must take or leave the "dose prescribed by the doctors in 
94Washington."
Prior to and during the public hearings on the Cana­
dian agreement, The American Cattle Producer accused the 
administration of trying to force acceptance of the trade 
agreements program with a huge publicity machine- Accord­
ing to the editor, the "well-financed" Economic Policy
Committee had been established by the Roosevelt administra-
95tion in order to "glorify the beauties of foreign trade."
As had Nebraska Representative Karl Stefan, William Lemke
of North Dakota and several other midwesterners, The Pro-
dueer reflected a degree of isolationist sentiment when it
criticized Hull for prefacing every statement about the
reciprocity program "with a warning that we must lower tar-
96iff barriers or face the threat of war."
When the State Department announced the official 
concessions in the Canadian agreement, the editor of The 
Producer reacted bitterly. He lamented the fact that the 
British had failed to offset the Canadian treaty with any 
substantial benefits to the livestock industry. In view 
of the vigorous A.N.L.A. protest against further duty re­
ductions, the editor concluded that the public hearings
15 .
^^Ibid.
^^The American Cattle Producer, XIX (April, 1938),
^^Ibid.
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conducted by the Committee for Reciprocity Information
were a "farce." "They might just as well have made their
protest to seven sticks as xo the committee mentioned,
which evidently has nothing to do with writing the trade 
97agreements." The editor did acknowledge that the new 
agreement included a quantity quota proposed by the A.N.L.A. 
earlier. He added, however, that the increased quota ren­
dered this limitation "practically valueless." In the 
words of the editor, "the American livestock industry has
98been sold down the river once more."
Not all midwestern editors and farm leaders were
as despondent over the new agreements as the editor of The
American Cattle Produc er. The editor of the Minnesota
publication. The F armer, remarked that the Canadian treaty
as a whole had been well received. While noting that some
ranchers and dairymen had expressed concern, he suggested
that the treaty would certainly "improve general trade
relations between the United States and England and Canada
99by increasing volume." However, he cautioned wheat far­
mers to contain their enthusiasm for the British agreement. 
He suggested that even though the United States could now 
export wheat duty free into England, the low value of the
^^Ibid., XX (December, 1938), 11. 
^^Ibid. 
^^The Farmer, LVl (December 3, 1938), 6
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pound sterling, plus Argentine dumping actions, would 
probably prevent the United States from greatly increasing 
its wheat exports to Britain.
Wallace's Farmer praised the British agreement, but 
less enthusiastically than before the final agreement was 
s i g n e d . A c c o r d i n g  to the journal's editor, the Corn 
Belt hog raisers should profit from increased lard and ham 
exports but beyond that he saw little gain for agricultural 
exports. The American concessions to British industrial 
products appeared to offer little relief to the farmer as 
a consumer. In the editor's estimation, the main value of 
the agreement was that it demonstrated willingness by two 
great nations to reduce tariff barriers and to advance 
towaid greater freedom in international trade.
The November 22 issue of the A.F.B.F. News Letter 
displayed none of the reservations evident in Wallace's 
F armer or The Farmer. The News Letter informed Farm Bureau 
members that the new agreements contained "American agri­
culture's most important gains under Secretary Hull's re­
ciprocal trade agreements p r o g r a m . A . F . B . F .  President 
O'Neal also enthusiastically endorsed the two treaties and 
the trade agreements program in general. According to 
O'Neal, "the great significance of the entire reciprocal
^^^Wallace's Farmer, LXIII (December 3, 1938), 6 
^^^A.F.B.F. , Official News Letter, November 22,
1938, pp. 1-2.
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trade program as formulated and carried through by Secre­
tary of State Cordell Hull, is the fact that it has lifted
our tariff-making activities out of the poker game class
102and elevated them to the level of real statesmanship."
After detailing the agricultural concessions in the two 
agreements, O'Neal concluded that the greatest gain from 
the treaties was not the potential increased sales of any 
particular commodity, but rather "the broad increase in
10 3trade generally that should result from lowered duties."
While Washington officials were conducting public 
hearings and negotiating the two trade agreements, con­
gressional candidates were campaigning in the fall elec­
tions. Although the political discussion over the reci­
procity program did not reach the intensity of the 1936 
campaign, the New Deal's tariff policy did incur the crit­
icism of many midwestern Republicans. In Nebraska, two 
Republican congressional candidates, George Heinke and 
Carl Curtis, attacked the Roosevelt reciprocity program
repeatedly during their successful campaigns against the
10^Democratic incumbents. In Iowa, Republican Albert
Swanson informed voters of the Ninth District that Secre­
tary of State Hull's administration of the reciprocal trade
102
Nebraska Agriculture, VII (December 22, 1938), 2.
lO^ Ibid.
^^^Omaha World Herald , September 2, 1938; Lincoln
Star, October 13l 193Ô; Minden Courier, October 27, 1938.
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agreements program meant that the products of the Iowa
farmer would "have to compete on your home markets with
the peon farmers of the world.
North Dakota Representative William Lemke revealed
his isolationist sentiments when he discussed the New Deal's
tariff policy during the campaign. He attributed most of
the farmer's problems to the "internationalist" attitude
of the New Deal. According to Lemke, both Secretary of
Agriculture Wallace and Secretary of State Hull were "too
foreign-minded" and "more interested in foreign nations
than in their own."^^^ He maintained that due to the
reciprocal trade agreements program the United States was
"being flooded with foreign agricultural and manufactured
107products as never before." As in 1936, both parties
distributed pamphlets and broadsides and purchased con­
siderable ad space to present their position on the reci- 
108procity issue.
The 1938 election resulted in significant Republican 
gains in the six states of the Upper Midwest, The
^^^Sioux City Journal, October 2, 1938.
^^^Radio address by Lemke in Bismarck on June 25, 
1938, Folder 4, Box 26, Lemke Papers.
107 Radio address by Lemke in Bismarck on October 13,
1938, Ibid.
^*^^Political Parties, Campaign Material, Folder 43 1 
Box 2, MS 4971 Nebraska Historical Society; W . R. Ronald 
to M. L. Wilson, October 8, 1938; L. W. Drennen to Hubert 
Utterback, March 17, 1938, NA, RG I6 .
l8l
Republicans picked up thirteen new seats~-nine at the ex­
pense of the Democrats and four from the Farmer-Labor party 
109in Minnesota. Undoubtedly, a number of factors contrib­
uted to the Republican gain- Generally, the election of 
1938 marked a Republican swing that resulted in that party 
nearly doubling its representation in the House. Also, the 
political repercussions of the court fight and the reces­
sion of the previous year caused many midwesterners to 
desert the New Deal camp. However, the concern displayed 
by both parties over the tariff issue indicated that the 
reciprocity program was indeed an important political issue 
in the Midwest and contributed to Republican success and to 
a further erosion of New Deal power in that region.
After the 1938 election the Republicans clearly 
dominated the congressional delegation in the Upper Mid­
western states. They held thirty-three seats while the 
Democrats held but ten and the Farmer-Laborites three. This 
alignment differed markedly from that of 1937-1938 when 
the Republicans held only a one seat margin over the Demo­
crats in the midwestern delegation. The developments 
within the trade agreements program had increased substan­
tially midwestern opposition to the New Deal farm program 
and had cost Roosevelt political support. In 1939 another 
major development would co.-tribute further to the process.
109Figures on the changes in the midwestern congres­
sional delegation were compiled from The Congressional 
Diiectory, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., and 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
CHAPTER VIII
THE NEW DEAL PROPOSES A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA
During the first four years of the reciprocity 
program, the two treaties negotiated with Canada caused 
the greatest stir in the Midwest. Many farm spokesmen 
repeatedly stated that they viewed the trade agreements 
program as primarily a mode to reopen foreign markets to 
American agricultural surpluses, while at the same time 
granting substantial concessions to foreign imports of 
industrial products. Thus, the Canadian agreement with 
its agricultural concessions had caused great concern and 
was viewed by some as a "dangerous precedent" for the 
future negotiation of trade agreements with agricultural 
nations. Consequently, the announcement early in 19 39 
of intention to negotiate an agreement with Argentina 
shocked midwesterners and aroused a storm of protest.
The administration decided to attempt negotiations 
with Argentina only after considerable interdepartmental 
discussion and consideration of the political repercussions. 
President Roosevelt had suggested the agreement as early as 
March, 1937; however. Secretary of Agriculture Wallace had
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strenously opposed the idea. The Secretary reminded 
Roosevelt that Argentina was a "red flag" to the farmers 
of the Midwest. Wallace indicated that such an announce­
ment would cost the administration the support of organized 
agriculture in the Midwest--especially that of the American 
Farm Bureau Federation.^ The midwestern element within the
A.F.B.F. led by Earle Smith and Clifford Gregory violently
2
opposed any agreement with Argentina. To alienate them 
would dissolve the midwestern-southern coalition so care­
fully forged by O'Neal and would in all likelihood mean an 
end to the A.F.B.F. support for the New Deal farm program.
Wallace suggested that the announcement of a pro­
posed treaty with Argentina would be politically disastrous 
as the reaction would undoubtedly preclude any victory for 
Roosevelt in the court fight. The Secretary remarked that 
he was "talking politics, not statesmanship or economics.
As soon as the court fight is won, I see no reason for not 
coming out with the Argentine proposal. But, in my opinion, 
we simply cannot fight successfully on these two fronts
simultaneously in the agricultural areas of the middlewest 
3
and the w e s t ."
Apparently Wallace's agruments prevailed for no 
announcement was made at that time. However, two years




later in March, 1939 i President Roosevelt informed Wallace
that he had directed the State Department to open negotia­
nt
tions with Argentina. Sumner Welles and others in the 
State Department had pressed Roosevelt for several years 
to seek an agreement in order to improve relations with 
Argentina and to enhance hemispheric solidarity through 
the Good Neighbor Policy. Apparently, by 1939 Roosevelt 
had concluded that the possibility of improved United 
States-Argentine relations outweighed the almost certain 
adverse reaction over the treaty in agricultural circles.
On August 23 the State Department announced its intention 
to negotiate an agreement with Argentina and set the open­
ing of public hearings for October l6.^
The proposed treaty listed a number of agricultural 
commodities for possible tariff concessions including live­
stock, flaxseed, wool, turkeys, cheese, corn, eggs and 
casein.^ The announcement sparked an immediate and general 
reaction from the Midwest. The editor of the Topeka 
Capital criticized the administration for failing to real­
ize that American farmers could not compete with the "cheap
4
Franklin Roosevelt to Henry Wallace, March 29,
1939, ibid.
^Cordell Hull to George Norris, October 26, 1939, 
Tariff Folder, Box 7, Tray 33, George Norris Papers.
^Committee for Reciprocity Information, Stenographic 
Report of the hearing before The Committee for Reciprocity 
Information in connection with Trade Negotiations with the 
Argentine Republic, October 16-19, 1939 (Washington, 19^0), 
p . 11Ô. Cited hereafter as Argentine Hearings.
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7
labor and mass farming methods" of Argentina. In the
editor's view, the farmers logically objected to being
made "goats" in an agreement designed to open new markets
for industrial products. The Kansas City Daily Drovers
Telegram expressed amazement that the administration would
submit the American farmer to such outside competition and
yet continually preach the necessity for crop reduction at 
8home.
Midwestern congressmen received a flood of mail 
from their constituency and other interested parties. Most 
of the correspondence urged the congressmen to appear at 
the public hearings and to protest the possible concessions 
on commodities important to the Midwest's economy. Con­
cerned about the possible tariff concessions on Argentine 
turkeys, August Maass of Newell, South Dakota, asked Repre­
sentative Francis Case to testify at the hearings on behalf
g
of the turkey farmers. In a letter to Henry Grady of the 
Committee for Reciprocity Information, Maass suggested 
that any reduction would spell disaster for South Dakota's 
turkey growers. "Our people already have enough problems, 
difficulties and disappointments, and should not be called 
upon to suffer the loss of one of the very few break-even
^Topeka Daily Capital, October 19» 1959-
g
Kansas City Daily Drovers Telegram, October 20,
1939.
9
August Maass to Francis Case, October 12, 1939, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Drawer 31, Case Papers.
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enterprises which we now have.""^^ Representative Case 
received correspondence critical of the proposed Argentine 
trade agreement from the Greater South Dakota Association, 
the Aberdeen Civic Association, and the Brookings Chamber 
of Commerce.
In a petition addressed to Representative William 
Lemke, forty-seven North Dakotans presented a list of 
objections to the proposed agreement. Noting that the 
Argentine treaty called for concessions on imports of 
flax, turkeys and meat products, the petitioners reminded 
Lemke that "the condition of farmers and livestock pro­
ducers is such today that they cannot stand further com-
12petition from cheap foreign products." They urged Lemke 
to use their petition to substantiate his protest against 
the Argentine treaty. Nebraska Senator George Norris, a 
consistent supporter of the reciprocal trade agreements 
program also received a flood of critical mail. The over­
whelming opposition of his constituency prompted him to 
question the propriety of the agreement. Norris remarked 
that in view of the "terrible, almost indescribable, con­
dition that affects the Nebraska farmer . . .  1 am
^^August Maass to Henry Grady, October 11, 1939i
ibid.
^^George Starring to Francis Case, October 28, 1939; 
Francis Case to Oscar Ryder, November 20, 1939; Carl 
Nodasely to Francis Case, October 25, 1939 i ibid.
12William Lemke to J. J. Trask, n.d.. Folder 5,
Box l8, William Lemke Papers.
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constrained to look with apprehension upon any proposal
that will have the effect of reducing the income of these
13stricken people."
Many others in the Midwest shared the doubts ex­
pressed by Senator Norris. By early October, seventeen 
congressmen from the midwestern delegation, fifteen Re­
publicans and two Democrats, had scheduled appearances at 
the public hearings. Several of this number such as 
Edward Burke of Nebraska had previously supported the 
reciprocal trade agreements program. In addition to the 
congressional delegation, a number of other midwestern 
farm representatives appeared before the Committee for 
Reciprocity Information including Edward O'Neal, Edward 
Thye, Deputy Agricultural Director of Minnesota, Ole Flatt 
of the Minnesota Farm Bureau, John Coulter representing 
several North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota organiza­
tions and William Miller of the Kansas Livestock Associa­
tion. Miller also testified on behalf of the Governor of 
Kansas and other interested Kansans.
Frank Carlson of Kansas expressed a general feeling
in the Midwest when he remarked that agriculture had "its
14back against the wall." He informed the Committee that 
no other treaty had aroused more concern in his section
^^George Norris to Cordell Hull, October l8, 1939i 
Tariff Folder, Box 7, Tray 33i Norris Papers.
l4Argentine Hearings, p. 253*
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than the one proposed with Argentina. Suggesting that the 
treaty was being used as a diplomatic ploy, Carlson stated 
that farmers should not be sacrificed especially in view 
of the fact that the "treaties have not brought about the 
great desired result of international peace that we have
15
hoped they would produce in this world." In conclusion, 
Carlson predicted that if the Argentine treaty was ac­
cepted, the hearings then being conducted by the Committee 
would be "a Sunday School picnic" in comparison to the 
meetings which would be staged in the agricultural Midwest.
Nebraska Senator Edward Burke testified that he had 
consistently supported the trade agreements program. 
However, the proposed treaty with Argentina caused him 
great concern. He revealed that throughout the State of 
Nebraska people questioned the consistency of reducing 
production and at the same time negotiating treaties which 
allowed the importation of competitive agricultural com­
modities. Burke urged the administration to consider the 
"deep-lying sentiment" in the Midwest "that something is
being done that is unfair to them and making their task
17that much harder." He suggested that by attempting to 
reach an agreement with Argentina, the New Deal was "laying 
the groundwork for a serious, perhaps fatal attack upon 
this whole Reciprocal Trade policy.
^^Ibid., pp. 254-55. ^^Ibid., p. 422.
^^Ibid., p. 426. ^^Ibid., pp. 425-26.
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Representative Harry Coffee, Democrat from western 
Nebraska, appeared on behalf of a bloc of nineteen con- 
gressmen--all opposed to the conclusion of a trade treaty 
with Argentina. Coffee, who had supported the reciprocity 
program in its initial stages, -was now one of the leading 
midwestern watchdogs of the program and defenders of mid- 
western livestock interests. He suggested that the treaty 
struck directly at agriculture and particularly the live­
stock industry and would serve only to "accentuate the 
trend towards industrialization in this country at the
expense of agriculture, a trend that has been prevalent
19particularly since 1932." Coffee's testimony included
a veiled threat that if the Argentine agreement became a 
reality. Congress would refuse to renew the trade agree­
ments program in 19^0 unless it was amended to include
20Senate ratification of all agreements.
The flax industry of both North Dakota and Minne­
sota sent several representatives to the hearings. John L. 
Coulter, past President of North Dakota State College and
ex-member of the Committee for Reciprocity Information,
21offered the most eloquent plea on their behalf. Coulter
questioned the proposed duty reductions on flax in view of 
the contribution flax farmers could make toward solving the 
agricultural surplus problem. According to Coulter, between




two and four million acres normally used to raise wheat,
corn and other surplus commodities could be converted to
2 2flax production. With adequate tariff protection, the 
flax industry could be quite profitable for American far­
mers while at the same time making a positive contribution 
to the surplus problem. Coulter suggested that if the 
administration felt compelled to reach an agreement with 
Argentina, it should not sacrifice any branch of agricul­
ture to do so. Rather, the agreement should include only 
items that the American farmer did not produce in suffi­
cient quantity and then any remaining imports should be 
restricted so as not to damage the American producer.
Even Edward O'Neal, President of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, and a strong supporter of the adminis­
tration's tariff program, found the proposed treaty diffi­
cult to accept. O'Neal pointed out, as had many other farm 
representatives, that most of the items under consideration 
were agricultural with only a few industrial concessions 
proposed. Thus, in his view agriculture was "confronted 
with the possibility of assuming the major burden of effect
in any change in our tariff rates negotiated under the pro-
2 3posed agreement." This possibility contradicted the of­
ficial A.F.B.F. position which called for reciprocal trade 
treaties to be negotiated in order "to restore agricultural
2 ?
Ibid., pp. 577-78.
^^Nebraska Agriculture, Will (October 26, 1939), 2,
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exports by judicious lowering of industrial tariffs." 
However, O'Neal refused to flatly condemn the treaty and 
suggested instead that if such an agreement must be con­
summated it should be limited to a one year duration with
24a thirty-day termination clause.
The testimony of the twenty-two midwesterners who 
appeared before the Committee expressed dismay and disgust. 
To the early supporters of the trade agreements program, 
the proposed Argentine treaty represented a rejection of 
the faith they had placed in the administration's promises 
to employ the program to further the interests of agricul­
ture. To the critics, the proposal confirmed their belief 
that the New Deal was betraying the best interests of far­
mers. As Iowa's Ben Jensen suggested, the proposal revealed 
for all to see that the interests of the American farmer 
were no longer being considered; rather the man of the soil 
had become "a pawn in the game of international power 
politics .
The Argentine treaty also incurred the wrath of most 
midwestern farm editors. The editor of The Nebraska F armer 
informed his readers that the Argentine pact was just an­
other in a line of "tariff adjustments that would make far­
mers the goat by reducing duties on imported farm commodi­
ties."^^ While acknowledging the desirability of good
24 25Ibid. ^Argentine Hearings, p. 260.
^^The Nebraska Farmer, LXXXI (December 2, 1939) i 8 .
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relations with South America, the editor demanded that the 
manufacturing industries should bear part of the sacrifice 
necessary to attain such friendship. In his view, "if Ar­
gentine good will and prosperity are to be obtained only at 
the expense of agriculture, then we are against the idea,
and fortunately that is the way most Midwest Congressmen
27feel about it." The editor of The Kansas Stockman read­
ily agreed that the Argentine treaty posed a great danger 
to agriculture and the American rancher in particular. He 
urged his readers to make their opposition known and called 
for a solid front "against such trade pacts and treaties, 
and also a concerted demand for cancellation or abrogation
28of the twenty-two such treaties already in force."
Arthur Capper in a lengthy editorial in Capper's 
F armer reiterated his vigorous opposition to the consump­
tion of such agreements. In his opinion, the Argentine 
treaty could easily become a "sell-out" and render serious
29damage to the agricultural industry. He urged farmers
to register their protests with their congressmen, the 
President and the State Department. Suggesting that the 
original grant of tariff-making power to the President had 
been a mistake. Capper reminded his readers that he had 
introduced legislation to provide for Senate ratification
^7%bid.
2 A
The Kansas Stockman, XXIII (December I5 , 1939) t 4.
29Capper's F armer, LI (January, 1940), p. 20.
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of all trade agreements. The editor of the Sioux Falls 
Argus-Leader went a step further than the other editors 
and suggested that the Argentine proposal could cause the 
rejection of the whole trade agreements program when it
30came up for renewal in early 1940.
The attempt by the Roosevelt administration to 
reach an agreement with Argentina also provoked consider­
able criticism from midwestern farm journalists who had 
previously supported the trade agreements program. The 
Farmer, after recalling its past support for the Canadian 
and British trade agreements, "unreservedly" joined in
31"viewing with alarm" the pending agreement with Argentina. 
The editor pointed out that he had not joined the alarmists 
over the Canadian pact because the production costs of the 
Canadian farmers were approximately the same as those in 
the United States. However, South American production costs 
were "immeasurably less" than those of the United States. 
According to the editor, if the pending agreement went 
through, the "northwestern farmers will be obliged to com­
pete with peon labor. It will mean that our prices will 
have to be reduced to meet the South American competition, 
and this at a time when the same administration which is 
negotiating this treaty is trying with its left hand to
^^Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, February 9, 1940. 
^^The Farmer, LVII (November 4, 1939)> 6.
194
3 2raise domestic prices of agricultural products." The 
editor also repeated the frequently uttered remark that 
industry had always been the chief beneficiary of the pro­
tective tariff and he suggested that the Argentine treaty 
certainly would not deviate from this norm. He urged his 
readers to express their feelings on the treaty and listed 
the address of the Committee for Reciprocity Information 
in Washington.
The thought of a trade agreement with Argentina was
so repulsive to most Midwesterners that even Wallace's
Farmer rebuked the administration for proposing the treaty.
While admitting that many farmers were unhappy about tariff
concessions made by Secretary of State Hull, the editor
suggested that over all agriculture had benefited from the
3 3reciprocity program. However, he suggested that the Ar­
gentine treaty transcended the realm of foreign trade into 
that of international politics--a development contrary to 
the original intent of the program.
According to the editor of Wallace's Farmer, admin­
istration officials favored the conclusion of the Argentine 
treaty as a means of enhancing the much-desired hemispheric 
solidarity. The announcement implied that these officials 
believed that the importance of good relations with Argen­
tina outweighed the possible hardships imposed by the
^^Ibid.
^^Wallace's Farmer, LXIV (November 4, 1939)i 7-
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agreement on cattlemen, dairymen and other farmers. In 
the editor's opinion, the administration would do well 
to reconsider the proposal because "the cattle states 
are strongly represented in the Senate, and impartial 
observers in Washington believe that adoption of the
Argentine trade agreement will defeat the entire trade
Jk
agreements program."
Roosevelt and other administration officials 
apparently reached the same conclusion after gaging the 
reaction to the treaty. Early in January, 1940, the 
State Department announced that it had suspended nego­
tiations with Argentina. Obviously the vociferous and 
hostile reaction in the Midwest influenced this decision. 
Even though the particular agreement with Argentina had 
been dropped, the proposal had made reciprocity one of 
the most important political and economic issues in the 
Midwest. The proposed negotiations had a very unsettling 
affect among midwesterners and caused even more farmers 
and their spokesmen in that area to not only question the 
merits of the trade agreements program but also the sin­
cerity of the administration in general. The growing con­
cern was reflected by the content and volume of letters 
which crossed the desks of midwestern congressmen during 
and after the public hearings on the treaty.
3^ibid.
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The office of Kansas Senator Arthur Capper in par­
ticular received considerable correspondence critical of 
the trade agreements program. Clarence Robb of Niotaze, 
Kansas, suggested that Secretary of State Hull, like 
President Taft before him, was trading off the American
market in order to obtain additional trade outlets for
35industrial products. Robb admitted that reciprocity
was "alright," but he objected to having his "shirt 
traded off to get a new silk hat for some industrial 
giant. Of course he gets more markets for his product 
he may employ more men who will inturn eat more of my 
pork and wheat with some of my beef for Sunday dinner, but 
what good will that do me if the disparity of prices con­
tinues so that I do not get enough back in exchange for 
my products for me to subsist and pay expenses?"
Arthur Smith also expressed concern about the loss 
of the domestic market. He informed Capper that "if we 
could put a stop to some of those Trade Agreements that 
Mr. Hull has been putting in effect with Foreign countries
and keep our markets for our own Farmers it would help a 
37lot." He added that "this is just one man's opinion so
Clarence Robb to Arthur Capper, December 25, 1939, 
Reciprocal Trade Folder, Agriculture Box, Capper Papers.
^^Ibid. 
37Arthur Smith to Arthur Capper, December 17,
1939, ibid.
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don't take it to serious. Yet I wanted you to know how it
o Q
looks to the small Farmer." Edward Anderson referred to
Capper as the farmers' friend and offered to the Senator 
his evaluation of the New Deal farm program. While favor­
ing a continuation of the Soil Conservation program, Ander­
son did not "beleaf [sic] the reciprocal trade agreement 
act should be continued as we feel we are entitled to our
own market and don't beleaf in turning the Grain Gamblers
3 9loos to pria on the American farmer." The correspondence 
received by Capper revealed that many Kansas farmers related 
all agricultural imports to the trade agreements program and 
thus they favored the program's termination.
Capper's colleague, Clifford Hope, also received 
many letters on the trade agreements program, including a 
letter from J. H. Conrad of Coolidge, Kansas. Conrad sug­
gested that if the trade agreements program had to be con­
tinued it should at least include Senate ratification.
Conrad declared that trainloads of scrub Mexican cattle 
were appearing in his hometown because of the reciprocity 
program and asked "How does it help our agriculture to give 
foreign countries the markets formerly supplied by our mil­
lions and millions of acres" reduced from production in
40wheat, corn and cotton.
^^Ibid.
39Edward Anderson to Arthur Capper, December l8, 
1939, ibid.
. H. Conrad to Clifford Hope, February 22, 19^0, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Box 102, Hope Papers.
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While much of the correspondence from midwestern
farmers attacked the trade agreements program specifically,
many expressed unhappiness with the New Deal in general and
discouragement over the plight of the farmer. John Hanson
after noting his opposition to the reciprocity program,
stated that he did not believe "we farmers of the United
4l
States are making any headway." J. E. Dazey remarked 
that the United States had been "the dumping ground for 
agricultural products long enough." He posed the question, 
"Is it possible that the farmer in this country is the only
Ij. 2
class of people that cannot get what is coming to them?"
One Kansas farmer stated that while he had complied with
the New Deal farm programs each year, he considered them
"fundamentally unsound." "As an emergency measure it was
at least something, though even a sop. As a permanent set
43up it is obnoxious in many ways." In the words of J. H. 
Conrad, "After seven long years some of the shine is begin-
44ning to wear off the New Deal."
The Canadian and Argentine treaties in particular 
had brought to the surface again the basic mistrust harbored
^^John Hanson to William Lemke, January 15, 1940, 
Folder 8, Box l8, Lemke Papers.
42J. E. Dazey to William Lemke, January 10, 1940, 
Folder 6, Box 18, Lemke Papers.
4 3Clarence Robb to Arthur Capper, December 25, 1939, 
Reciprocal Trade Folder, Agriculture Box, Capper Papers.
44J. H. Conrad to Clifford Hope, February 26, 1940, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Box l82, Hope Papers.
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by many midwesterners of the "eastern industrial interests." 
Several times at the hearings conducted by the Committee 
for Reciprocity Information Representative Coffee and 
others had decried the increasing trend toward industriali­
zation. Clifford Hope suggested that Roosevelt had "put 
himself in a position where he and his groups have become
the party of the great cities and the industrial labor
Zj.5
groups of this country." He stated that the South and 
West must band together to protect the interests of agri­
culture. The apparent triumph of industrial interests 
within the trade agreements program prompted one South 
Dakota farmer to remark that "we had the east by the tail 
until congress threw it all away in a moment of hysteria
„46seven years ago."
Thus, in the latter part of 1939 in an atmosphere 
of uncertainty the major farm organizations in the Midwest 
stepped up the process of re-evaluating their positions on 
the New Deal tariff policy and started preparing their 
briefs for the renewal hearings in early 1940. At the 
major conventions in late 1939 and early 1940, the question 
of the tariff received closer scrutiny than ever before.
45Clifford Hope to R. J. Laubengayer, November 13, 
1937, Miscellaneous Folder, Box 1?0, ibid.
46
C. W. Haidle to Francis Case, February 23, 1939, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Drawer 31, Case Papers.
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study. O'Neal announced that the A.F.B.F. would study 
Schultz's findings closely before formulating its trade 
agreements resolution for 19^0. After several months of 
research, Schultz met with the Board of Directors to in-
3
form them of his findings. He reported that the "direct 
effect" of the reciprocity program on expansion of agri­
cultural exports had been limited. For example, excluding 
the British agreement, the United States had received few 
benefits for wheat exports. Concessions on meat and meat 
products were more numerous but not from the leading con­
sumers. Schultz pointed out that the fruit and vegetable 
growers had benefited more than any other branch of 
agriculture.
Schultz urged the Farm Bureau Board and other agri­
cultural spokesmen to consider the limitations of the trade
4
agreements program. In particular, most of the conces­
sions actually sought and obtained served only to expedite 
the "natural flow" of trade rather than change this; flow. 
According to Schultz, any attempt by the United States to 
force farm commodities on other nations who would not 
otherwise buy them would only prompt unfavorable reactions. 
At the same time, he pointed out that the United States 
could not refuse to accept certain products without
3
A.F.B.F., Minutes of the Board of Directors 
Meeting, December 2l 1939 (Chicago, Illinois).
^lowa Farm Economist, VI (January, 1940), 4.
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endangering the entire trade agreements program. He cited 
as an example, the Canadian-British situation. The United 
States could not refuse periodic Canadian cattle imports 
without "risking the loss of the British agreement and its 
larger market for wheat, pork and lard." Schultz suggested 
that the most important gains derived from the trade agree­
ments probably came to the farmer as a consumer because of 
imports which weakened the power of the monopolies in man­
ufacturing. However, he admitted that even this "gain" 
had been minimal.
Schultz concluded that in general the trade agree­
ments program was "working" for agriculture--but not spec­
tacularly. He based this generalization on three separate 
conclusions. First, the trade agreements program had 
prompted moderate business expansion both at home and 
abroad. Secondly, and a more tangible benefit, the new 
tariff policy had helped check the restrictionism so prev­
alent in international trade--a condition very detrimental 
to the American farmer. Lastly, the reciprocal approach 
offered an effective method of lowering tariff walls, 
especially when compared to the futile congressional at-
5
tempts of the past. The Schultz study certainly did not 
offer the definitive answer that most farm representatives 
wanted and demanded. Rather, the report only echoed the 
previous administration statements which emphasized the
^Ibid.
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indirect and long-range benefits of the program and the 
potential expansion of foreign trade in a freer inter­
national economic community.
The trade agreements resolution drafted by the 
national A.F.B.F. convention acknowledged the Schultz 
study, but it also reflected the tensions manifested by 
recent developments within the program. The resolution 
guardedly stated: "From all facts thus far available, it
appears that while the greatest portion of increased ex­
ports has been in industrial products, from which agri­
culture has only indirectly benefited, yet this study, 
together with other information available to the Federa­
tion, reveals that the net effect of the agreements has 
been helpful rather than hurtful."^ In reference to 
agreements previously negotiated or contemplated, the 
resolution renewed "with increased emphasis" the A.F.B.F. 
demand that no treaties be negotiated which had the effect 
of holding the domestic prices of farm commodities below 
the parity level. The delegates echoed the feelings of 
many in the Midwest when they insisted that economic fac­
tors be weighed equally with those of diplomacy and state­
craft in the negotiation of all trade treaties. In order 
to secure the proper consideration of economic factors and 
the interests of agriculture, the A.F.B.F. urged an
^A.F .B .F ., Resolutions Adopted at the Annual 
Meeting, December 1939 (Chicago, Illinois).
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amendment to the present act to provide for unanimous 
approval by the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Agri-
7
culture before a particular agreement became effective.
The proposed trade agreement with Argentina did not 
escape the attention of the convention. In the opinion of 
the delegates, it would be "extremely difficult to nego­
tiate an agreement with the Argentine which is not fought 
[sic] with grave danger to American agriculture, for the 
reason that the bulk of Argentine exports are directly
g
competitive with the products of American farms." The 
resolution relative to the Argentine treaty also reminded 
Farm Bureau members of the brief filed at the public hear­
ings by the national office.
At best, the A.F.B.F. resolution offered only 
qualified support for the New Deal tariff policy. How­
ever, in view of the increasing criticism, much of it from 
the Midwest, the administration greeted the A.F.B.F. reso­
lution with enthusiasm. Secretary of State Hull, after 
referring to the reciprocity program as an "emergency pro­
gram designed to deal with a grave and continuing emergency 
situation," saluted the A.F.B.F. for its favorable resolu-
Q
tion. He reassured farmers that "in the future--as has 
been the case to date--all pertinent factors bearing on
7Ibid. ^Ibid.
Q
A.F.B.F., Official News Letter, December I9 ,
1939, p. 1.
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the problem of safeguarding and promoting the interests of
our producers and of the nation as a whole will be fully
taken into consideration in the administration of the 
,,10program.
President Roosevelt publicly complemented the 
Schultz study and used the occasion to reprimand the crit­
ics of his reciprocity program. He remarked that "the re­
sults of this careful and unbiased study afford a perfect 
illustration of what happens when the reckless and irre­
sponsible charges that have been made against the trade- 
agreements program are properly sifted and exposed to the 
test of f a c t s . A c c o r d i n g  to Roosevelt, the evidence 
that agriculture had benefited rather than suffered under 
the program was "unanswerable." In an attempt to reassure 
questioning farmers, he pointed out that "every effort has
been made, and will continue to be made, to safeguard the
12interest of agriculture."
Several weeks after the national convention, O'Neal 
contacted members of the midwestern congressional delega­
tion and informed them of the A.F.B.F. position relative 
to the trade agreements program. The O'Neal telegram did 
not reflect the reservations evident in the Schultz study
^°Ibid.
^^Franklin Roosevelt to Edward O'Neal, December 26, 
1939, R.L., P.P.F. 1011.
^^Ibid.
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and the A.F.B.F. resolution, but rather noted that far­
mers from thirty-nine states had "endorsed without a dis­
senting vote continuance of reciprocal trade agreements"
with the provision that all the agreements be approved by
13
the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Agriculture.
O'Neal's telegram prompted an immediate response 
from several midwestern congressmen. Francis Case of 
South Dakota questioned whether South Dakota Farm Bureau 
members had voted directly on the program at the conven­
tion, because it was his impression that his constituency 
"distinctly" favored changing the procedure to require
Senate ratification before any reciprocity treaty could
l4be implemented. North Dakota Representative William 
Lemke responded in a more explicit manner. He informed 
O'Neal that he was "very sorry but while the Wallace 
brigade in 39 states might have endorsed the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements I happen to know that the farmers are 
practically unanimously opposed to them." He added that 
he could not support a bill which was sponsored by the 
"international bankers, the coupon clippers and the inter­
national manufacturers" and had as its object the sacrifice
1 1
Edward O'Neal to Francis Case, February 19, 1940, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Drawer 31, Case Papers; Edward 
O'Neal to Clifford Hope, February 19, 1940, Trade Agree­
ments Folder, Box l82, Hope Papers; Edward O'Neal to 
William Lemke, February 19, 1940, Folder l6, Box l8,
Lemke Papers.
l4Francis Case to Edward O'Neal, February 22, 1940, 
Trade Agreements Folder, Drawer 31, Case Papers.
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of the domestic agricultural market to "foreign horse 
15traders."
As suggested by South Dakota's Francis Case, some 
Farm Bureau members did not concur with the Schultz con­
clusion that the trade agreements program had "generally" 
benefited agriculture. Most of the midwestern state 
organizations debated the issue at length and issued reso­
lutions on the subject. The Iowa Farm Bureau endorsed 
without qualification the policy of reciprocal trade 
agreements and urged renewal of the program as a means of 
encouraging and expanding foreign t r a d e . D e l e g a t e s  at 
the state convention agreed with Schultz that the trade 
agreements negotiated thus far had been helpful rather 
than harmful to agriculture. However, they did endorse 
the provision in the national resolution which called for 
cabinet approval of all trade agreements.
Several other midwestern Farm Bureaus did not share 
the enthusiasm expressed by the Iowa group. The Kansas 
convention endorsed the principle of reciprocity but de­
manded that "such treaties should be negotiated primarily
for the purpose of restoring the export outlets for sur­
ly
plus agricultural commodities," The Nebraska Farm Bureau
^^William Lemke to Edward O'Neal, February 23, 
1540, Folder I6 , Box I8 , Lemke Papers.
^^lowa Farm Bureau, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, January, 1940 (Des Moines ) . ---------------------
17Kansas Farm Bureau, Resolutions of the Annual 
Meeting, November 10, 1939 (Manhattan) .
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voiced some displeasure with the present conduct of the 
reciprocity program and demanded that industrial manufac­
turers not be granted benefits at the expense of agricul­
ture.^^ Also, the delegates opposed all tariff conces­
sions on farm products whose price was already below par­
ity. The trade agreements resolution adopted at the 
twenty-first annual meeting of the Minnesota Farm Bureau 
in January, 1^40, echoed the Nebraska Bureau demand that 
no tariff concessions be granted on products currently 
priced below the parity level, and added several other 
considerations. Implying criticism of the present pro­
cedure, the convention requested that "full hearings be 
given to spokesmen for producers of agricultural com­
modities affected in any way by treaty concessions, with 
a guarantee of consideration of such representations, and 
assurance that no treaty shall be completed until a full
and complete record of such hearings has been made avail- 
19able." Even more important, the Minnesotans recommended 
Senate ratification of all proposed treaties.
In view of the above resolutions, it was apparent 
that many midwestern Farm Bureau members were unhappy with
18Dr. Arthur Bunce, Assistant Professor of Rural 
Economics at Iowa State College addressed the state con­
vention and told the assembled farmers that the trade 
agreements program should be supported and that it had 
not sold the farmer down the river. Nebraska Agriculture, 
VIII (December 21, 1939)i 1.
19Minnesota Farm Bureau, Resolutions Adopted at the 
Annual Meeting, January l8, 1940 (St. Paul).
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the New Deal conduct of the trade agreements program and 
that the national organization could not keep all units 
in line. Initially in 1934, many farmers had seen great 
potential in the program for the opening of foreign mar­
kets. However, after six years it seemed to critics that 
industry reaped more benefits than agriculture. While 
few actually opposed the idea of reciprocity, by 19^0 
more and more farmers were questioning both the principle 
and the application of reciprocal trade agreements.
Early in January, 1940, ranchers from the Midwest 
and West gathered in Denver, Colorado, for the annual con­
vention of the American National Live Stock Association. 
The American Cattle Producer captured the mood of the 
meeting when the editor in his convention issue stated 
that there was "no issue of greater importance to the
agricultural industry of this country than the question
20of the reciprocal trade agreements." He complained 
that the recently negotiated trade treaties were opening 
the doors "wider and wider" to an increasing flood of 
agricultural imports. He also criticized the A.F.B.F. 
endorsement of the program. According to the editor, 
the "great majority" of the Farm Bureau membership did 
not agree with the endorsement; however, the A.F.B.F. 
leadership played "so closely with the present
1940), 25.
20The American Cattle Producer, XXI (January,
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administration that they appear to be led into untenable 
21positions." He also suggested that Secretary of Agri­
culture Wallace had been forced by the administration to 
support the reciprocal trade agreements program against 
his better judgment. He predicted that despite adminis­
tration efforts to becloud the issue "eventually the views 
of the nation's farmers crying out in protest at the sur­
render of their markets will be heard above that of their
22misguided leaders."
The A.N.L.A. convention opened with reports from
President Hubbard Russell and Secretary F. E. Mollin.
Both discussed the trade agreements program at length.
President Russell analyzed the impact of cattle imports
2 3under the two Canadian treaties. According to Russell, 
the only real damage to the domestic market had occurred 
in the spring of 1936. Since that time the market had 
been able to absorb the imports because of very unusual 
conditions including a relatively light domestic slaughter 
and an extremely light pork supply. However, Russell 
pointed to increasing domestic production and predicted 
"that continued heavy imports will have a disastrous effect 
on our markets." He indicated that the import situation 
could worsen considerably in the near future because he 
believed the administration had only temporarily suspended 
the negotiations with Argentina out of political expediency,
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 7 -
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In view of the threat of increased livestock imports,
Russell informed the assembled ranchers that there was
"nothing more important to the association than to devote
itself to seeking either a change in policy or termination
24
of the reciprocal trade program."
Secretary Mollin also referred to the recently pro­
posed Argentine treaty in his message and assured the ran­
chers that the Association had registered a firm protest 
25
against it. He suggested that only a special session 
of Congress called to consider neutrality legislation 
prevented the State Department from pushing the agreement 
through while Congress recessed. Mollin reminded the 
delegates that the "fight" to renew the program was cur­
rently in full swing and that he intended to appear at 
the congressional hearings in the near future. Accord­
ing to the Secretary, the battle was shaping up with the 
administration, the industrial exporters and the American 
Farm Bureau Federation supporting renewal while "practi­
cally all" other farm, dairy and livestock organizations, 
many business groups and others opposed the agreements. 
Mollin also disagreed with those who claimed that Senate 
ratification of trade agreements would nullify the program.
^^Ibid.
25A.N.L.A., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
January 11-13, 1940 (Denver,Colorado), pT 2.
^^Ibid., p. 4.
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In his estimation, such a provision would place a desirable 
check on the conclusion of trade agreements and insure a 
degree of protection to domestic producers.
Three midwestern spokesmen, Harry Coffee, George 
Peek and Dr. John Coulter, addressed the convention and 
analyzed the trade agreements program and its relationship 
to agriculture. Peek had been a constant critic of the 
A.A.A. and of the most-favored-nation principle ever since 
1933) and his differences with Secretary Wallace which 
resulted in his resignation as administrator of the A.A.A. 
had never been reconciled. In an address entitled "Agri­
culture and Foreign Trade" Peek severely criticized the 
administration and suggested that in the coming election
year the farmers of America would have an opportunity to
27register their verdict on the New Deal farm programs.
He accused the Roosevelt administration of blatant incon­
sistency. On the one hand. New Deal legislation attempted 
to raise domestic prices independent of world price levels. 
On the other hand, the administration foreign trade program 
implemented a "policy of low tariffs, free trade, and in­
ternationalism, disregarding wage, price, and living condi­
tions in this country compared with those in the world at 
28large." According to Peek, this practice was "like try­
ing to ride two horses going in opposite directions at the
^^Ibid., pp. 62-63. ^^Ibid., p. 64.
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same time. It cannot be done, and the attempt does not 
29make sense."
^eek also took Secretary of Agriculture Wallace to 
task for his stand on the trade agreements issue. He 
stated that the Secretary had steadfastly refused to sup­
port the farmers' attack on a program which undermined 
farm prices and farm prosperity. In fact, the Secretary 
had subordinated the farmer to Secretary Hull's "doctri­
naire low tariff ideals." According to Peek, Secretary 
Wallace had committed an unforgivable blunder when he
sought to justify the Argentine treaty as a measure of
30"war insurance."
Peek informed his listeners that he had originally 
supported the reciprocal trade agreements program as a 
means of moving the "oppressive surpluses" of American 
export commodities. However, instead of seeking to 
achieve this goal, the Roosevelt administration had used 
the program as a means to effect general tariff reduction 
without congressional approval. Peek pointed out that the 
reduction had been achieved through the use of the uncon­
ditional most-favored-nation clause "under which any con­
cession granted to any one nation was straightaway granted
to every other nation in the world, without requiring any
31concessions from them in return." He complained that
29lbid. ^°Ibid., pp. 65-66. ^^Ibid., p. 68
21k
the administration was ignoring hundreds of bi-lateral 
agreements between other nations which excluded the United 
States. In Peek's view, a continuation of the most-favored- 
nation principle would serve only to further weaken the 
United States bargaining position and to extend concessions 
to undeserving nations who refused to grant any concessions 
of their own.
In addition to discussing the program's proposed 
goals and its failure to achieve them, Peek suggested an 
organizational change relative to the conduct of foreign 
trade. He suggested that the Tariff Commission be con­
verted into a "real Foreign Trade Board" and be responsible,
under direction from Congress and the President, for the
3 2entirety of United States trade activities. According 
to Peek, this reorganization would enable the State De­
partment to concentrate on diplomatic and political mat- 
ters--"its traditional sphere." In conclusion. Peek told 
his listeners that the Roosevelt administration had had 
its chance to serve American agriculture. Having failed, 
farmers must seek to "replace theroists with realists,
inconsistency with consistency, incompetency with ability,
3 3fiction with truth, and the time is now."
Harry Coffee, an officer in the Nebraska Livestock 
Association, followed George Peek to the rostrum and
^^Ibid., p. 77. ^^Ibid., p. ?8.
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outlined his proposal to amend the present trade agree­
ments act when the renewal question came before Congress.
He told his fellow ranchers that agriculture and particu­
larly the livestock industry, could be "properly" protected 
with implementation of Senate ratification. He pointed out 
that the President had delegated the tariff-making grant to 
the Secretary of State. According to Coffee, "because of 
the detailed complexities and ramifications of tariffs, the 
Secretary of State has of necessity largely delegated his 
power to a secret committee. . . .  No elected representa­
tives of the people participate in the deliberations or in 
the promulgation of the list of items upon which tariff 
concessions are to be granted to foreign countries."
Coffee added that many congressmen felt their testi­
mony at the public hearings received very little considera­
tion and had little effect upon the individuals who actually 
negotiated the trade agreements. He added that the "hear­
ings are often referred to on the 'Hill' as a convenient
35place for those opposing concessions to 'blow off steam.'"
In contrast to the present situation, Coffee suggested that 
the provision for Senate ratification would assure agricul­
ture "an adequate opportunity to be heard on the actual 
terms of the agreements before they became effective." He 
added that such an amendment would also remove the legal
^^Ibid., p. 1 09. ^^Ibid.
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objections voiced by many relative to the grant by Con­
gress of tariff, taxation and treaty-making powers to the 
executive branch.
The Nebraska congressman admitted that the objec­
tives of the reciprocal trade agreements program were 
laudable and that some of the agreements had achieved 
satisfactory concessions. However, he commented that 
many had been "a boomerang to American agriculture" and 
several under consideration posed even a more serious 
threat. Thus, in view of the program's past performance
it would be up to the Congress "to preserve the good and
37eliminate the bad features. . . ."
On the last day of the convention. Dr. John Coulter 
addressed a general convocation of the ranchers. The ap­
pearance of and statements by Dr. Coulter were extremely 
important to the critics of the trade agreements program.
As a qualified economist, past President of North Dakota 
State College and ex-member of the Committee for Reciprocity 
Information, Coulter provided the opposition a degree of 
legitimacy and expertise. In a sense, he was the "resident 
intellectual" engaged to offset the presence and statements 
of Professor T. W. Schultz on the other side of the issue. 
Twenty-two civic and farm organizations in North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Minnesota had retained Dr. Coulter to
^^Ibid., p. 122. ^^Ibid., p. Il6
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study the trade agreements program and to represent them
38at the congressional hearings.
Coulter informed the ranchers that he had come 
directly from Washington where the trade agreements pro­
gram was the primary topic of discussion. He pointed out 
that President Roosevelt had devoted almost a third of his 
annual message to the subject. Like Peek and Coffee, 
Coulter stressed the trade agreements program's short­
comings and called for changes in its implementation. 
According to Coulter, the concessions granted by the 
United States had had several undesirable results. First, 
the concessions had "served to force farm prices down or
to prevent them from rising, or at least to slow down the
39advance which was taking place." At the same time, the 
program encouraged increasing quantities of agricultural 
imports. In Coulter's estimation, the farmer had been 
indirectly hurt because some of the imports displaced 
factory products "thus causing unemployment and hurting 
the farm market by lowering the purchasing power of the
kofactory wage earners."
Coulter reiterated the ever-increasing midwestern 
complaint that the trade agreements program had become a
n Q
U.S., Congressional Record, ?6th Cong., 3d Sess., 
Appendix, p. 735-
39A.N.L.A., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 
January 11-13, 1940 (Denver, Colorado), p. l45■
^°Ibid.
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diplomatie instrument for the State Department which had
no conception of the desires and needs of farmers. He
belittled the previous administration argument that the
program was a positive force toward international peace.
In fact, Coulter stated that since the implementation of
the reciprocity program there had been "more revolutions
and wars (declared and undeclared) among foreign countries
4lthan during any recent comparable period." Coulter even 
suggested that the United States was running a dangerous 
risk of getting involved in the European war by negotiating 
agreements with Czechoslovakia, Finland, France and other 
countries.
Coulter concurred with Peek and Coffee that the 
trade agreements program had resulted in broad tariff re­
vision by executive action. More specifically. Secretary 
of State Hull, who was concerned primarily with interna­
tional diplomacy, directed the reciprocity program. Ac­
cording to Coulter, the program had evolved into " a new 
type of dollar diplomacy." "Foreign countries are promised 
all manner of special advantages in the markets of the 
United States in return for agreeing to suggestions from 
the United States as to how these foreign countries should
4 2conduct their own affairs." " He concluded that interfer­
ence of this nature on the part of the United States could 
lead to undesirable involvement.
^^Ibid., p. 136. ^^Ibid., p. I38
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In order to right the course of the trade agree­
ments program and to enhance its effectiveness, Coulter 
offered several changes. He repeated Coffee's proposal 
for Senate ratification, but added that in view of the 
revenue matters involved the House of Representatives 
should also be granted the right of approval. At the 
same time, a "conditional" rather than "unconditional" 
most-favored-nation principle should be employed. In 
that way, concessions would not be extended to any third 
party unless that nation entered into an agreement grant­
ing equivalent concessions to the United States. Coulter 
also called for the establishment of some specific criteria
as a basis for rate changes such as differences in cost of
Zj-3
production or differences in living standards. In his
view, an attempt to fix rate changes with these differ­
ences in mind made more sense than the "present point of 
view which is largely to appease foreign countries by 
making concessions which are damaging to our own economic 
life."
The addresses of Peek, Coulter and Coffee were well 
received and the trade agreements resolution finally 
adopted by the delegates reflected the criticism expressed 
by the speakers. The resolution stated that, "whereas, a 
large majority of our people, and particularly of our agri­
culturists, are unalterably opposed to reciprocal trade
4:3^Ibid., p. 151.
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agreements; therefore be it resolved that we are definitely
opposed to an extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
44
Act." Should the Congress consider it necessary to ex­
tend the program, the A.N.L.A. demanded Senate ratification 
of all agreements. A short time after the convention mem­
bers of the A.N.L.A. leadership traveled to Washington and 
presented a massive brief on behalf of their position at 
the congressional hearings. At the same time, the midwest- 
ern congressional delegation received form letters from the 
A.N.L.A. urging support to either end the reciprocity pro­
gram or at least for a requirement of Senate ratification
45
for all agreements.
But these views obviously had no effect on the
President. In his annual message to Congress on January 3,
1940, some four months after the outbreak of war in Europe,
Roosevelt made a strong plea for the renewal of the recip-
46
rocal trade agreements program. The President pointed 
out that in the years after World War I increasing economic 
nationalism blocked the channels of international trade
44
A.N.L.A., Resolutions Adopted at the Annual 
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causing a huge backlog of unsalable surpluses. In an 
attempt to loosen the log-jam, the Roosevelt administration 
had initiated the trade agreements program. Having reiter­
ated the basic purpose of the new tariff policy, the Presi­
dent sought to answer the constitutional critics. Accord­
ing to Roosevelt, it was "not correct to infer that legis­
lative powers have been transferred from the Congress to
4?the Executive branch of the Government." While acknowl­
edging that general tariff legislation was a congressional 
function, he suggested that it was "advisable to provide 
at times of emergency some flexibility to make the general 
law adjustable to quickly changing conditions. We are in 
such a time today. Oui present trade agreement method 
provides a temporary flexibility and is, therefore, prac­
tical in the best sense. It should be kept alive to serve 
our trade interests--agricultural and industrial--in many
48valuable ways during the existing wars."
Roosevelt stressed even more vigorously the pro­
gram's positive contribution to the foundation of peace.
He reminded Americans that the United States must exert 
leadership in the international community to open trade 
channels "in order that no one nation need feel compelled 
in later days to seek by force of arms what it can and will 
gain by peaceful conference. For that purpose, too, we
47 48
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need the Trade Agreements Act even more today than when 
it was passed."
The House Ways and Means Committee opened its 
hearings on the renewal question January 20 followed by 
the Senate Finance Committee a month later. The 1940 
hearings were much more spirited than those in 1934 and 
19371 and included substantial comment from midwestern 
representatives. In contrast to the earlier years, by 
1940 developments within the program had helped to harden 
positions among those testifying. For the first time, the 
A.F.B.F. offered substantial testimony at the congressional 
hearings and representatives from the Grange and the Far­
mers Union also put in an appearance.
In contrast to the earlier hearings. Secretary of 
Agriculture Wallace and Secretary of State Hull testified 
before both Committees. Secretary Wallace emphatically 
endorsed the New Deal's tariff policy and immediately 
turned to the "perennial" question of agricultural imports. 
The Secretary repeated the administration position on the 
import issue by attributing those imports to two general 
developmentS--the "disastrous" droughts of 1934 and 1936, 
and to the overall improvement of economic conditions
50within the United States. In an attempt to "dispel the
^^Ibid., p. 6.
^^U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Com­
mittee on Ways and Means, Hearings on H.J. Res. 40?: A
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myth that trade agreements were responsible for the tem­
porary rise in imports during the middle thirties.” Wal­
lace reminded the critics that imports of wheat from
Canada, Argentine corn and hides and wool from Australia
51came in at the Smoot-Hawley rates. In contrast to the
views of some agricultural representatives, the Secretary
stated that he did not know of a single case where duty
reductions had "seriously inconvenienced an American agri-
5 2cultural industry."
Wallace also referred to the recent turmoil caused 
by the proposed Argentine treaty and implied that he did 
not concur with those who predicted disaster for agricul­
ture if the treaty was formalized. He criticized the in­
dividuals who suggested that the suspension of negotia­
tions was just a subterfuge to insure renewal of the trade 
agreements program. According to Wallace, such accusa­
tions overlooked two important facts. First, the nego­
tiations broke down because the United States demanded 
quantitative limitations on competitive farm commodities 
to be imported under reduced rates. Secondly, Wallace 
maintained that Secretary Hull’s integrity would prohibit
Joint Resolution to Extend the Authority of the President 
Under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930. As Amended. 
7^th C o n g 3d Sess. (January 20, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26, 




any "sell out." Contrary to the critics, Wallace sug­
gested that "if the handling of the Argentine negotiations 
proves anything, it proves that this Administration is 
looking out for the interest of agriculture and is not 
sacrificing the interest of agriculture to those of 
industry."
Representative Harold Knutson of Minnesota, a con­
sistent critic of the trade agreements program, built his 
criticism around Secretary of Agriculture's testimony. 
Knutson suggested that the only lobbyist in Washington 
for extension of the program were those of the "biggest 
interests" such as the automobile and lumber industries. 
According to Knutson, the "only'' people protesting the 
renewal were the American farmers. He reminded Wallace 
that the Democrats had promised in 1932 that no agricul­
tural tariffs would be reduced and yet in the twenty-two
agreements so far negotiated the rates on 1Ô0 agricultural
55commodities had been reduced. He referred in particular 
to the rate change on hogs. Under the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
the rate stood at two cents a pound; however, the Canadian 
agreement had reduced the rate to one cent. Knutson re­
marked that the hog raisers of Wallace's home state of 
Iowa probably did not appreciate the cut. Wallace replied 
that the reduction was "a great blessing to the farmers of
53lbid., p. 119. ^^Ibid., p. 133-
^^Ibid., p. 134.
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Iowa, because in return for that we get a reduction in 
the Canadian tariff on swine and we are in position to
56export more to Canada than Canada is to us."
The Minnesota Representative pointed to a decline 
in agricultural exports as evidence that the trade agree­
ments program had failed to fulfill its promise to the 
farmer. According to Knutson's figures, the United States 
exported $752,000,000 of agricultural commodities in 1937; 
however, in 1939 after five years of reciprocity the amount 
had fallen to $683,000,000.^^ Wallace admitted that the 
volume had decreased somewhat, but he maintained that the 
farmers were "giving away" their surpluses during the 
period when the total volume was higher than the current 
level. In Wallace's estimation, the farmer had little to 
gain by continuing such a giveaway.
Secretary of State Hull also encountered the Min­
nesota Representative when he appeared before the Ways and 
Means Committee. Knutson reminded Hull that when the pro­
gram was proposed in 1934 it had been pictured as a posi­
tive influence toward world peace; however, since that
5 9time there had been constant warfare. Knutson added 
that he could not recall any wars during the implementa­
tion of the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley tariffs.
Hull replied that he still felt the "emerging" trade
^^Ibid., p. 135. ^^Ibid., p. 136.
^^Ibid., pp. 146-47. ^^Ibid., p. 15.
226
agreements program made a strong contribution toward the 
foundation of peace by "inducing many nations to abandon 
the controversial and discriminatory and burdensome trade 
practices which too often lead to war. . . . The two
men also had an exchange on the import issue and Secretary 
Hull criticized the Minnesota Representative for issuing 
misleading statements. "I call your attention to your 
statement of a few weeks ago, which was put all over the 
Nation, charging that there had been an increase from
296.000 head to 604,000 head of cattle imported into this 
country under the reduced rate during the first 9 months 
of 1939 when, according to the official reports, our 
total imports of cattle at the indicated rate were only
284.000 head during the first 9 months. Now, I hope you 
will withdraw that statement on account of its inaccuracy."^^
When the administration officials later appeared 
before the Senate Finance Committee hearings they en­
countered another midwestern critic. Arthur Capper again 
hammered away at theNew Deal's Tariff program's inability 
to open foreign wheat markets. He informed Secretary of 
Agriculture Wallace and the Committee that twenty-two 
Kansas farm groups had asked him to oppose the reciprocity 
program's renewal because it was not working for them.^^
^°Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 21.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Hearings on H.J. Res. 40?‘ A Joint Resolution to Extend
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Wallace reminded the Kansas Senator that the United Kingdom 
had traditionally been the best wheat market and that the 
recently negotiated trade agreement had removed a six cent 
tariff rate against American wheat. Wallace refused to 
state whether wheat exports had actually increased but sug­
gested that at least United States wheat was now in a much 
better competitive position due to the rate reduction.
Capper also confronted Secretary of State Hull with 
the question of wheat export markets. Like Wallace, Secre­
tary Hull referred to the significant concessions recently 
granted by the British. However, he added that due to cir­
cumstances beyond the administration's control, wheat ex­
ports had not greatly increased. According to Hull, "the 
war situation which developed in Europe has diverted the 
purchasing power from wheat, lard, and other products, as 
it normally existed, and put it into armaments.
The most important testimony from the administra­
tion's point of view was that of Edward O'Neal of the Amer­
ican Farm Bureau Federation. The value of the qualified 
support offered by the Farm Bureau was immeasurable in the 
face of the considerable criticism from the farm sector.
The 1940 hearings marked the first official appearance of
the Authority of the President under Section 350 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended, 7&th Cong., 3d Sess. (Feb­
ruary 26, 27, 28, and 29, March 1,'2, 4, 5, and 6, 1940), 
p. 53. Cited hereafter as Senate Hearings, 1940.
G^ibid., p. 36.
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the A.F.B.F. at the congressional hearings on the trade 
agreements program. To record the official Farm Bureau 
position, President O ’Neal presented the national A.F.B.F. 
resolution including the provision for cabinet approval of 
all agreements.
In the course of his testimony, O'Neal disagreed 
with those midwestern farm leaders, some within his own 
organization, and congressmen who suggested that the trade 
agreements program and the accompanying imports were in­
consistent with other phases of the New Deal. He stated 
that the reciprocity policy dovetailed with the agricul­
tural adjustment program. "Under the one program, far­
mers are keeping their production in line with existing 
demand, and under the other program the Government is 
attempting to regain foreign markets so that farmers can
6kproduce more at profitable prices." With regard to 
agricultural imports, O'Neal pointed out that the total 
volume of imports under the trade agreements program was 
"substantially less" than during the period 1924-1929.
O'Neal noted that a number of individuals and or­
ganizations were proposing Senate ratification of all 
trade agreements. In his view, such a provision would 
nullify the effectiveness of the present approach and 
"would mean a return to the old system of log rolling.
^^House Hearings, 1940, p. l673*
^^Ibid., p. 1680,
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Instead, he proposed that the A.F.B.F. proposal for 
cabinet approval would insure the proper protection for 
all producers and yet not restrict the implementation 
of the program.
O'Neal referred several times to the study con­
ducted by T. W_- Schultz. He praised the report and 
pointed out that the Farm Bureau had based its trade 
agreements resolution on that study. At the conclusion 
of his testimony, O'Neal placed in the record the entire 
Schultz study. The report isolated each agreement and 
analyzed its impact upon American agriculture. Schultz's 
remarks on the Canadian treaty and the proposed Argentine 
agreement differed considerably from the statements of 
several other midwestern witnesses at the hearings. The 
study acknowledged limited damage to American cattle pro­
ducers because of Canadian imports; however, it concluded 
that there had been no "devastating or disastrous" effects, 
and the statements that the United States cattlemen had 
been "sold down the river" were wholly misleading. The 
report also defended the administration's decision to 
seek an agreement with Argentina.
George Peek also appeared before the Ways and Means 
Committee and registered his opposition to the New Deal 
tariff policy. Contrary to the testimony of O'Neal and 
the Schultz study, Peek suggested that the Canadian treaty
^^Ibid., pp. 1789-790. ^^Ibid., pp. I836-837.
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offered little to American agriculture.^^ He recalled 
Roosevelt's 1932 campaign promise not to reduce tariff 
rates on agricultural commodities. Contrary to this 
promise, the Canadian treaty and several others already 
consumated had included numerous concessions to foreign 
agricultural imports.
The midwestern farm spokesman lodged a vigorous 
protest against the present conduct of the reciprocity 
program. In particular, he demanded that all trade 
treaties be subjected to congressional approval. Accord­
ing to Peek, the trade agreements must be considered 
either treaties or tariff acts. "If they are regarded as 
treaties, the Constitution clearly says that treaties must 
receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Sen­
ate. If they are regarded as tariff acts, the Constitu­
tion provides that all revenue legislation must originate
6 9in the House of Representatives."
Peek again objected to employment of the uncondi­
tional most-favored-nation principle. In his view, because 
of this clause, the United States bargaining power "de­
clined progressively" with each agreement concluded. Peek 
pointed out that at the same time the United States was 
granting concessions on a most-favored-nation basis, the 
other nations of the world operated under "hundreds of
^®Ibid., p. 1428. ^^Ibid., p. 1427.
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70bilateral agreements" •which excluded the United States.
He belittled the performance of the program by suggesting 
that it had failed to open foreign markets to American 
farm products. Peek also recorded several of his past 
public statements which further delineated his opposition 
to the New Deal's tariff policy. Thus, two respected and 
important midwestern farm spokesmen, Edward O'Neal and 
George Peek, had appeared before the Ways and Means Com­
mittee and presented contrasting evaluations of the past 
performance of the reciprocal trade agreements program.
Representatives of the National Farmers Union and 
the Grange also appeared at the hearings; however, their 
testimony reflected little research or precise under­
standing of the New Deal's tariff policy. L. J. Taber,
Master of the Grange, echoed the same views he had ex-
71pressed at the program's inception in 193^. He informed 
the Committee that the Grange opposed the reciprocity meas­
ure for six reasons including the apparent increase in 
agricultural imports and violation of the Constitution.
M. W. Thatcher, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of 
the Farmers Union, presented a brief statement which crit­
icized the proposal calling for Senate ratification of 
each agreement. Thatcher's remarks certainly did not rep­
resent a consensus of midwestern Farmers Union members for
^^Ibid., p. 1430.
^^Senate Hearings, 1940, pp. 570-72
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early in January, 1940, national officers and midwestern
leaders met in St. Paul, Minnesota, and endorsed the
"philosophy of reciprocal trade pacts" but demanded Senate
72ratification of all such agreements. A number of mid-
western organizations went even further and demanded an
7 3end to the program. While opposing Senate ratification, 
Thatcher suggested that the A.F.B.F. proposal for cabinet 
approval would offer the necessary protection to 
agriculture.
Once again as in 1934 and 1937 Charles Holman of 
the dairy industry and F . E. Mollin of the American Na­
tional Live Stock Association presented elaborate testi­
mony on the damage rendered their constituents by the 
trade agreements program. Even though they strongly op­
posed the program's renewal, both implicitly acknowledged 
that in all likelihood it would be continued. With this
7 2North Dakota Union Farmer, VI (January 1,
1940), 4.
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74Thatcher's testimony apparently raised some 
questions in the Midwest. Floyd Dean complained to Rep­
resentative Lemke that Thatcher appeared to be on both 
sides of the trade agreements issue. He added that 
Thatcher must be lobbying for his personal views and not 
those of the farmer. Floyd Dean to William Lemke,
April 8, 1940, Folder 11, Box 19, Lemke Papers.
233
in mind, both organizations vigorously supported an amend­
ment providing for Senate ratification.
All the farm representatives at the hearings, in­
cluding Edward O'Neal, had urged the administration to 
make a sincere effort to respect the interests of agricul­
ture in all future agreements. As indicated, to these in­
dividuals, the "proper" safeguards ranged from Senate rati­
fication to general cabinet approval. Whatever the recom­
mendations, the active participation of midwestern repre­
sentatives reflected the concern of their section and in­
dicated that the renewal question would encounter careful 
scrutiny in Congress.
Congress debated the program's renewal periodically 
for over two months and representatives from the Midwest 
figured prominently in the discussion--especially on behalf 
of the opposition. Much of the debate centered around old 
issues which had been stated and restated since the first 
years of the reciprocity policy. By 1940 both sides were 
voicing their positions and arguments dogmatically with 
little regard to what the other said. Midwestern con­
gressmen in particular offered the common criticisms of 
the program such as the presence of agricultural imports, 
the inadvisibility of the most-favored-nation clause, and 
constitutional objections. Also, a number of midwest- 
erners complained that the trade agreements were being 
employed by the State Department for diplomatic reasons 
regardless of the economic consequences.
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While many of the old issues received considerable 
comment, a number of recent developments within the pro­
gram also prompted remarks from the midwestern critics. 
Several congressmen referred to the recently suspended 
Argentine negotiations. Kansas Representative John Houston, 
a Democrat, defended the administration's decision to seek 
an agreement and also its conduct of the negotiations. 
According to Houston, the United States had demanded cer­
tain qualifications, quotas and restrictions in order to 
protect the American producer. Despite the extreme inter­
national importance of the agreement, when the Argentines 
refused to accept the necessary restrictions, the adminis­
tration refused to "sell American cattlemen and farmers
down the river" in order to insure conclusion of the 
75agreement.
Representative Karl Mundt of South Dakota and sev­
eral other midwestern congressmen disagreed with Houston. 
Mundt remarked that the administration officials had "re­
sorted to smart politics when they permitted the discus­
sions on the Argentine treaty to lapse just prior to the 
time the extension of this Executive treaty-making power 
was to be considered by C o n g r e s s . H e  suggested that 
the administration might seek to reopen the negotiations
U.S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 
February 19, 19^0, p . 1d66.
'^^Ibid. , February 23, 1940, p. 1932.
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in the near future, especially in view of the recent com-
77ments by Argentine President Roberto M. Ortiz. August
Andresen of Minnesota also suggested that the suspension
of negotiations was temporary and stated that "within 48
hours after the results of the November election have
been announced, Secretary Hull, at the instance of the
President, will reopen negotiations with Argentina on the
*7 o
trade treaty. . . ." Thus, the Republicans charged
that the suspension of negotiations was politically 
motivated and did not represent a true change of mind.
In their estimation, the administration would reopen the 
negotiations as soon as it looked politically feasible.
While many midwestern congressmen vigorously op­
posed renewal of the trade agreements program on the floor 
of Congress, privately they admitted little chance of suc­
cess. However, they were optimistic about the prospect of
79amending the present act to include Senate ratification.
On the last day of debate in the House, Nebraska Repre­
sentative Harry Coffee introduced an amendment to provide
77According to Representative Mundt, the Associated 
Press carried a dispatch from Argentina quoting President 
Ortiz as stating that Roosevelt would favor resumption of 
the negotiations in the near future. Ibid.
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for Senate ratification of all a g r e e m e n t s . H e  sug­
gested that such a provision was necessary in the inter­
est of good government. According to Coffee, the original 
inttnt of the act had been violated when the President 
delegated the tariff-making power to the State Department. 
To complicate matters, the State Department had inturn 
passed the responsibility to a secret committee. The 
Nebraska congressman maintained that his amendment would 
allow the necessary and proper "public scrutiny and leg­
islative approval." In contrast to the present framework, 
senatorial approval would "give the Members of Congress 
an opportunity to know what is in these agreements before
they become effective and an opportunity to present their
8lcase before a legislative committee." Coffee contended 
that most important to midwesterners the importation of 
competitive farm products. Despite the efforts of Coffee 
and several other midwestern Representatives, the Senate 
ratification amendment went down to defeat by a rather
82
close margin of 177 to 157*
A short time after the defeat of Coffee's proposal, 
Frank Carlson of Kansas offered another amendment which
80The Coffee amendment read: "No foreign trade
agreement entered into after the date of enactment of 
this joint resolution under such section 350 shall not 
be effective unless concluded by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate as in the case of treaties." U.S., 
Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., February 23, 
1940, p. 1895. “
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. l899.
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included the provision for cabinet approval recommended
83by the American Farm Bureau Federation. He noted that
there was a "feeling generally that agriculture does not
receive proper consideration at the State Department in
gli
the making of trade agreements." Minnesota Representa­
tive August Andresen reminded those opposing the Carlson 
amendment that A.F.B.F. President Edward O'Neal had been 
"one of the best supporters of the New Deal." According 
to Andresen, O'Neal had "gone out of his way many times 
to recommend and urge the passage of legislation here 
that has been detrimental to agriculture as a whole, just 
because he wanted to go along and help the New Deal with 
its p r o g r a m . H e  added that he would have liked to see 
the amendment go as far as the one recommended by the 
Minnesota Farm Bureau which called for Senate ratification 
in addition to cabinet approval. Karl Mundt of South 
Dakota added that every member of Congress had received a 
telegram from the A.F.B.F. urging inclusion of cabinet
approval. After a short debate, with only l82 congress-
86men voting the Carlson amendment was rejected.
ft i
Carlson's amendment read: "That no such foreign
trade agreement concluded after the date of the enactment 
of this joint resolution shall take effect until it shall 
have been approved in writing by the Secretaries of State, 
Agriculture and Commerce; And provided further. That no 
import concessions be made by the Trade Agreements Commit­
tee on competitive farm products which are below parity 
prices, parity prices to be determined by the Secretary 
of Agriculture." Ibid., February 23, 1940, p. 190?.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. I908.
^^The vote produced IO8 opposed to ?4 in favor. 
Ibid., p. 1909.
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Several hours after the defeat of the Coffee and
Carlson amendments, the House voted to renew the trade
agreements program without amendment; however, the vote
87was considerably closer than in 1937* ' While a majority
in the House voted to continue the trade agreements pro­
gram, the midwestern delegation opposed it by a vote of 
twenty-seven to five. The near unanimous midwestern op­
position of 19^0 contrasted rather markedly with the nar­
row eighteen to fourteen opposition margin in the 1937 
vote. In 1937 eleven midwestern Democrats and three 
Farmer-Laborites supported the reciprocal trade agreements 
program. However, in 1940 only six Democrats held seats 
in the midwestern delegation. Ifvo of them, Harry Coffee
of Nebraska and Elmer Ryan of Minnesota, abandoned their
881937 position and voted against the program's renewal.
The Senate continued to debate the renewal ques­
tion for over a month after the House vote and as in the 
House several midwestern representatives strongly supported 
an attempt \.o add a Senate ratification amendment to the 
trade agreements act. In the Senate, Kansas Senator
O m
The renewal passed with a vote of 2l8 to l68 and 
this compared with a 285 to 101 count in 1937- Ibid., 
p. 1936.
88Prior to the vote in the House, Secretary of State 
Hull noted that several Democrats were wavering on the 
trade agreements bill. He contacted both John Houston of 
Kansas and Elmer Ryan. However, as mentioned above Repre­
sentative Ryan still voted against the renewal. Mr. Boland 
to Mr. Gray, February 12, 1940, R.L., O.F. 66.
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Arthur Capper, the leading midwestern critic of the New 
Deal tariff policy, placed in the Record correspondence 
he received from twenty-two midwestern farm organizations
89--all of which supported Senate ratification. In a
lengthly speech on the Senate floor. Capper again main­
tained that the trade agreements act violated the Consti­
tution by enabling the President to negotiate treaties 
and make them effective without ratification by the Senate. 
He noted that he had had a Senate ratification amendment 
before the Senate for more than three years and thus he
strongly supported the current proposal by Key Pittman of 
90Nevada.
Senator George Norris of Nebraska, one of the only 
three midwestern congressional representatives to support 
the reciprocity program verbally, disagreed with Senator 
Capper and suggested that "the Pittman amendment would kill
91the whole measure as dead as a doornail." According to 
Norris, the Pittman proposal would return the tariff system 
to the "log-rolling" days of the past when it was impos­
sible for Congress to construct an effective and workable 
tariff. On March 291 the Pittman amendment came before the 
Senate and was narrowly defeated forty-four to forty-one.
^^Ibid., March 28, 1940, pp. 3584-592.
90The Pittman amendment on Senate ratification was 
identical to the one introduced by Harry Coffee in the 
House. Ibid., March 25, 1940, p. 3321.
^^Ibid., March 29, 1940, p. 3682.
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Six midwestern Senators, five Republicans and South Dakota 
Democrat William Bulow, voted for the amendment with George 
Norris and the two Iowa Senators, Guy Gillette and Clyde 
Herring both Democrats, voting against it- Several days 
later the Senate voted to renew the trade agreements pro­
gram by a vote of forty-two to thirty-seven. However, as
in the House, the midwestern delegation opposed its 
92continuation.
Thus, the congressmen and senators from the s 
Upper Midwest states rejected the reciprocity measure by 
a count of thirty-five to eight with four abstentions.
This represented a complete reversal by the midwestern 
delegation on the trade agreements act. At the program's 
inception in 1934 many in the Midwest had believed that 
it offered a great opportunity to reopen important for­
eign markets. However, in the opinion of many in that 
area the program had failed to fulfill this promise while 
at the same time giving numerous concessions to foreign 
agricultural imports. Factors other than the trade agree­
ments program undoubtedly contributed to both developments, 
but in the minds of the midwestern congressional delegation 
the policy posed more disadvantages than the limited agri­
cultural concessions obtained.
92
In the 1940 vote seven midwestern Senators voted 
against renewal with three voting for it. This count 
amounted to a reversal from 1937 when seven voted for the 
program and four against it. Ibid., April 5, 1940, p. 4105
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The gradual rejection of the trade agreements pro­
gram in the Upper Midwest parallelled the political decline 
of President Roosevelt in that area. In the 1932 election 
he had swept all six states with mai"gins ranging from 69 ■’6 
percent xn North Dakota to 53-6 percent in Kansas. How­
ever, his appeal melted away to the extent that in the
9 31940 election he lost five of the six states. In terms
of the popular vote, his 1932 margin of 844,$84 votes
q4
turned into a deficit of 2^  ; 8?1 votes in 1940. The
reversal was even more dramatic in terms of counties car­
ried. In 1932 Roosevelt captured 483 of the $06 counties;
however, in 1940 the Republicans carried a majority of the
95counties in all six states and a total of 391»
An examination of several congressional districts 
offers a more accurate assessment of the political conse­
quences of the trade agreements program. In Iowa, both 
the Fourth and Seventh District elected Democrats in 1932 
to 1938. The Fourth District included a substantial dairy 
industry, while livestock raisers dominated the economy of 
the Seventh District. In 1932 Roosevelt carried the Fourth 
District by 20,000 votes and the Seventh by 21,000 votes. 
However, in 1940 he lost the Fourth by 12,000 votes and the
9 3Roosevelt carried Minnesota by less than four 
percentage points and 48,000 votes. The two urban coun­
ties encompassing Minneapolis-St. Paul provided the margin 
of victory. Edgar E. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt: 
The Presidential Vote, 1932-1944 (Stanford, 1947), PP. 110-
13.
^^Ibid., pp. 43-44. ^^Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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96Seventh by 15,000 votes= The same reversal occurred in
the wheat and cattle districts of western Kansas. In 1932
Roosevelt carried both the Sixth and Seventh Districts
easily; however, eight years later he lost them both by
97substantial margins.
The Fifth District of Nebraska is perhaps the most 
accurate reflection of all. The livestock industry dom­
inated this western district. In 1932 Roosevelt swept 
the District by over 26,000 votes. In 1940, the voters 
of the Fifth District returned Democrat Harry Coffee, who
had consistently opposed the program, to the House, but
98voted against Roosevelt by nearly 20,000 votes. Appar­
ently, the cattle raisers of this district who had fol­
lowed the reciprocal trade agreements program closely 
voted for Coffee because they believed that the program 
constituted a real danger to their industry.
The political reversal in the Midwest was not, of 
course, attributable entirely to the New Deal's tariff 
policy. Such issues as the third term, the court fight, 
deficit spending and opposition to other administration 
policies influenced many voters. Moreover, the area was
^^Ibid., pp. 89-93.
97In 1932 Roosevelt won the Sixth District by over 
21,000 votes but lost it in 1940 by almost the same margin 
of 21,000 votes. In the Seventh District, the voters gave 
Roosevelt a margin of l4,000 in 1932, but favored Wilke by 
a vote of over 13,000 in 1940. Ibid., pp. 93-97-
98
 ^ Ibid., pp. 123-27.
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traditionally Republican and the reciprocal trade agree­
ments program provided a highly evident and emotional issue 
around which critics of the administration rallied. Thus, 
the controversial reciprocity program was an important fac­
tor in the political comeback of Republicans and the rejec­
tion of the New Deal in the Upper Midwest -
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
The proposal for a change in tariff policy by the 
Roosevelt administration in late 1933 sparked a great deal 
of interest in midwestern agricultural circles. Midwestern 
farmers, like other Americans in the early 1930's, were 
looking for a solution or solutions to their economic 
plight. By the early 1930's many midwesterners were re- 
'ating the agricultural depression to the protectionist 
tariff policies of the 1920's. Cognizant of the disap­
pearing world market, some farm spokesmen viewed with 
great interest the Roosevelt proposal which promised to 
reopen foreign markets to American agricultural surpluses. 
It was in this spirit of hope that the Midwest supported 
the New Deal's tariff program in its initial stages.
While many viewed the program with great expecta­
tion in its formative years, this attitude was by no means 
unanimous. Indeed, from the outset the Roosevelt tariff 
program posed a very real paradox to farmers in the Upper 
Midwest. Because of heavy surplus production, wheat far­
mers and hog raisers were extremely interested in the de­
velopment of foreign trade and the reopening of foreign
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markets to their products. To them reciprocal trade agree­
ments appeared to offer some practical and positive help. 
However, ranchers, flax farmers, sugarbeet growers and 
others producing mainly for domestic consumption expressed 
little interest in the concentrated effort to enlarge 
America's portion of world trade. To these producers, 
expansion of the home market and exclusion of competitive 
products appeared to be much more helpful. The livestock 
industry, particularly, adopted a very nationalistic and 
antagonistic position relative to the New Deal's reci­
procity program because of that industry's reliance on 
the domestic market and its fear that meat imports would 
hurt prices in the United States.
While farmers and their representatives in the 
Upper Midwest expressed reservations and even outright 
opposition to the program from the outset, these fears, 
reservations and doubts were intensified over time both 
by the principle of the legislation and its administration. 
Roosevelt's decision to let the State Department administer 
the program troubled some midwesterners. Few believed that 
the State Department could or would carefully consider the 
economic consequences for agriculture. Very early, farm 
spokesmen complained about the hearings procedure and the 
secrecy surrounding the negotiation of the trade agree­
ments. By 1938-1939 many farm leaders had concluded that 
their testimony had little influence on the final terms of
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the agreements negotiated. They agreed with Representative 
Coffee that the public hearings conducted by the Committee 
for Reciprocity Information were no more than a place for 
concerned parties to "b1ow off steam." The seeming dis­
regard for their opinions reinforced the belief held by 
some in the Midwest that officials in Washington neither 
understood nor cared about the problems of farmers.
As more and more midwesterners became familiar with 
the trade agreements program and its implementation, the 
administration's decision to employ the unconditional most- 
favored-nation principle incurred increasing criticism.
Many midwesterners refused to accept the administration's 
contention that the "principle supplier" policy limited 
the advantages gained by third parties. The suggestion 
that the United States must take the lead in fostering 
international economic good will meant little to midwest- 
erners when they considered the possibility that other 
nations were receiving tariff reductions from the United 
States without reciprocating with concessions of their own.
As the administration referred more and more to the 
importance of the trade agreements program to world peace 
and the need for the United States to assume leadership in 
international economic relationships, midwestern represen­
tatives began to express isolationist sentiments. By 1939 
some midwesterners had concluded that Secretary of State 
Hull was using the program as a diplomatic ploy to further
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United States leadership in the international community 
without sufficient regard to the economic consequences 
for midwestern farmers.
The administration of the program by the State 
Department, the implementation of the unconditional most- 
favored-nation principle, the secrecy surrounding the 
actual negotiations all combined to alienate midwester- 
ners. At the same time, it appeared to farmers and their 
representatives that Roosevelt and his administration had, 
after all their promises to farmers, sold out to the "east­
ern industrial interests." Farm spokesmen in the early 
1930's repeatedly maintained that the manufacturing inter­
ests of the East had been the principal beneficiary of pre­
vious tariff policies. With this thought in mind, midwest- 
erners expressed the hope that the Roosevelt administration 
would use the reciprocity program to attack the tariff wall 
protecting the eastern industrialists. However, most of 
the early agreements were negotiated with agricultural 
countries and thus the desired attack on industrial rates 
failed to materialize. By 1938 Harry Coffee and other mid- 
western spokesmen were complaining that the trade agree­
ments program was actually contributing to the trend towards 
"industrialization" in the United States rather than helping 
to arrest this trend.
The announcement of intention to negotiate, a trade 
treaty with Argentina in 1939 shocked many in the Midwest
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and substantially reduced their confidence not only in 
the administration's farm program but in the entire New 
Deal. Undoubtedly, citizens in the Upper Midwestern 
states were alienated by issues other than the reciproc­
ity program such as the court fight, expansion of presi­
dential authority and extended government participation 
in American life. There is evidence that by 1940 many 
midwesterners had become disenchanted with the entire 
New Deal farm program. Among other things, to them, the 
acreage restriction program of the A.A.A. contradicted 
the reciprocity program which supposedly encouraged agri­
cultural imports. The controversy over the trade agree­
ments program afforded the disenchanted an opportunity to 
express their unhappiress. In view of the fact that the 
Midwest was traditionally a Republican stronghold, con­
tinued support for a Democratic administration depended 
greatly on a popular farm program. Without question, the 
trade agreements program had become quite unpopular by 
1940 and cost Roosevelt considerable support.
Reciprocity was one of those issues so common in a 
democratic system where national and local interests come 
into conflict, or where one set of local interests such as 
manufacturing benefited over other local interests, in this 
case agriculture. Farmers saw their own welfare first, 
which is not surprising, and when they saw their interest 
threatened they forsook support for the trade agreements
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program. It has been said that interest groups can have 
a direct influence on congressional decision-making only 
insofar as they have an effect on individual congressmen.
In the case of the reciprocity issue, midwestern farmers 
were successful in that they expressed a unanimity of 
opposition to the program which convinced their represen­
tatives that it was in their best interests to do so also.
It is difficult if not impossible to gage the ef­
fects of the trade agreements program accurately. Out­
side factors such as the recurring drought, general im­
provement in economic conditions, plus international de­
velopments all affected the status of United States trade. 
While the reciprocity program may have prompted increased 
agricultural imports, the impact of these imports on mar­
kets and prices is another question. The dairy industry 
and ranchers were the most vocal critics of the program 
and yet in 1940 beef cattle prices were at their highest 
level of the decade and prices of all meat animals equalled 
103 percent of parity. At the same time, dairy products 
were 119 percent of parity. On the other hand, by the 
administration's own admission, the reciprocal tariff pol­
icy had not reopened foreign markets to the extent pre­
dicted. In 1940 wheat growers exported only 3.8 percent 
of their domestic production compared to 30*3 percent in 
1924 and 17 percent in I929.
Despite the favorable price level, some critics 
could and did argue that prices would have been even better
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had not the New Deal employed the reciprocal trade agree­
ments program. In light of the price level in 1940, the 
reciprocity program apparently did not harm agriculture 
to the extent suggested by the critics. Neither is there 
evidence that it brought any substantial relief to 
depression-ridden producers. However, the realities are 
not as important as what midwesterners thought, since 
their attitudes and actions were based upon what they be­
lieved to be true. By 1940, most nidwesterners had con­
cluded that the trade agreements program was not in their 
best interests. The New Deal's tariff program had served 
only to reinforce the Midwest's traditional position of 
economic nationalism and undoubtedly the hostility gener­
ated by that program was a major cause in alienating far­
mers in the Upper Midwest from the entire New Deal.
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